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ABSTRACT 
 
 The term model is ubiquitous in science, philosophy of science, and science 
education. Although there is no general consensus regarding its definition, the traditional 
approach in all of these disciplines has always been to view models as some kind of 
representation of reality. Recently, however, there has been a move towards non-
representational and deflationary accounts of modeling that eschew the notion that 
models must come equipped with both necessary and sufficient conditions. Following the 
philosophy of the later Wittgenstein, I develop my own narrative concerning modeling 
called the integration account. The integration account maintains that models are 
comprised of various elements that are organized in a distinctive way in order to solve 
scientific problems. Some of these elements include, but are not limited to: theories, laws, 
theory-ladenness of ideas, choice, funding availability, feasibility, social relationships, 
and even serendipity.     
The integration account encounters some difficulty when it is applied to the field 
of science education, in particular science teaching. The latter’s pedagogical project 
appears to run contrary to the integration account’s commitment to solving scientific 
problems. As a result, I propose that pedagogical models and scientific models be viewed 
as separate kinds of models, each replete with their own separate function. Scientific 
models should only be used by professional scientists to solve scientific problems and not 
used as teaching tools by science teachers. The reverse is also true. Pedagogical models 
can still be used by science teachers even if they have run their course when it comes to 
solving scientific problems.      
 
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my wife 
Amanda Belarmino 
and my parents 
Jesus and Nora Belarmino 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This project would not have been possible without the guidance and feedback of 
my Dissertation Committee. Bill, your thought-provoking comments have certainly given 
me a lot to think about when it comes to the cognitive science of science and how 
students represent their knowledge. Chris, we have known each other for a long time 
now. Our discussions on Plato, Aristotle, Arendt, and MacIntyre have been some of the 
most exhilarating in my life. Fouad, I would like to personally thank you for embracing 
me into your NOS (Nature of Science) circle. Had we not met, I never would have 
pursued my interest in philosophy of science, let alone written a dissertation in the field. 
And last, but certainly not least, I would like to acknowledge Nick Burbules, my advisor 
and dissertation Chair. Thank you for always believing in this project and me. There were 
several moments when I had serious reservations about both, but your undeterred 
confidence in me never allowed me to give up.         
Most importantly, I need to express my gratitude to my family, especially my 
wife, Amanda, who has been a constant source of inspiration and reassurance. The 
completion of this project is a testament of your unrelenting care and support. I would 
also like to recognize my parents, whose lives were the very embodiment of eudaimonia. 
May you rest in peace.     
 
v 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1  
 
 
Part I 
 
Chapter 2. Three Accounts of Representation ................................................................................ 10 
 
Chapter 3. The Integration Account of Modeling .......................................................................... 43 
 
Chapter 4. Pierre Duhem’s Critique of Modeling .......................................................................... 76 
 
 
Part II 
 
Chapter 5. The Role of Models in Science Education .................................................................... 95 
 
Chapter 6. Three Case Studies on Modeling ................................................................................ 122 
 
Chapter 7. Models Revisited ........................................................................................................ 152 
 
 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 178 
 
1 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Plato’s Model Mythos  
 
In Book 7 of the Republic, Plato tells his audience an amazing tale. He welcomes 
them to use their imaginations to envision a cave that extends far beneath the Earth’s 
surface. Deep inside this cave, towards the very bottom, there are very unique prisoners. 
These prisoners are shackled in a way that they are forced to stare at the cave wall in 
front of them; they cannot move their heads from side to side or even look behind them. 
Far behind the prisoners, towards the cave’s entrance, is a burning fire. In between the 
fire and the prisoners there is a slightly elevated path. On this path, there are people 
carrying various statues of everyday objects from one side of the cave to the other. Now 
the statue carriers are holding the statues in such a way that the shadows of the statues are 
visible to the prisoners, but the statues themselves are not. Because the prisoners cannot 
turn their heads, they do not know who or what is producing the shadows. In fact, from 
their perspective, they do not even know that they are looking at shadows; for all they 
know, the shadows are the only genuine reality. One day, however, one of the prisoners 
breaks free from his shackles. Once unfettered, he immediately turns around and follows 
a path propelling him towards the entrance of the cave. As he is walking, he is astonished 
at what he sees; for he sees statues that resemble the ones he has been staring at his entire 
life. After considering the statues and their likenesses on the wall, he realizes that the two 
cannot be a coincidence. The objects on the wall are nothing more than the shadows of 
these statues. At this moment, the prisoner’s entire reality is turned upside down. 
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Everything he thought was real was only a mere likeness, a dismal chimera. For his entire 
life he had witnessed the most elaborate puppet show ever produced, unfortunately none 
of it was real. He wants to turn back the hands of time, return to his rightful place in front 
of the wall, and call out the names of shadows again. But he knows that this is 
impossible. Instead, he summons up the courage to keep climbing towards the entrance of 
the cave. As he approaches the entrance, he sees a burning fire and realizes that it is the 
mechanism that has been perpetuating the farce known as his life. He wants to put it out, 
but he cannot. So he keeps on climbing. As he gets closer to the entrance to the cave, his 
vision becomes more and more impaired. For his entire life he had grown accustomed to 
looking at things in the dark; and now, all of a sudden, he is inundated by light. As he 
begins to walk outside, his vision gradually returns. At first he is only able to see the 
shadows of objects on the ground and the reflections of objects on the water’s surface. 
Eventually he lifts his head and is able to look at the objects themselves, the ones 
producing the various shadows and reflections. He has never seen anything so beautiful 
in his entire life. But out of nowhere, he feels a sudden urge, an ineffable compulsion 
prompting him to gaze up to the heavens above him. And that is when he catches a 
glimpse of the sun, its radiance extending from one end of the horizon to the other. In that 
moment, he knows his journey is complete. What began as a day that was a kind of night, 
has become the one, true day.        
Those remotely familiar with Plato’s famous Allegory of the Cave recognize the 
philosophical impact that the myth has had on metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, 
politics, and education. What is rarely recognized, however, is the myth’s influence on 
philosophy of science, in particular, the philosophy of modeling. The shadows on the 
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wall of the cave are models of the statues being carried along the pathway, whereas the 
statues themselves are representations of the actual objects outside of the cave. Plato’s 
point is that the objects outside represent the true Reality, while the shadows on the wall 
inside the cave are the farthest removed from the realm of immortal, incorporeal, and 
unchanging Forms. Now there is a great deal of metaphysics in Plato’s myth, which 
makes it even more ironic that the scientific community, by and large, has adopted his 
philosophy of modeling. When Plato speaks of his Theory of Forms as being the ultimate 
Truth, he is referring to the abstract truths of mathematics. For Plato, all physical objects 
in the natural world are poor representations, or mere shadows, of their mathematical 
counterparts. Even though Plato developed his view of mathematics in the 4th century 
B.C.E, consider what Johannes Kepler, one of the most important astronomers to come 
after Nicholas Copernicus, said in the Mysterium Cosmographicum nearly two thousand 
years later, “The ideas of quantities have been and are in God from eternity, they are God 
himself; they are therefore also present as archetypes in all minds created in God’s 
likeness.”1 Or, more recently, consider the words of theoretical physicist Paul Dirac, one 
of the pioneers of quantum mechanics, “As time goes on, it becomes increasingly evident 
that the rules which the mathematician finds interesting are the same as those which 
Nature has chosen.”2 For Plato, Kepler, Dirac, and many others, mathematics is more 
than just a mirror of nature—it is the one, True Nature. 
                                                 
1. Johannes Kepler, Mysterium Cosmographicum, in Arther Koestler, The Watershed: A 
Biography of Johannes Kepler (New York: University Press of America, 1960), 65. 
 
2. Paul Dirac, Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, in “Science Quotes by Paul M. 
Dirac,” Todayinsci, 1999 – 2017, accessed on August 10, 2017, 
https://todayinsci.com/D/Dirac_Paul/DiracPaul-Quotations.htm.  
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When I initially began this project, my intention was to defend Plato’s 
mathematical approach to models and modeling. After years of research on the topic, I 
experienced a Kuhnian “gestalt switch” and actually reached the opposite conclusion: 
models, even mathematical models, are not mirrors of nature, and models do not need to 
represent. This view was largely influenced by the likes of Nancy Carwright, Nancy 
Nersessian, Mauricio Suarez, Mary S. Morgan, and Margaret Morrison, all of whom 
challenged the traditional, or Platonic, approach. In particular, I sympathize with Nancy 
Cartwright’s simulacrum account of modeling where a model has “the form or 
appearance of a certain thing, without possessing its substance or proper qualities.”3 In 
other words, just because a model may bear similarities to its target, it does not 
necessarily follow that it represents it. Representationalists maintain that looking at a 
model gives us a glimpse into Nature, whereas I have come to the realization that looking 
at a model is more akin to “see[ing] through a glass, darkly.”4 The following exploration 
chronicles the anti-representationalist view I have adopted, along with its philosophical, 
scientific, and educational implications.  
 
1.2 Summary of my Key Claims 
This dissertation is formally divided into two separate, but essentially interrelated, 
parts. In Part I, chapters 2 – 4, I embrace the challenge of producing an adequate account 
of modeling conducive to scientists, philosophers of science, and science educators alike. 
My primary contribution is the development of the integration account of modeling 
whereby a model is best understood as a composition of its various components that 
                                                 
3. Nancy Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 17. 
 
4. 1 Cor. 13:12 
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come together in a unique manner in order to solve a scientific problem. These elements 
include, but are not limited to: theories, laws, theory-ladenness of ideas, politics, funding 
availability, feasibility, various social dynamics, personal motivation, choice, and even 
serendipity. The integrated account is both anti-representationalist and deflationary. It is 
anti-representationalist in that it denies that models can ever provide us with a true mirror 
of reality, and it is deflationary in the sense that it has conceded the search for both 
necessary and sufficient conditions regarding what a model is. The best way, then, to 
understand what a model is is through the concept of modeling spheres whereby different 
kinds of models are represented through concentric spheres. The most basic and universal 
models (e.g., physical, explanatory models) are located near the center spheres, while the 
more abstract and unorthodox conceptions (e.g., formal, mathematical models) retreat 
towards the outermost spheres. The idea is that even though the models within these inner 
and outer spheres are wildly different, they are all models nevertheless. 
In Part II, chapters 5 – 7, I explore the possible application of the integration 
account to science education. This task proved to be a far more difficult one than I 
initially expected given the vastly different approaches to modeling between professional 
scientists and science educators, specifically teachers. On the one hand, professional 
scientists’ penchant for problem solving makes them more likely to embrace the 
integration account given the latter’s non-representationalist stance. On the other hand, 
science teachers are burdened with the difficult task of knowledge transmission, which 
usually involves the communication of scientific facts and information. Sadly, the 
integration account fits rather uneasily with most teachers’ pedagogical goals given its 
imprecise and open-ended nature. Hence, my discovery, and this is the key take away 
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from Part II, that professional scientists and science teachers use models differently to 
accomplish their specific purposes. The Bohr model of the atom might be a poor 
scientific model of the atom in that it egregiously misrepresents the behavior of electrons, 
but it can still be a useful pedagogical model for beginning students, especially when it 
comes to identifying the different parts of an atom. Contrarily, the liquid drop model of 
the atomic nucleus might be a prodigious scientific model given its ability to account for 
fission; be that as it may, its depiction of the atomic nucleus as a classical fluid might 
escape the comprehension of even the most advanced physics student.5 In order to avoid 
any further confusion, I insist that we make a clear distinction between scientific and 
pedagogical models and avoid conflating the two.           
 
1.3 Outline of the Study 
 
Chapter 2 is going to investigate the three major approaches to representation: 
correspondence, denotation, and “models as mediators.” The correspondence account will 
be divided into its stronger and weaker versions (isomorphism and similarity), both of 
which I will argue are insupportable. Next, denotation will be discussed, paying 
particular attention to R.I.G Hughes’s DDI (denotation, demonstration, and 
interpretation) account. I will make the case that although denotation has some 
advantages over the correspondence theory, it is insufficient all the same. Finally, I will 
explore Mary S. Morgan and Margaret Morrison’s “models as mediators” account. The 
“models as mediators” position is different from both the correspondence and denotation 
                                                 
5. Margaret Morrison, “One Phenomenon, Many Models: Inconsistency and Complementarity,” 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42, no. 2 (2011): 343 – 349. 
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explanations in that it moves farther and farther away from the notion that models must 
be representations of a target system.   
Chapter 3 is where I develop my own account of models and modeling. I will 
begin by using Marcel Bouman’s account of modeling as a starting point and develop my 
position from there. Next, I will use Wittgenstein’s conception of language-games to 
defend the deflationist and naturalistic attitude inherent in my integration account. Then, I 
will consider three criticisms against my position: (1) that I am guilty of the fallacy of 
composition, (2) that my account fails to distinguish models from theories, and (3) that I 
commit the naturalistic fallacy. After answering each of these charges in depth, I will 
explain the advantages that my integration account has over the three modeling accounts 
described in chapter 2. As part of my response to criticism (2), I formulate the modeling 
spheres model. 
In chapter 4, I perform a close reading of Pierre Duhem’s, The Aim and Structure 
of Physical Theory. In his book, Duhem dismisses mechanistic models on the grounds 
that they: concretize abstract phenomena, are illogical, and are dispensable in the long 
run. I will respond Duhem’s criticisms one by one; in the process defending the viability 
of physical models and what Duhem derogatorily refers to as the “English mind.” 
Towards the end of the chapter I will discuss the irony of Duhem’s anti-modeling 
position and argue that if he were alive today, he would be at the forefront of the 
modeling movement.     
Chapter 5 examines how educational researchers and practitioners approach 
modeling. The chapter begins by looking at the various ways models have been discussed 
in the science education literature. After the similarities and differences between the 
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various conceptions are pointed out, they are all compared to the integration account 
provided in chapter 3. The chapter concludes by investigating teachers and students’ 
perceptions of models. The research suggests that both appear to hold on to a realist 
epistemology, the purpose of which is to ascertain the ultimate Truth. During this 
discussion, an important distinction is made between scientific models (the models 
scientists use to solve problems) and pedagogical models (the models teachers create and 
use). 
Chapter 6 includes an in-depth investigation of three modeling curriculums that 
have already been implemented in the classroom. The first case study involves middle 
school students creating mathematical models through the scientific method. The second 
case study observes high school engineering students participate in an engineering design 
challenge whereby they have to design a neighborhood playground. The final case study 
focuses on a group of upper secondary Biology students and their exposure to a model 
based teaching and learning strategy consisting of several distinct modeling stages. Each 
case study will be described in great detail and analyzed. Towards the end of the chapter I 
will comment on what I consider to be an alarming trend in STEM education, namely the 
proliferation of mathematical models at the expense of physical, mechanical models.      
In the final chapter, chapter 7, I revisit some of the dissimilarities between 
scientific and pedagogical models made in chapter 5, and extend my argument to student 
models as well. Just as a science teacher’s knowledge does not mirror the knowledge of a 
practicing scientist, similarly a student’s mental models does not mirror that of her 
teacher. As part of this conversation, I discuss some of the shortcomings of student 
mental models (e.g., they are oftentimes incomplete, limited, unstable, etc.) and a few of 
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the complications that teachers have getting students to their “zone of proximal 
development” regarding them. Towards the end of the chapter, I suggest that even though 
we should view the relationship between scientist, teacher, and student models as a 
societas (i.e., one built on mutual respect), rather than a universitas (i.e., one built on a 
shared essence), it does not follow that I am advancing a relativistic theory of models and 
modeling. This chapter also includes why I do not believe that children should be thought 
of as little scientists, as well as further arguments supporting the scientific model / 
pedagogical model distinction.   
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Part I 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Three Accounts of Representation 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
If you ask any number of scientists, science educators, and science teachers what 
a model is, the most popular response you will receive is that a model is a representation 
of its target. This answer seems innocuous enough, but ultimately it leaves much to the 
imagination because it fails to provide a robust account of representation. For example, 
the claim that the solar system model of the atom is a representation of a real atom is 
meaningless unless it is further specified in what respect the solar system model of the 
atom is a representation of a real atom. Fortunately, philosophers of science have recently 
become quite interested in the topic of scientific representation. Now after a thorough 
investigation of this burgeoning literature, three distinct accounts of representation have 
emerged: the correspondence account, the denotation account, and the models as 
mediators account. 
 
2.2 The Correspondence Account 
 
The correspondence account of representation maintains that models represent 
their targets by corresponding to them. Built in to this account of representation is the 
notion that there are degrees of correspondence ranging from perfect or ideal 
correspondence on one end of the spectrum to very little correspondence on the other 
end. No philosopher of science believes that models are or should be perfect copies of 
their targets for at least two reasons. First, in many instances it is physically impossible to 
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perfectly recreate most target systems in science for a number of reasons: they are either 
too big or too small, we lack the requisite building material, or we lack the requisite 
“blueprints” for building a particular model. In the end, then, Paul Teller is correct in his 
observation that “The only PERFECT model of the world, perfect in every little detail, is, 
of course, the world itself.”1 This naturally leads to the second reason why models should 
not be thought of as perfect copies of reality: “One of the damn things is enough.”2 If the 
size of the solar system and the atom were manageable enough that we could study them 
directly without building models of them, then we would. But the fact of the matter is that 
their sizes are untenable and thus need to be modeled.    
Now although perfect correspondence might be off the table, many of the 
proponents of the correspondence account believe that models only need to be identical 
to their targets in the only way that matters: structurually. In the literature, this view is 
referred to as the isomorphic account. According to isomorphism, some model x is a 
representation of its target system y if and only if x shares the same structure as y. This 
implies that the following relationships between models and their targets hold: (1) x and y 
must be symmetric, (2) x1, x2, and y must be transitive, and (3) x must be reflexive.  
A model is symmetric to its target just in case x is a representation of y and y is a 
representation of x. Consider a physical model of the Golden Gate Bridge and the actual 
Golden Gate Bridge. Isomorphism requires that the physical model represents the actual 
bridge and that the actual bridge represents the physical model. 
                                                 
1. Paul Teller, “Twilight of the Perfect Idol,” Erkenntnis 55, no. 3 (2001): 410. 
 
2. Anonymous in Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc., 1976), 3.  
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Next, a model is transitive of its target if the following relationship holds: If some 
model x1 represents a target y, and some other model x2 also represents the same target y, 
then models x1 and x2 each represent one another. Let x1 represent a drawing of the 
Golden Gate Bridge, x2 represent a physical model of the Golden Gate Bridge, and y 
represent the actual Golden Gate Bridge. This means that if a drawing of the Golden Gate 
Bridge represents the actual Golden Gate Bridge, and a physical model of the Golden 
Gate Bridge also represents the actual Golden Gate Bridge, then the drawing must 
represent the physical model.     
Lastly, isomorphism requires that models be capable of representing themselves. 
This simply implies that a drawing of the Golden Gate Bridge represents a drawing of the 
Golden Gate Bridge and the same applies to physical models as well.             
The critics of isomorphism maintain that all of the preceding relationships fail in 
one way or another. The main argument against symmetry is that it is simply not the case 
that if some model x represents a target y, that target y represents model x. Although it is 
true that a physical model of the Golden Gate Bridge represents the actual Golden Gate 
Bridge, it does not follow that the actual Golden Gate Bridge represents the physical 
model. As a matter of fact, the actual Golden Gate Bridge does not represent anything; 
rather it is that which is represented. The problem with transitivity is that even if it is true 
that models x1 and x2 represent the same target y, it is not the case that models x1 and x2 
represent one another. Even though it is true that the a drawing of the Golden Gate 
Bridge and a physical model of the Golden Gate Bridge both represent the actual Golden 
Gate Bridge, it is not true that the drawing and the model represent one another. The 
argument against reflexivity is that a model does not represent itself; rather it is always a 
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representation of something else, in particular some kind of target. A physical model of 
the Golden Gate Bridge is not a representation of itself; on the contrary, it is a 
representation the actual Golden Gate Bridge. 
At this juncture, supporters of isomorphism might argue that their critics are using 
the term “structurally” rather loosely.  According to isomorphism, some model x is a 
representation of its target system y if and only if x shares the same mathematical 
structure as y. This clarification bodes well for isomorphism because the aforementioned 
criticisms of symmetry, transitivity, and reflexivity appear to no longer hold. Regarding 
symmetry, isomorphism now requires that the physical model and the actual bridge share 
the same mathematical structure (i.e., geometrical shape), which happens to be true. With 
respect to transitivity, it actually turns out to be the case that a drawing of the Golden 
Gate Bridge and a physical model of the said bridge share the same mathematical 
structure. Finally, it is ridiculous to suggest that a physical model of the Golden Gate 
Bridge does not have the same mathematical structure as itself because what other 
mathematical structure would it have other than its own? 
The problem with all of these responses is that in the end they tell us very little, 
except that a drawing and a model of the Golden Gate Bridge exhibit the same geometric 
pattern as the real thing. But in 1956 and 1956 when the Army Corps of Engineers built a 
model of the San Francisco Bay in a warehouse to explore the possible repercussions of 
John Reber’s plan to build two dams in the San Francisco Bay, their model needed to be 
more than just isomorphic to the Golden Gate Bridge and the rest of the San Francisco 
Bay—it also needed to be similar to the latter in other aspects as well. For instance, the 
Army Corps of Engineers built their model to a horizontal scale of 1:1000 and a vertical 
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scale of 1:100.3 The model was also scaled for slope and velocity (10:1), discharge rates 
(1:1,000,000), volume (1:100,000,000), and tidal cycle (1:100).4 Nevertheless, as 
Mauricio Suarez makes clear, “isomorphism, which is well defined only as a relation 
between mathematical structures, does not apply to the relation between two physical 
objects”.5 So when we discuss the volume of the San Francisco Bay model in relation to 
the actual San Francisco Bay, what we are really doing is comparing a physical property 
of the two, which is not the same thing as comparing an abstract mathematical structure 
such as a geometric shape. Ultimately, the most that can be said about the San Francisco 
Bay model is that it is similar to the original, but in no way is it isomorphic to it.         
In the end, the model built by the Army Corps of Engineers proved to be worth 
the time, effort, and money because it successfully predicted that Reber’s plan would be a 
disaster if it was implemented.6 The model demonstrated among other things that the 
dams would not only fail to create the freshwater lakes that it promised, but they would 
also bring in high-velocity currents into the Bay, rendering water traffic nearly 
impossible.7 What Michael Weisberg’s case study of the San Francisco Bay model shows 
is that similarity might be a more helpful way to think about representation than 
isomorphism because even though the Bay model was not isomorphic to the actual Bay, 
                                                 
3. Michael Weisberg, Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 1, 7. 
 
4. Weisberg, Simulation and Similarity, 8. 
 
5. Mauricio Suarez, “Scientific Representation: Against Similarity and Isomorphism,” 
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17, no. 3 (2003): 231.  
 
6. Weisberg, Simulation and Similarity, 9. 
 
7. Ibid. 
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it was similar enough to it that it was able to predict what would happen if Reber’s plan 
did in fact come to fruition.  
The leading proponent of the similarity view of representation is Ronald Giere 
who believes that the relationship between a model and the world is one of fit. Meaning, 
if a model is similar to its target in relevant ways then the fit between the model and the 
world is a good one and the model should be thought of as an accurate representation of 
the world. This is certainly what Paul Teller has in mind with his remark that a good 
model “succeeds in representing things as they are, in the way achieved by an accurate 
map, a true (enough) statement, and other sorts of accurate but not completely exact 
representations.”8 Although the Army Corps of Engineers model of the San Francisco 
Bay did not accurately represent all of the actual San Francisco Bay’s properties, it was 
close enough to its likeness that it was able to predict what would happen were the actual 
Bay to be dammed up. To be disappointed with the model because it did not provide a 
completely accurate representation of the San Francisco Bay is tantamount to being upset 
with your smart phone map because it failed to inform you that the street you just turned 
right on is riddled with potholes. If models are constructed using the most accurate 
empirical and mathematical data and are similar to their targets in relevant ways, they 
should be thought of as fitting the world and accurately representing reality. To demand 
more of models is unreasonable.       
The key word in the previous section is relevant. How do we decide which 
properties are relevant to a phenomenon and which are not? The intuitive answer is to 
appeal to the scientists themselves who employ empirical data to build models. For 
                                                 
8. Paul Teller, “Fictions, Fictionalization, and Truth is Science,” in Fictions in Science: 
Philosophical Essays on Modeling and Idealization, ed. Mauricio Suárez (New York: Routledge, 2009), 
237. 
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example, the Army Corps of Engineers were the ones who decided that when building 
their model of the San Francisco Bay delta, velocity of water, discharge rates, volume, 
and tidal cycle had to be made to scale. In other words, they decided that these were the 
relevant properties that made their model a trustworthy representation of the real thing. In 
this particular instance there was no disagreement between empirical data and model, all 
of the data suggested that one kind of model be built with certain relevant properties. But 
such congruence between data and model cannot always be expected; sometimes 
different empirical data suggest contradictory models of a single phenomenon. As 
Margaret Morrison points out, this happens to be the case with the atomic nucleus.9 
Currently there are over 30 different models of the atomic nucleus, each of them based on 
different assumptions, with each providing a different kind of insight into nuclear 
structure.10 Contrary to popular perception, we should not think of these models as 
succeeding one another in the sense that “inferior” models are continuously replaced by 
their “superior” counterparts. In fact, all of these models are currently being used by 
physicists for all sorts of purposes. The most explicit example that Morrison uses to 
demonstrate that the atomic nucleus is modeled in contradictory, yet empirically 
adequate, ways is her comparison of the liquid drop and shell models. The liquid drop 
model describes the nucleus as a classical (Newtonian) fluid consisting of protons and 
neutrons that randomly bump into one another.11 The shell model, on the other hand, 
assumes that the atomic nucleus is a quantum body with protons and neutrons moving in 
                                                 
9. See Margaret Morrison, “One Phenomenon, Many Models: Inconsistency and 
Complementarity,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42, no. 2 (2011): 342 – 351. 
 
10. Morrison, “One Phenomenon,” 347. 
 
11. Ibid., 348. 
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well-defined orbits that hardly ever collide into one other!12 Nevertheless, despite their 
contradictory characteristics, both models are employed by the physics community. The 
liquid drop model successfully accounts for fission,13 but it does not explain the “proton 
and/or neutron numbers at which the nucleus is particularly stable” (the so-called “magic 
numbers”).14 The advantage of the shell model is that it successfully explains the magic 
numbers,15 but its account of asymmetric fission “is so ad hoc as to not really constitute 
an explanation at all.”16 
Let us now return to the issue of how to discern a model’s relevant properties 
from its irrelevant properties. The suggestion that an appeal be made to experts using 
empirical data is untenable because we have seen that different experts use empirical data 
differently to construct contradictory models of the same phenomenon. So whereas some 
physicists might appeal to a liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus to account for 
fission, others might employ a shell model to explain its stability. But who is to say 
which feature is the most relevant? Is explaining fission more relevant than explaining 
nuclear stability or is it the other way around? One cannot take the easy way out and 
simply combine the models in order to highlight both fission and nuclear stability 
because the two models stand in explicit contradiction to one another. This complication 
                                                 
12. “Nuclear Models,” Oracle ThinkQuest, 
http://library.thinkquest.org/3471/nuclear_models_body.html (accessed October 3, 2013). 
 
13. Morrison, “One phenomenon,” 349 – 350. 
 
14. Daniela M. Bailer-Jones, Scientific Models in Philosophy of Science (Pittsburgh, PA: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 191. 
 
15. Bailer-Jones, Scientific Models, 191. 
 
16. Morrison, “One Phenomenon,” 350. 
18 
 
suggests another aspect of representation that takes us further and further away from a 
similarity account: choice.        
 The notion that choice plays a role in how a model represents its target poses a 
significant problem for proponents of the similarity view because it implies that 
similarity, by itself, is not enough to explain representation. Consider another example, 
the distance between an atom’s nucleus and its electron(s). The most recent, accepted 
model of the atom in secondary physics textbooks usually depicts a tightly packed 
nucleus surrounded by an electron “cloud.” The illustration of the electron as a cloud is 
intended to make the point that the location of the electron is never fixed and always 
probable. When teachers employ the electron cloud model they usually do so in order to 
steer students away from Niels Bohr’s visually captivating solar system model of the 
atom where electrons are supposed to orbit the nucleus like planets orbiting the sun. In 
terms of describing the actual behavior of electrons, the electron cloud model is vastly 
superior. However, it certainly does not follow from this that the electron cloud model is 
an accurate description of what an atom is actually like because although it may correctly 
describe the behavior of electrons, it grossly distorts at least one important aspect of the 
atom: the atomic radius or the distance from the nucleus to the outermost edge of the 
electron cloud. When you look at illustrations of the electron cloud model in various 
textbooks, the boundary of the cloud is no more than a couple of centimeters away from 
the nucleus. This gives students the misleading impression that the atomic radius for any 
given atom is not exceptionally large, when in actuality the distance between the nucleus 
and the electron boundary is so expansive that no textbook illustration can do it justice 
without vulgar misrepresentation. A more empirically adequate analogy suggests that if 
19 
 
we were to use a golf ball to represent the nucleus, we would have to place the outermost 
boundary of the cloud 1.5 miles away!17 So although it is the case that the electron cloud 
model is similar to a real atom when it comes to its description of electron behavior, it is 
vastly dissimilar to it as a representation of the atomic radius, atomic diameter, and the 
atomic nucleus.  
My point, then, is two-fold: first, any model is going to leave out significant 
(maybe even essential) properties when attempting to represent its phenomenon; and 
second, these omissions are usually intentional. The first point undermines the similarity 
account of representation because any model that is both like and unlike its target in one 
or many relevant ways is ultimately not similar to its target. The second point regarding 
intentionality and choice also undermines the similarity account because it brings 
attention to the fact that it is the modeler who decides which properties are relevant and 
which are irrelevant for her specific purposes. A physicist interested in exploring fission 
will be more inclined to adopt the liquid drop model of the nucleus, whereas a physicist 
exploring nuclear stability will adopt the shell model. Both of these physicists are aware 
of the shortcomings of their particular models; nevertheless they employ them because 
the models further their understanding of the properties and processes that they are 
interested in exploring. The isolation of such properties, however, is tantamount to a 
concession that for modelers, the models come first and not the representation of a target 
system.18 In the words of solid state physicist John Bolton, “It’s not the real world. It’s a 
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toy world, but you hope it captures some central aspects of reality, qualitatively at least, 
how systems respond.”19 
Morrison’s example of the atomic nucleus provides an example of how different 
data suggest different models of the same phenomenon. But what about cases where 
scientists have the same data, yet proceed to build different models? Do these kinds of 
examples also undermine the thesis of relevant similarity? I believe that they do. The 
thesis of underdetermination, first set forth by Pierre Duhem, argues that there can be an 
infinite number of alternative hypotheses for any given data set because there is no way 
that the data, by itself, can confirm one hypothesis against its alternatives. According to 
the underdetermination thesis, the successful fit between empirical data and a hypothesis 
does not amount to much because there are several competing hypotheses that can be said 
to fit the data. The only conclusion that can be inferred from a fit between a model and 
the data is that the model fits the data; no inference can be made that the model represents 
what the world is actually like. In a recent article on astrophysics and cosmology, 
Stephanie Ruphy argues that underdetermination is rampant in her field, two examples 
being the evolution of the universe and the shape of the Milky Way galaxy.20 The 
problem with these models is not just that there are different models that fit the data, but 
it is also the case that the models themselves are built upon sub-models that are also 
underdetermined. Take for instance, the Millenium Run, an ambitious computer 
simulation of the evolution of the universe a few hundred years after the Big Bang to the 
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present.21 According to Ruphy, the Millenium Run is suggested by at least eight different 
sub-models: Friedmann-Lemaitre models, inflation, cold dark matter models, model of 
galactic morphological transformation, model of star formation, model of gas cooling, 
models for dust obscuration, and population synthesis models,22 all of which are 
underdetermined. But it gets even more interesting. The Millenium model depends on 
semi-analytic galaxy formation modeling, which assumes the existence of dark matter, 
which is inferred from the existence of Big Bang inflation, which relies on the existence 
of Friedmann-Lemaitre universes.23 However, at no point in this chain of model 
dependency do we get a model that has escaped the charbydis of underdetermination. The 
Friedmann-Lemaitre model assumes the untestable philosophical hypothesis that we are 
not privileged observers (otherwise known as the ‘Copernican Principle’).24 The inflation 
model has the same explanatory power and empirical support as the topological defect 
model.25 And according to modified forms of gravitational equations, dark matter need 
not exist.26 Given that each subsequent model is dependent upon another 
underdetermined model, it is hard to take seriously the claim that the Millenium Run is a 
simulation of how the universe actually evolved. At most, it is a model that represents a 
mix bag of empirical data, mathematical models, philosophical assumptions, and human 
choice. Now I am in no way want downplaying the magnificence of the simulation and 
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what it can teach us about our universe, but at the same time we should be weary of the 
claim that it represents the real thing.                    
The most common and obvious reply to the underdetermination argument is that 
its conclusion is trivial and uninteresting.27 Although it might be true that there are an 
infinite number of different interpretations for any given data set, it does not follow that 
there are an infinite number of good interpretations. In fact, the number of good 
interpretations will be quite limited. Thus, some models might be better than others by 
virtue of their simplicity, while others might be better because they lead to more 
productive research programs. A good model, then, in addition to being similar to its 
target in relevant ways must also separate itself from other possible models by appealing 
to such features as: simplicity, fruitfulness, testability, etc.  
The response to the trivial and uninteresting argument is that it is self-defeating 
because it undermines one of the key theses that those unfriendly to underdeterminism 
implicitly maintain: that relevant similarity provides both a necessary and sufficient 
condition for a source to represent its target. Because a good representational model 
depends on relevant similarity in addition to simplicity, fruitfulness, and/or testability, it 
follows that relevant similarity cannot, by itself, possibly establish both necessity and 
sufficiency. This leaves those sympathetic to the correspondence theory of representation 
with two options: either accept the underdetermination critique and continue to hold the 
view that relevant similarity is both necessary and sufficient for substantive 
representation, or give up on necessity and sufficiency altogether in order to deal with the 
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imbroglio of underdetermination. Because each of these options present some kind of 
Faustian bargain, it is difficult to imagine how correspondence theorists will proceed.                     
A second argument against underdetermination is that it is an impatient 
overreaction by anti-realist philosophers of science who would rather make hasty 
epistemological judgments concerning the impossibility of knowledge instead of 
allowing the process of scientific discovery to run its course. A classic example in the 
history of science is the geocentrism versus heliocentrism debate. It is well known that 
when called upon to reconcile geocentrism with the retrograde motion of the other 
planets against the background stars, Ptolemy argued that when the other planets orbited 
around the earth they would break from their orbits, travel in a circular motion, and then 
continue along their original paths. By introducing the concept of the epicycle Ptolemy 
was able to account for the same data (the retrograde motion of the planets) as 
Copernicus’s competing heliocentrism theory. Because both theories appeal to the same 
evidence to defend their theories, both theories are underdetermined by the evidence. 
Anti-realists believe that underdetermination poses a grave epistemological problem in 
that it introduces an unavoidable skepticism regarding scientific theories. Realist 
philosophers, on the other hand, believe that this kind of underdetermination is 
innocuous. Even if geocentrism and heliocentrism are underdetermined by the data, it 
does not follow that both theories are equally persuasive. On the one hand, Ptolemy’s 
epicycle solution to retrograde motion is clearly an ad hoc attempt to save geocentrism. 
On the other hand, Copernicus’s heliocentric theory is supported by additional evidence 
such as predictive success,28 consistency with Kepler’s laws of planetary motion, 
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Galileo’s discovery of Venus’s phases, and parsimony. Realists suggest that this 
additional evidence gives us good reasons to prefer heliocentrism over geocentrism 
despite their data equivalency. In the end, there really is no problem of 
underdetermination.                        
The heart of this argument is that a lot of scientific theories and models that are 
underdetermined in the short run are not underdetermined in the long run because of the 
availability of new empirical data made possible by new technology, such as Galileo’s 
telescope. While this explanation may apply to geocentrism, it is certainly not ubiquitous 
for all theories and models. One example that immediately comes to mind is the 
Millenium Run model alluded to above. For the sake of argument, suppose that scientists 
discover evidence against the existence of dark matter. The following three scenarios 
then become plausible. First, scientists sympathetic to the Millenium Run simulation will 
simply assimilate the new data to fit their model.  Regarding the Millenium Run, Ruphy 
maintains that “adjustments by fine tuning or by addition…can be obtained without 
altering previously chosen key ingredients of the model.”29 In other words, the initial 
inclination of scientists is to try to fit the incoming data to the model that they already 
have in place. Second, after futile attempts to fit the new data to the model, a Kuhnian 
revolution occurs where the Millenium Run model is overthrown for a different model 
that better fits the non-dark matter data. This model is thought to be the new best 
available model of the evolution of the universe. The final scenario that can be 
envisioned is that after the Millenium Run model is overthrown, the non-dark matter 
model of the universe gives birth to several different sub-models, which in turn suggest 
several different models of the evolution of the universe, all of which are equally 
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empirically plausible. So in contrast to the second scenario where only one model is 
produced that fits the data, this last scenario produces several competing models that can 
all equally accommodate the new data. 
Those unfriendly to the thesis of underdetermination believe that the second 
scenario is probably the likeliest of the three. Because of its fit with the new evidence, the 
new model will become the paradigm of cosmology and astrophysics so long as it is able 
to accommodate all of the data (both old and new) better than other competing models. 
Once it is unable to do this, the model choice process starts all over again until a new 
model captures the imagination of the field. Unfortunately, this account of model 
adoption paints far too a rosy portrait of how models are adopted by scientists. Model 
choice is messy business, especially in cosmology and astrophysics. As Ruphy attests,  
Had the cosmologists chosen different options at some stages in the model-
building process, they would have come up with a different picture of the 
evolution of cosmic matter. And the point is that those alternative pictures would 
be equally plausible in the sense that they would also be consistent both with the 
observations at hand and with our current theoretical knowledge.30 
 
So there is more to model choice, at least in cosmology and astrophysics, than simply 
adopting the model that best fits the new data because multiple models will end up 
meeting this criterion even if some of the older ones no longer do. If it turns out that the 
dark matter model of the universe no longer provides the best fit with the data, we should 
expect several models to emerge instead of just one. These models will depend on several 
different sub-models, all of which will be equally empirically adequate. When the model 
adoption process reaches this point, which model a scientist chooses will depend less and 
less on empirical adequacy (because several models will meet this criterion) and more 
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and more on “subjective factors”31 that cannot be adjudicated with empirical evidence 
alone such as simplicity or an individual scientist’s theory-ladenness. All of this suggests 
that scenario number three is actually the most plausible description of what happens 
when new empirical data is introduced to older models.  
This brief look at the correspondence account of representation, in either its 
stronger isomorphic manifestation or weaker similarity version, shows that it is imbued 
with flaws. For now, we must look elsewhere for a viable account of representation, 
which takes us to the denotation account.   
 
2.3 The Denotation Account 
 
According to the denotation account of representation, a model should be thought 
of as a sign or symbol that refers to the target being represented. To be clear, denotation 
is not a concept originating in the philosophy of science. It is a borrowed concept from 
art (usually referring to paintings) to describe the relationship between a work of art and 
what it represents. For example, it is well known in the art world that Picasso’s Guernica 
symbolizes both the bombing of the town of Guernica and the rise of fascism in Europe.32 
The point is that whenever a learned viewer looks at Picasso’s masterpiece, her thoughts 
are immediately directed towards the bombings and Fascism. A model in science is 
supposed to refer in the same way. Anyone familiar with Galileo’s diagrams in 
Discourses Concerning Two New Sciences knows that he used vertical lines to refer to 
time intervals and horizontal lines to refer to an object’s speed.33 Galileo’s intent was that 
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the mere sight of these lines would elicit thoughts of time and speed. So in both art and 
science, there are objects (paintings and models) that refer, or more particularly, 
symbolize something else (the rise of Fascism and time intervals). This form of 
representation is called denotation.               
One thing is clear, for R.I.G. Hughes and Caroline Elgin denotation in science 
does not involve resemblance. Both are in agreement with philosopher of art Nelson 
Goodman, “that no degree of resemblance is sufficient to establish the requisite 
relationship of reference. Nor is resemblance necessary for reference…Denotation is the 
core of representation and is independent of resemblance.”34 Nevertheless, Goodman 
himself is not of the belief that denotation supplies a necessary condition for 
representation. To make this point, Goodman introduces the case of fictions. His most 
famous examples are unicorns and pictures of “Pickwick.”35 According to Goodman, 
paintings of unicorns and Pickwick do not denote or signify anything because unicorns 
and Pickwick do not exist, but it does not follow that they are not representations. They 
are representations, but not the kind we are accustomed to. Van Gogh’s self portrait is a 
representation of Van Gogh. A portrait of Pickwick, on the other hand, is not a 
representation of Pickwick; on the contrary it is better understood as a Pickwick-
representation. The difference between the two kinds of representation is that Van 
Gogh’s self portrait picks out Van Gogh in the world such that were we to come across a 
picture of Van Gogh we could identify the man in the picture as Van Gogh. Pickwick-
representations and unicorn-representations obviously do not pick out and select anything 
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in the world, but this does not mean that they are not representations; they are just empty 
representations. 
Axel Gelfert agrees with Goodman that there are special kinds of representation 
that do not involve denotation, but argues that when it comes specifically to scientific 
representation, denotation “may still turn out to be a central ingredient.”36 In particular, 
Gelfert strongly believes that R.I.G Hughes’s DDI (denotation, demonstration, and 
interpretation) account makes a convincing case for denotation by eschewing Goodman’s 
worry that anything can stand as a symbol for anything else. This is possible according to 
the DDI account because denotation, by itself, does not carry the entire burden for 
representation; instead representation in science is understood to be a tri-partite schema 
that equally involves denotation, demonstration, and interpretation. Only when all three 
of these components are satisfied can there be any kind of meaningful representation. In 
Gelfert’s words, “demonstration and interpretation may provide the DDI account with the 
internal resources to keep ‘in check’ whatever element or arbitrariness is introduced by 
denotation.”37  
To understand how demonstration and interpretation are supposed to keep 
denotation ‘in check’ we can look at Hughes’s primary example in his article, figure 49 
from Galileo’s Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences. For Hughes, the geometrical 
diagram is a clear example of denotation because it is a sign that signifies something else. 
As a whole the figure is intended to show that the distance traveled by a uniformly 
accelerating object starting at rest and an object already moving at uniform speed will be 
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the same so long as the final accelerated speed of the former is twice the final uniform 
speed of the latter.38 At this point, the critic of denotation will argue that all she sees are 
horizontal and vertical lines, some parallelograms and some triangles. In other words, 
denotation by itself gives us very little. In order for it to be a meaningful scientific 
representation we need to be convinced of two things: first, that the proof demonstrated 
by the diagram is true and second, that this is actually how objects in the real world 
behave. Hughes believes that the first worry can be allayed by the second component of 
his DDI account, demonstration. Galileo demonstrates that the distance travelled by an 
object starting at rest will be the same as an object already travelling at a uniform speed 
by transforming the kinematics problem into a geometry problem.39 In Figure 47, the area 
of parallelogram AGFB represents the total distance traversed by an object already 
travelling at a uniform speed, while triangle AEB represents the total distance traversed 
by an object starting at rest. Simple geometry allows us to infer two conclusions: (1) the 
distance travelled by both objects are equal, and (2) the final speed of the object that 
starts from rest (BE) is double that of the object already travelling at a uniform speed 
(BF). If we accept Galileo’s geometrical re-presentation of the problem along with the 
basic axioms of geometry and the propositions that follow from them, then we must 
similarly accept the truth of the proofs generated from such diagrams.  
The final component of the DDI triad is interpretation. It should be noted, 
however, that Hughes deviates from the term’s ordinary usage. Whereas the usual 
understanding of the term means to make some proposition comprehensible, Hughes 
                                                 
38. Hughes, “Models and Representation,” S236. 
 
39. Ibid., S237. 
30 
 
refers to interpretation as that which is supposed to yield the predictions of a theory.40 
And we can see from Galileo’s diagrams that they do just that. However much we 
increase or decrease the amount of time it takes for an object to traverse a given space 
(represented by AB), its final speed will always be double that of an object already in 
uniform motion.  
Galileo’s diagrams support Gelfert’s observation that Hughes’s DDI account 
provides a much stronger version of representation than denotation alone. Demonstration 
and interpretation (or prediction) provides proponents of denotation a way to combat 
Goodman’s notorious charge that anything can represent anything else. When non-
experts encounter Galileo’s diagrams for the first time they simply have to take his and 
other experts’ word for it that certain lines and geometrical figures represent what they 
are supposed to. This certainly does not bode well for denotation. But once we add 
Hughes’s additional requirements that models should also be able to justify their theories 
and make novel predictions, we can begin to understand the appeal of the DDI account.        
Regardless, the DDI account is not without its shortcomings as well. First, let us 
begin with the notion of interpretation, better understood as prediction. Hughes states 
that, “Only after interpretation can we see whether theoretical conclusions correspond to 
the phenomena, and hence whether the theory is empirically adequate.”41 Now I agree 
with Hughes that we should have more confidence in our models when they yield 
accurate empirical predictions. However, this does not mean that we have accurately 
connected the model to reality. Hughes himself concedes as much when he refers to 
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Galileo’s diagrams as “representations of representations.”42 The latter description is apt 
given that Galileo’s geometrical diagrams are replete with idealizations such as 
frictionless motion that have no correspondence in the real world. But as science shows 
us time and time again, this does not prevent us from making accurate empirical 
predictions. For example, real life pendulums: have a bob with mass, have a suspension 
wire with mass, must take into account the friction between the bob and the suspension 
wire, the suspension wire and the support, and most significantly, air resistance.  
Theoretical pendulums, on the other hand, are point masses and frictionless. 
Nevertheless, emendations can be made to the acceleration of gravity equation so that it 
takes into account such things as bob mass and air resistance thus bringing the theoretical 
pendulum more and more in line with its real world counterpart. Returning to Galileo’s 
diagrams, emendations can similarly be made to them so that they more accurately reflect 
the behavior of phenomenological objects and not idealized ones. But does any of this get 
us any closer to the idea that models accurately represent the real world? I am in 
agreement with Nancy Cartwright that it does not because whatever corrections are made 
to idealized diagrams and equations to make them more empirically accurate are made 
“from the ground up, so-to-speak, and not from the top down…What we do instead is to 
add a phenomenological correction factor, a factor that helps produce a correct 
description, but that is not dictated by fundamental law.”43 Because these alterations are 
driven by the world and how it actually behaves and not the models themselves, they 
cannot be said to represent items in the actual world, which is what they were supposed 
to represent all along.  
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All of this returns us to Goodman’s argument regarding things that do not exist in 
the real world (i.e. fictions). Recall that Goodman’s stance on fictions is that they can be 
represented, but not denoted, rendering them empty representation. If we take Goodman 
seriously, then we must treat scientific fictions as we would literary and artistic fictions; 
namely as representations devoid of denotation. But this undermines Gelfert’s insistence 
that scientific representation is best understood through Hughes’s DDI account because 
scant attention would be paid to scientific fictions such as idealizations and 
approximations which have no correspondence in the real world, yet scientific practice 
would be impossible without. Hughes himself is silent about whether or not scientific 
fictions can denote, but he clearly does not have any kind of ontological issues regarding 
the idea that some models can serve as models for other models. Quoting Hughes, “the 
DDI account readily accommodates a hierarchy of this kind. For the model used at an 
early stage of theorizing (model1) can itself be the subject of another model at a deeper 
level (model2).”44 If my interpretation of Hughes is correct, model2 is “at a deeper level” 
because it produces more empirically accurate predictions than model1, which is just 
another way of saying that model2 better corresponds to the world than model1. Whereas 
Hughes and Gelfert believe that the introduction of such correction factors brings these 
models closer to reality, I maintain that the very incorporation of these factors support the 
opposite view that models represent entities that do not really exist. In other words, 
models are about fictions. 
At the most basic level, denotation involves symbols symbolizing a target. 
Among Goodman’s many contributions to our understanding of denotation include the 
idea that denotation only involve entities that exist. Fictional entities such as unicorns and 
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Pickwick can be unicorn-representations and Pickwick- representations, but they cannot 
be representations of unicorns and representations of Pickwick. Using an example from 
the history of science, Maxwell’s ether model is best understood as an ether-
representation and not a representation of ether because the ether does not exist. The fact 
that this statement is true and cannot be disputed is beside the point, however. I maintain 
that a lot of the confusion surrounding modeling arises when denotation moves to the 
center of representation and mutatis mutandis the center of modeling. If we are adamant 
about following Goodman’s emphasis on denotation, then Maxwell’s ether model is not 
technically a model, neither are any of Galileo’s diagrams, nor is the equation for the 
simple pendulum one either. But this seems counterintuitive. If all of the latter are non-
models, then what exactly are they? The truth of the matter is that they are models and it 
is only Goodman’s theory of denotation that is causing confusion. What often gets 
overlooked in Goodman’s analysis of denotation as an alternative to the correspondence 
theory is that it shares one glaring similarity with its rival: both assume that models 
necessarily involve targets, the difference between the two accounts being that one 
believes that representation is predicated on correspondence, while the other does not. 
Even though denotation has moved past correspondence, it has not been able to 
circumvent its reliance on target systems. The ‘models as mediators’ account presented in 
the next section takes us in this very direction. 
 
2.4 Models as Mediators Account 
 
A third approach to modeling that has become more and more popular in the past 
fifteen years is the models as mediators view put forward by Mary S. Morgan and 
Margaret Morrison. According Morgan and Morrison, models neither correspond to their 
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targets, nor do they denote them. A better to way to understand the relationship between 
models and their targets is through the concept of mediation. The two authors make it 
explicitly clear that they do not have in mind a hierarchy where theory is at the top, the 
empirical world is at the bottom, and models are located somewhere in between the two. 
Nor do they have in mind a horizontal relationship with theory and the empirical world 
are situated on opposite sides of a spectrum with models positioned somewhere in the 
middle. Instead, “Because models typically include other elements, and model building 
proceeds in part independently of theory and data, we construe models as being outside 
the theory-world axis.”45 This brief remark contains two of the key elements in the 
models as mediators view: (1) autonomy and (2) combination. Although these two 
elements appear contradictory, they are not. Morgan and Morrison believe that models 
are autonomous in the two-fold sense that they are not completely deduced from theory 
and not completely dependent on empirical evidence. For example, despite the fact that 
we know that the atomic nucleus is a quantum system, scientists still use the classical (i.e. 
non-quantum) liquid drop model to explain fission. If scientists were only concerned with 
deducing models from theories, then the liquid drop model would not be considered a 
potential model because of its blatant contradiction with quantum mechanics. The fact 
that the liquid drop model is still viable today supports the idea that model construction is 
not completely determined by theories. At the same time, models are not fully dependent 
on empirical data either. When Watson and Crick were building their DNA models, they 
notoriously disregarded Rosalind Franklin’s x-ray evidence that suggested that DNA did 
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not have a helical structure.46 Had they been seduced by the x-rays they might have 
abandoned the helix thesis altogether. Instead, Watson famously retorted to Franklin’s 
face that “she was incompetent in interpreting X-ray pictures”47 and that it would benefit 
her to “learn some theory”.48 Watson and Crick’s success in discovering the structure of 
DNA demonstrates that scientists do not strictly rely on empirical data to guide the 
construction of models. Together both of these examples reinforce Morgan and 
Morrison’s position that models are both theory-autonomous and empirical data-
autonomous entities.                   
The remark that “models typically include other elements” means that models are 
not constructed on the basis of a single factor such as theory alone or empirical evidence 
alone, etc. Rather, the mediator view argues that model-building depends on a 
combination of several elements in addition to theory and empirical evidence, including 
but not limited to: mathematical formalism, metaphor, analogy, story, scientist’s 
preference, aesthetic parameters, etc. According to economist Marcel Boumans, “Model 
building is like baking a cake without a recipe. The ingredients are theoretical ideas, 
policy views, mathematisations of the cycle, metaphors, and empirical facts.”49 A great 
example of scientists combining these various and often disparate elements to form a 
model is the Watson and Crick model of DNA. As already discussed above, that 
particular construction process showed the scientists involved commit to a helical theory 
of DNA despite the availability of non-helical theories, as well as X-ray data 
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problematizing their preferred theory. Put differently, Watson and Crick’s approach to 
model-making was overtly theory-laden. But it does not follow that they were wholly 
averse to empirical evidence. Although they did not take too much stock in the X-rays of 
the A form of DNA, they had the completely opposite reaction to the X-rays of the B 
form. According to Watson, “With the A form, the argument for a helix was never 
straightforward...With the B form, however, mere inspection of its X-ray picture gave 
several of the vital helical parameters.”50 So it was not the case that Watson and Crick 
were dependent on theory alone. They relied on empirical evidence, but were selective as 
to what kinds of evidence they would allow to affect their model. In addition to theory 
and empirical evidence, the famous double helix model was aided by another key 
ingredient, luck. Watson’s discovery that adenine bonded naturally with thymine and 
guanine with cytosine was not derived from any theory; in fact Watson’s “like with like 
prejudices” was an obstacle that had to be overcome. Watson’s personal account of the 
discovery in The Double Helix does not suggest that the pairing was based on any kind of 
empirical evidence either. In the end, he was able to make the discovery by simply 
“shifting the bases in and out of various other pairing possibilities”51 until all the 
hydrogen bonds appeared to form naturally. In a February 2005 Ted talk Watson 
reaffirmed the fortuitous nature of the base pairing by explaining to the audience in 
attendance that “We got the answer on the 28th of February 53 and it was because of a 
rule which is to me a very good rule, never be the brightest person in a room.”52 Watson 
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was referring to the fact that he was not professionally trained as a chemist, which led 
him to the rather unorthodox method of changing the base pairings around until they fit 
together in a way that was not coerced. Because of its non-scientific connotations, many 
scientists, philosophers, and educators downplay the role that luck plays in the formation 
of scientific theories and/or the construction of models by banishing it to the context of 
discovery abyss. It is clear to me that the DNA example forces us to reconsider this 
notion.                                        
Another important dimension of Morgan and Morrison’s models as mediators 
view is their insistence that models are instruments of theory production. In particular, 
they believe that models help scientists further develop their theories. The DNA example 
discussed throughout this chapter is a prime example of how scientists use models to do 
this. Watson and Crick had made up their minds early on that the structure of DNA had to 
be helical. This led the two to their model-building method whereby any empirical 
evidence was either assimilated or neglected depending on whether or not it supported or 
rejected their helical theory. The more traditional route to theory and model formation is 
to gather all of the available data, make sure that the latter does not contradict each other, 
and then propose a theory and/or build a model based on the consistent empirical 
evidence. As described above, this was Rosalind Franklin’s approach to science; and 
from Watson and Crick’s perspective it was also what prevented her from immediately 
embracing the helical structure. The two discoverers of the DNA, inspired and 
empowered by the example of Linus Pauling and the discovery of the alpha helix through 
model building, believed that “careful model building could embody constraints that the 
final answer had in any case to satisfy. Sometimes this could lead to the correct structure, 
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using only a minimum of the direct experimental evidence.”53 Put differently, model 
construction requires the adoption of several rules (or constraints) that limit, and 
therefore guide, the kinds of models that can be built. Watson and Crick took advantage 
of these constraints and used them to discover the structure of DNA.               
 At the same time, Morgan and Morrison are also adamant that models are not 
purely instruments; they are also partial representations of the world and of theories. The 
Army Corps of Engineers model of the Golden Gate Bridge and surrounding bay-delta 
area is a wonderful example of a model attempting to accurately represent the world. The 
model possessed several relevant characteristics that allowed it to be compared to the 
actual bay-delta area: 
• The model was built to horizontal and vertical scale.54  
• It was filled with salt water just like the Pacific Ocean.55 
• It was built with a pumping system to simulate the tidal cycle.56 
• The model included freshwater pipes to simulate river and steam flows into the 
Bay.57 
• The velocity of the water was built to scale.58 
• The volume of water was built to scale.59 
 
But even the most faithful models provide only partial representations. The bay-delta 
model was built out of concrete slabs, screws, and butumious joint material60; the actual 
bay-delta area formed naturally out of dirt, rock, and sand. The model used a pumping 
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system to simulate the tidal cycle, while the actual tidal cycle is caused by the 
gravitational force of the moon. The model used freshwater pipes to bring in freshwater; 
the actual bay-delta uses streams and rivers. Despite these differences, the bay-delta 
model was relevant enough that it demonstrated what would have happened had Reber’s 
plan to dam up the bay come to fruition. In this sense it fulfilled its dual function as both 
instrument and representation. 
Just as models are used to represent the world, they are also used to represent 
theories. Recall once again the liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus. Because the 
model treats the atomic nucleus as a classical rather than a quantum phenomenon, it 
cannot be a true representation of what the nucleus is actually like. So if the liquid drop 
model is not a representation of the world, then what exactly is it a representation of? 
Morrison argues that it is a representation of strong force theory, the view that the atomic 
nuclei are bound together by the residual strong force that is a minor residuum of the 
strong force that binds quarks together to form protons and neutrons.61 Yet, the static 
liquid drop model is at best only a partial representation due to the existence of other 
strong force models, such as Bohr’s compound nucleus model, that emphasize the 
theory’s more dynamic features.62             
In layman terms, a mediator is someone who brings two or more parties together 
with the hope of reaching a compromise. This usually means that no one side will entirely 
get their way and everyone will end up sacrificing something important in the process. 
According to Morgan and Morrison, models should be thought of in the same manner—
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as  some kind of compromise between our theories and the world. This is a bold 
interpretation of modeling that refuses to allow models to be strictly deduced from 
theories or solely inferred from empirical evidence alone. According to this view, models 
will always be a compromise between theories, data, metaphors, and mathematical 
formalism. Similarly, models should never be thought of as only instruments or just 
representations. The models as mediators approach acknowledges the representational 
power of such instruments, as well as the instrumental power of such representations.             
            
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Recall that I began this chapter by trying to understand what makes a model, a 
model. Because most of the discussion surrounding models involved the seemingly 
innocuous claim that models are supposed to represent their targets, this inevitably led me 
to a thorough investigation of representation. Three popular accounts were subsequently 
discussed: correspondence, denotation, and models as mediators. The strong version of 
the correspondence account (isomorphism) was argued to be too strong, requiring all 
models to share the same mathematical structure as their targets. Though correspondence 
theory’s weaker version, similarity, provided us with an improved understanding of 
models, it yielded difficult problems of its own, including the bothersome problem of 
underdetermination. All of these issues with the correspondence theory led me to 
consider an alternative way to explore the nature of models, that of denotation. What 
makes denotation appealing is that it avoids the notion of resemblance altogether, making 
it possible for a model to represent a target without necessarily sharing in its likeness. 
Denotation, however, does not embrace the notion of fictions as models because even 
though the latter involve a special kind of representation, they do not denote (recall 
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Goodman’s examples of unicorns and Pickwick). At the same time, scientific fictions 
have played an integral role in the production of scientific knowledge, especially in 
highly theoretical fields like quantum mechanics where physicists are able to make highly 
accurate predictions about the behavior of subatomic particles despite knowing very little 
about their nature. This suggests that the benefit of studying scientific models lies in what 
we can learn from them instead of becoming enmeshed in the quagmire of representation. 
The strength of the models as mediators approach is that it is supported by the 
way science is actually practiced. This is clearly demonstrated in the numerous case 
studies in Morgan and Morrison’s book, as well as the DNA example in this particular 
chapter. Whereas the syntactic and semantic approaches to modeling both maintain that 
there is an inextricable link between models and theories, the mediator view significantly 
weakens the dependency of the former on the latter without severing the tie completely. 
Although this is the foundation of what Morgan and Morrison refer to as the autonomy of 
models, it is more accurate to characterize the relationship between the two as partial 
autonomy given the fact that theories are usually involved in the process of model 
construction to some degree.  
Morgan and Morrison are adamant that their work does not include a “’theory’ of 
models”63 that provides “well-defined criteria for identifying something as a model and 
differentiating models from theories.”64 The next chapter of this project will take up the 
challenge of formulating a theory of models, but will eventually reach the same 
conclusion as Morgan and Morrison regarding the difficulty of distinguishing models 
from theories. Because theories are involved in the construction models and models are 
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involved in the construction of theories, it is all but impossible to identify where one 
begins and the other ends, hence the problem of differentiation. Whereas Morgan and 
Morrison believe that models mediate between theories and the world, I contend that the 
purpose of a model is not so much mediation as it is solving scientific problems. At any 
rate, there is one idea that both of our accounts can agree on: scientific modeling must 
move on to a post-representation phase.  
43 
 
Chapter 3 
 
The Integration Account of Modeling 
 
 
3.1 Towards an Integration Account 
 
3.1.1 The Integration Account of Modeling – Version 1.0  
 
If the correspondence, denotation, and models as mediators accounts all provide 
an inadequate account of models and modeling, then we must begin where we left off and 
ask, “What is a model?” As a point of departure I would like to begin with the account of 
modeling put forth by Marcel Boumans in his article “Built-in Justification.”1 Boumans 
argues for an integration account of modeling whereby a model is simply understood to 
be the product of several elements interacting with one another. The importance of this 
interaction is that each of the elements involved places a restriction on what the end 
product (i.e. the model) eventually looks like. When combined, Boumans believes that 
these various restrictions produce a model with “built-in justification.”2 In Boumans’s 
own words, “Model building is like baking a cake without a recipe. The ingredients are 
theoretical ideas, policy views, mathematisations of the cycle, metaphors and empirical 
facts.”3 To continue the baking metaphor, just as different cake ingredients are mixed 
together in unique ways to make different kinds of cake; similarly, theories, data, and 
metaphors can all be integrated in various ways to create unique models. Bouman’s point 
regarding “built-in justification” is that for each model the theories involved restrict how 
the data can be interpreted, the data restrict what theories can be proposed, and the 
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metaphors used restrict how the data can be interpreted by the theory. One of Bouman’s 
main points is that there is no set recipe for building a model because the ingredients 
involved will dictate how the model comes together in the first place. For example, 
Boumans points out that one of the key ingredients in some economic models is current 
economic policy. The idea that some models might be influenced by policy should 
remind us of Reber’s plan to build two dams in the San Francisco Bay area. If it was not 
for Reber’s plan and the growing support that the plan seemed to be receiving, the Army 
Corps of Engineers would never have built their model of the San Francisco Bay in the 
first place. So in this particular instance, a model was largely influenced by policy. But if 
we consider the DNA model, I am unfamiliar with any government policy influencing 
Watson and Crick’s construction of the double helix. In fact, Watson has made it 
abundantly clear that one of his primary motivations (i.e. model ingredients) was making 
the discovery before anyone else so as to win the Nobel Prize. In one model a certain 
ingredient might be essential, while in another it might not even exist. This, however, 
does nothing to their ontological status as models. Both are still models, just made up of 
different ingredients, integrated in their own unique way. 
For the most part, I agree with Bouman’s integrated account of modeling. My 
only concern with the view is that Bouman’s list of possible model components is far too 
limited. If by “ingredients” Bouman is referring to the myriad of ideas, concepts, 
processes, and physical objects that are involved in constructing a model, then there is 
certainly far more that goes into model construction than just: theoretical ideas, policy 
views, mathematical formulations, metaphors and empirical facts. In addition to the 
components already on Bouman’s list we need to add: laws of nature, experiments, 
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instruments, research programs, tacit knowledge (including metaphysical assumptions), 
funding, interpretation, the historical development of a field and the theories within it, as 
well as any fortuitous, non-rational contingencies that may have contributed to the 
construction of a model (i.e. luck). In the end, even this list is not comprehensive and 
exhaustive enough, which is precisely why model construction is such a capricious and 
frustrating exercise.   
The integration account is shared by Gerald Holton, who remarks, 
 
When you ask, “What is light?” the answer is: the observer, his various pieces and 
types of equipment, his experiments, his theories and models of interpretation, 
and whatever it may be that fills an otherwise empty room when the lightbulb is 
allowed to keep on burning. All this, together, is light.4 
 
I agree with Holton that the textbook definition of light as “electromagnetic waves in the 
visible spectrum”5 is simplistic to the point that “too much is left out.”6 Light is a 
contradictory phenomenon whose interpretation depends in large part on the theoretical 
perspective of the scientist who is studying it. Maxwell believed light to be a wave 
phenomenon because he could not envision how else a light source could arrive at its 
target, unless it was brought there by some kind of physical phenomenon (i.e. the ether). 
On the other hand, the later Einstein, more the realist than the empiricist,7 believed that 
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light could be explained without resorting to physical waves, so he proposed the particle 
theory of light whereby light was thought to consist of ‘packets’ of energy called 
photons. In Einstein’s view, electromagnetic waves were not a property of the ether; 
rather they were a property of space-time itself.8 With this radical interpretation of the 
nature of reality, Einstein undercut the empiricist need for “bodies acting directly on one 
another”9 because electromagnetic waves were “no longer a manifestation of a process 
taking place in an underlying medium.”10 Holton refers to such grand theoretical 
assumptions as themata. Themata are the 
fundamental presuppositions, notions, terms, methodological judgments and 
decisions…which are themselves neither directly evolved from, nor resolvable 
into, objective observation on the one hand, or logical, mathematical, and other 
formal analytical ratiocination on the other hand.11 
 
In other words, themata are neither synthetic nor analytic (to use Kant’s terms), meaning 
they cannot be justified by either experience or logical deduction. Nevertheless, these 
themata “are commonly regarded as essential features of reality within an epistemic 
community, which form the basis of intelligibility in any account of reality.”12 Any 
attempt to describe a scientific phenomenon outside the context of its themata will 
inevitably be incomplete because these thematic principles are fundamental to any 
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scientific phenomenon. Thus I am in complete agreement with Holton that any robust 
conception of what a model is must include the themata that serves as its groundwork.  
 This leads me to my first iteration of what a model is, the integrated account – 
version 1.0:                      
The integrated account – version 1.0: A model is a collection of elements (e.g., 
theoretical ideas, policy views, mathematical formulations, metaphors, empirical 
facts, instruments, the historical development of a field, serendipity, and themata, 
etc.) all interacting with one another. 
 
 
3.1.2 The Integration Account of Modeling – Version 2.0 
 
So far, I understand a model to be the end result of several elements interacting 
with one another. It would be impossible to create an exhaustive list of these elements 
here, but some of the more notable ones mentioned above include: instruments, 
experiments, theories, historical and social contexts of a discovery, tacit knowledge, luck, 
and themata. And yet, I have a nagging suspicion that in its present form this definition of 
models is only partially adequate. What is missing is some sense of purpose. It is true that 
models are created when a myriad of distinctive elements come together, but for what 
purpose? I believe that Bailer-Jones is on the right track when she states that the purpose 
of a model is to provide their creators and users with some kind of epistemic access.13 
However, I disagree with her when she further specifies that the epistemic access models 
give us is access to some kind of phenomenon.14 First, as I argued earlier in this study, 
not all models are created with a phenomenon (or target) in mind. Second, and more 
importantly, the notion of epistemic access has serious realist overtones that I vehemently 
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disagree with. If the access in question is not to some kind of phenomenon, then what do 
models provide access to? The answer is: answers to scientific problems. When I think of 
models as granting human beings epistemic access, I do not think of them as somehow 
penetrating phenomena and giving us a glimpse into Platonic (metaphysical) or 
Aristotelian (physical) essences. As anti-climactic as it may sound, when it comes down 
to it, models help scientists solve problems and therein lies their benefit.  
The integration account – version 2.0: A model is a collection of integrated 
elements, interacting with one another, whose purpose is to help scientists solve 
different kinds of scientific problems. 
 
At this juncture, it should be noted that my conception of problem-solving is 
slightly different than Thomas Kuhn’s notion of “puzzle-solving” as articulated in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. When Kuhn articulates that successful scientists prove 
themselves to be expert puzzle-solvers, he is specifically referring to problems only found 
in normal science and not extraordinary science or the science of scientific revolutions.15 
For Kuhn, puzzle-solving involves “Bringing a normal research problem to a 
conclusion…in a new way,”16 and not aiming “to produce major novelties, conceptual or 
phenomenal.”17 The notion of problem-solving I am using in this project applies to 
problems in both normal and revolutionary science. My primary concern here is the 
application of models to solve any kind of scientific problem, traditional or novel.     
 
3.1.3 The Integration Account of Models - Version 3.0 
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Another important element of models is their temporary nature. This is to be 
expected if we accept the problem solving function of models in the previous section. 
Quoting Thomas Nickels, “Heuristics is not single, fixed doctrine; rather, it consists in 
growing and changing families of (often content-specific) search procedures which can 
be adapted to the special problem at hand.”18 Once models help scientists solve their 
problems they can be discarded. Similarly, when scientists realize that the model that 
they have adopted is not moving their research program forward, they can discard that 
particular model and move on to one with more epistemic potential. Such is the life of 
models—they are fleeting entities whose existence depends on what problems need to be 
solved. In science, problems are changing all of the time; it should come as no surprise 
then that the models accompanying them are just as transient.  
This idea is wonderfully explicated by Dudley Shapere who recognizes that,  
 
The methods we employ lead us to new beliefs, which in turn lead us to modify 
those very methods, sometimes replacing them with new ones. The result has 
been a growing integration of method with belief. A cycle of mutual adjustment 
of beliefs and methods has thus become a characteristic of the scientific 
enterprise...19         
 
What Shapere is discussing here is a hermeneutic circle of method and belief. First, our 
methods help produce new beliefs within us.  Next, these newly acquired beliefs suggest 
the development of different methods to help us make sense of these newly acquired 
beliefs, which in turn produce even more new beliefs, etc., etc. This is also how model 
production happens to work. A scientific problem requires the production of certain 
models, which then suggest a host of novel problems to be solved, which again require a 
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new set of wholly distinctive models, etc. etc. The main point is that model production is 
not merely the logical conclusion of a one-way deduction that begins with a problem and 
ends at an inevitable model. As Majorie Grene so eloquently recognized, “The sciences 
are too many-faceted to subject themselves to a program of monolithic 
unification…[T]he orderliness of parts of it [the natural world] not only may be studied in 
different ways and/or at different levels, but exist in different ways and/or at different 
levels.”20 Grene’s idea that nature exists and can be studied at a plurality of levels 
indicates that our models of it will inevitably be both variegated and ephemeral. This 
brings me to my third iteration of what a model is.        
The integrated account – version 3.0: A model is a temporary collection of 
integrated elements, interacting with one another, whose purpose is to help 
scientists solve different kinds of scientific problems. 
 
3.2  A Deflationist Attitude 
 
The integration account takes a deflationary attitude towards models and 
modeling.21 According to Suarez, a deflationist strategy “entails abandoning the aim of a 
substantive theory to seek universal necessary and sufficient conditions that are met in 
each and every concrete real instance of scientific representation.” Simply put, a 
deflationist attitude has forsaken the hope of ever establishing any kind of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for what it is to be a model. Because models are far too variegated 
and heterogeneous types of entities, it is utterly impossible to isolate a few of their 
properties and argue that they constitute a model’s essence. A look at the DNA, Bay 
Area, and simple pendulum models certainly attest to this. The DNA and Bay Area 
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models are similar in that they are both physical models, yet they have different purposes. 
The DNA model explains the structure of DNA while the Bay Area model was used to 
predict what would happen if dams were built in the Bay Area per Rebus’s plan. On the 
other end of the spectrum we have the model of the simple pendulum, which is neither a 
physical object nor an abstract idea; instead it is a mathematical equation. As such, its 
purpose is less explanation and more prediction. This brief sketch alone has eliminated 
four possible necessary and sufficient components. Not all models have to be physical 
objects because the model of the simple pendulum is not a physical object. At the same 
time, not all models have to be mathematical equations because even though the 
construction of both the DNA and Bay Area models required complex mathematical 
equations, their ultimate manifestations are physical, tangible objects rather than an 
abstract equation. Two other candidates for necessity and sufficiency are explanation and 
prediction, but these are both inadequate as well. The DNA model explains but does not 
predict, while the simple pendulum models predict, but do not explain. Yet, all of the 
physical structures and mathematical equations discussed above are universally 
recognized in the literature as models.  
What we need, then, is an approach to definitions that is not married to the idea of 
necessary and sufficient conditions. One philosopher who maintains such a viewpoint is 
Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein argues that we eschew talk of necessary and sufficient 
conditions altogether in favor of a “family resemblance” approach.  According to the 
latter, concepts such as game and family all exhibit a series of overlapping and 
crisscrossing similarities with no one feature making us use the same word for all.22  
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Applied to the concept model, this means that there is no single feature or combination of 
features that helps us characterize a model as a model; instead, it is all but inevitable that 
some models (m1) will be similar to other models (m2) with respect to some characteristic 
x, but different from other models (m3) with respect to characteristic y.  For Wittgenstein, 
even though m1, m2, and m3 fail to have a single or a cluster of essential characteristics in 
common, they are all nevertheless appropriately called models. 
       
3.3 Criticisms of the Integration Account of Modeling 
 
There are three primary objections to the integration account of modeling. First, it 
is guilty of the fallacy of composition; second, the account does not help us distinguish 
models from non-models; and third, it commits the naturalistic fallacy.  
 
3.3.1  Parts/Wholes 
 
The most obvious objection to the integration account is that it commits the 
fallacy of composition. According to this fallacy, a whole is much more than simply the 
sum of its parts. For example, if we ask someone what a car is and she answers that a car 
is made up of: an engine, spark plugs, a timing belt, an air filter, muffler, tires, doors, 
steering wheel, seats, etc., we would argue that she has not adequately answered the 
question. Although it is true that a car is composed of all of these parts, it does not follow 
that this is all there is to being a car. Even the most exhaustive list of components will not 
tell you anything about the purpose of a car, which seems to be inimical when 
considering what a car is. Similarly, the integration account may tell us all about the 
different components that go into constructing a model, but this does not mean it tells us 
what a model is. According to Morrison and Morgan, models are important because they 
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“are a source of both explanatory and predictive power,”23 while Suarez maintains that 
their significance has more to do with their ability to help agents make inferences about 
the target being modeled.24 If the integration account of modeling does not tell us 
anything about a model’s ability to explain, predict, or draw inferences, then its 
applicability is severely limited and thus, ultimately flawed. 
 
3.3.2 Models vs. Non-models 
 
The integration account of modeling provides us with a poor account of modeling 
because it does not allow us to distinguish models from other scientific concepts like 
theories and laws. For instance, if we take the definition of model in section 4.1.3 and 
substitute the word ‘theory’ for ‘model,’ we have a working definition of ‘theory’: A 
theory is a temporary collection of integrated “items” whose purpose is to contribute to 
human knowledge by helping scientists solve different kinds of scientific problems, while 
at the same time also making them aware of untenable research programs. A good 
definition provides both necessary and sufficient conditions for a concept. The integration 
account of modeling supplies us with the former, but not the latter and that is why the 
terms ‘model’ and ‘theory’ become interchangeable.    
 
3.3.3 Naturalistic Fallacy 
 
A third criticism of the integration account is that it is guilty of the naturalistic 
fallacy. According to one version of the fallacy, the difficult task of evaluating the 
validity of x is replaced by an explanation of how x comes to be. For instance, naturalized 
epistemology is concerned with all of the psychological processes that produce our 
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beliefs; it is not at all concerned with justification. Quoting W.V.Quine, “The stimulation 
of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in 
arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction really 
proceeds? Why not settle for psychology?”25  Some philosophers, however, doubt if 
naturalist epistemology is even epistemology at all. Traditionally understood, 
epistemology has been the study of knowledge and its conditions. It is concerned 
primarily with two questions: (1) What is knowledge?, and (2) What is the criteria for 
knowledge?. According to Jaegwon Kim, if philosophers follow Quine’s lead and 
abandon these questions altogether, then not only will epistemology go out of business, 
but knowledge itself also will because knowledge and justification are “inseparably 
tied.”26 Traditional epistemologists agree that naturalized epistemology is an informative 
discipline with far reaching consequences regarding how we come to our beliefs, but 
because it does not concern itself with normative and evaluative concerns, it is not, and 
will never be, epistemology per se.  
The more traditional way of framing this criticism is to argue that the integration 
account falls under the aegis of the context of discovery and not the context of 
justification. Those who oppose a naturalized epistemology believe there is a strict 
dividing line between how a theory is discovered and its justification.  Because the 
integration account only concerns itself with the psychological, social, and historical 
processes that lead to a discovery of a theory or a production of a model, it is a purely 
descriptive enterprise. The context of discovery, however, has nothing to do with the 
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context of justification. Those sympathetic with the context of justification believe that it 
is one thing to describe the various contexts within which a scientific theory or model 
arises, wholly another to argue that the theory or model itself is acceptable. According to 
Harvey Siegel, “What is crucial for epistemology is not the actual train of thought which 
culminates in an epistemologically potent pronouncement; rather, epistemology is 
concerned with evaluating, with establishing the potency of, that pronouncement.”27 Put 
simply, discovery is not in the justification business.  
Just as Kim accused Quine of naturalizing epistemology and in the process giving 
up on the most important task of epistemology (i.e. justification), it might similarly be 
argued that in settling for a naturalized account of models I am giving up on one of the 
most significant issues in scientific modeling and that is developing a criteria for models. 
Those critical of naturalizing epistemology argue that it is one thing to list all of the 
different components that go into constructing various models and wholly another to list 
all of the conditions that distinguish models from non-models and good models from bad 
ones. Naturalized epistemology might be fruitful for burgeoning fields such as the 
cognitive science of science, but it is not very helpful for the field of scientific modeling 
that approaches scientific models from a strictly philosophical point of view.  
 
3.4 Response to Criticisms 
 
As formidable as these critiques are, each one can be met with a response. What is 
particularly interesting about the following replies is that they all share the same pattern; 
namely, that all of the so-called objections are not even objections at all.    
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3.4.1 Parts/Wholes 
 
The composition fallacy is based on the unfounded assumption that there must be 
more to the whole than the sum of its parts. But this need not be the case. Reductionist 
theories in the philosophy of mind argue that the mind is just the brain and that the brain 
is just a complex organization of synapses and firing neurons. The burden of proof is on 
the anti-reductionist to demonstrate that there is more to the mind than just the brain. So 
far this has been an exercise in futility for the anti-reductionist who nevertheless believes 
that there must be something more to the mind than just synapses connecting and neurons 
firing. Wishful thinking, however, is not an argument. Similarly, those opposed to the 
integration account have to demonstrate that there is more to a model than its various 
parts (e.g. theories, laws, background assumptions, etc.) without resorting to the notion 
that there just has to be something more. If they believe that scientific models must have 
an essence, they must not only articulate the essence of such models, but also 
demonstrate how such an essence is possible.        
 
3.4.2 Models vs. Non-models  
 
As I noted in section 3.2, the integration account is largely influenced by the 
philosophy of the later Witgenstein who stayed away from the project of delineation (i.e. 
definition) altogether because he thought it was an exercise in futility. For Wittgenstein, 
there are two ways you can try to explain to someone what a game is who does not 
already know what it is. The first is to provide a definition of game and label all of the 
activities that conform to that particular definition as a game. For example, if someone 
defines a game as any competitive activity, this means that the boundary separating 
games from non-games is that of competition. But a problem immediately arises with this 
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definition and all subsequent definitions: they ultimately lack necessity and sufficiency. 
To claim that competition is a necessary and sufficient condition for games means that 
not only are all games competitive, but also that everything that is competitive is a game. 
It is clear that both of these statements are false. There are some games that are non-
competitive, for example a child who throws a ball up in the air and tries to catch it is not 
trying to win at anything. It is also the case that not every competitive activity is a game 
because standardized test taking, although highly competitive, is usually not thought of as 
participating in a game. In the words of Wittgenstein, “we can draw a boundary—for a 
special purpose. Does it take this to make the concept usable? Not at all!”28 This quote’s 
message is two-fold. First, it reminds us that any attempt to define what a game (or 
model) is will inevitably be a human, and thus a social, construction. This point is 
important because it raises doubts about any concept that claims to possess intrinsic 
qualities. And second, Wittgenstein suggests that if the world has gotten along just fine 
using the word ‘game’ without necessarily adopting a universal definition of it, then 
definitions might not be as significant as their proponents take them to be.           
At this juncture the anti-naturalist might make a concession. She will concede that 
definitions are human constructions that we create for our edification, but argue that this 
by itself is not enough to deter us from the human project of constructing definitions. 
Contrary to Wittgenstein, some propose that we should draw a boundary around the word 
game and argue that the child throwing the ball in the air is not playing a game, while 
students who take standardized tests are embroiled in a very high stakes game. In other 
words, just because there are different definitions of a concept in circulation, it does not 
follow that all definitions are created equal—some definitions are better than others. In 
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fact, some historians of science would argue that concept development in science is a 
cumulative enterprise where our more primitive understanding of a concept is continually 
replaced by more refined conceptualizations that arise out of new experimental data 
and/or the application of rigorous mathematical analysis. Take, for example, the 
development of what a field is. Faraday is usually acknowledged as the foremost pioneer 
when it comes to our modern day understanding of what a field is. He believed that a 
field was made up of “physical lines of magnetic force”29 that transmitted magnetic and 
electric forces.30 Maxwell is believed to have improved upon Faraday’s conception by 
formulating a mathematical representation of Faraday’s lines of force.31 Ironically, 
Maxwell developed his mathematical equations by employing various physical analogies. 
First, he envisioned Faraday’s lines as tubes filled with an incompressible fluid.32 Next, 
he envisioned this fluid to be made up of geometrically arranged “vortices” or elastic 
cells that rotated with angular velocities representing the intensity of the electromagnetic 
field.33 To prevent neighboring cells from hitting one another, Maxwell imagined 
“electrical particles”34 to function as idle wheels between them.35 These “idle wheels” 
represented the electric current.36 As fantastic as these analogies sound, he was able to 
                                                 
29. Michael Faraday as quoted in Nersessian, “Aether/Or,” 185. 
 
30. Nersessian, “Aether/Or,” 185. 
 
31. Ibid., 193. 
 
32. Ibid., 187. 
 
33 Daniela M. Bailer-Jones, Scientific Models in Philosophy of Science (Pittsburgh, PA: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 25. 
 
34. Nersessian, “Aether/Or,” 191. 
 
35. Bailer-Jones, Scientific Models in Philosophy of Science, 25. 
 
36. Ibid. 
59 
 
use them to mathematize Faraday’s physical lines of force in a manner consistent with 
previously known electromagnetic data.37 After Maxwell, the next major contributor to 
our modern day conception of a field was the Dutch physicist, Hendrik Lorentz. Lorentz 
agreed with Maxwell that the electromagnetic field was a state of the ether, but contra 
Maxwell he did not believe that the ether was a mechanical substance.38 Another way of 
saying this is that Maxwell believed that his theory of electromagnetism was consistent 
with classical (i.e. Newtonian) mechanics while Lorentz clearly saw that it was not.39 
This leads us to Einstein who is often credited with our most current understanding of 
what a field is. Contrary to both Maxwell and Lorentz, Einstein viewed the very idea of 
the ether to be “superfluous.”40 According to Einstein, the electromagnetic field was not a 
state of some material substance called the ether; rather it was its own material substance 
replete with the hallmarks of matter: energy and momentum.41  
The point of this example is that although Faraday, Maxwell, Lorentz, and 
Einstein’s conception of field contain criss-crossing and overlapping similarities, it does 
not follow that all of their conceptions are equal. In fact, in the end, the only correct 
formulation is Einstein’s. So even though we speak of Faraday, Maxwell, and Lorentz as 
contributing to our modern conception of what a field is, technically speaking none of 
them discuss fields per se, only Einstein does. This implies that the Wittgensteinian 
philosopher of science is mistaken when he argues for multiple formulations of a 
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scientific concept such as a field or model. Even though numerous iterations of a 
scientific concept are developed throughout the history of science, empirical evidence, 
consistency with theories and laws, along with rigorous mathematical analysis will 
usually single out a superior conception in the long run. Anti-naturalists can breathe a 
sigh of relief because philosophy of science’s normative project has been vindicated; the 
task of evaluation does not have to give way to description. 
But this foregoing analysis is only appropriate if we are absolutely certain that 
Einstein’s conception of a field is correct once and for all. Unfortunately, modern science 
does not bear this out. In fact, the most up-to-date science seems to have brought us full-
circle, back to talk about the ether. A telling quote by Einstein himself suggests that even 
he never quite made up his mind about the ether: 
According to the general theory of relativity, space without ether is unthinkable;  
for in such space there not only would be no propagation of light, but also no 
possibility of existence for standards of space and time, nor therefore any space-
time intervals in the physical sense.42 
 
According to Nobel Prize winner Frank Wilczek, the “stuff” that constitutes physical 
reality: 
• Fills space and time.43 
• Each segment of space and time is made up of this “stuff.”44 
• Is made up of unpredictable quantum activity.45 
• Renders the cosmos a multilayered, multicolored superconductor.46 
• Contains a metric field that gives space time rigidity and causes gravity.47 
                                                 
42. Albert Einstein, as quoted in, Frank Wilcznek, The Lightness of Being: Mass, Ether, and the 
Unification of Forces (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 97. 
 
43. Wilcnek, “The Lightness of Being,” 111.  
 
44. Ibid. 
 
45. Ibid. 
 
46. Ibid. 
 
61 
 
• Has a universal density.48 
 
Throughout the history of science, this primary ingredient has had several appellations, 
some of the most recent being space-time and quantum field. However, one of its earliest 
designations (which is making a comeback by the way) is simply referred to as the ether.  
If a highly technical concept like ‘field’ is still resisting definition, then most of 
our concepts (including ‘model’) cannot be quantified into a single, self-sustaining 
definition. The best we can do is follow Wittgenstein’s advice and provide examples, 
pointing out similarities and differences along the way. This is the strategy adopted by 
the integrated account of modeling. Rather than providing a formula for differentiating 
models from non-models or good models from bad ones, the integrated account is content 
with listing all of the elements that go into the construction of a model and discussing 
how those elements come together to produce the model in question.     
 
3.4.2.1 The Modeling Spheres Model (MSM) 
 
Related to the criticism that the integrated account does not help scientists and 
philosophers distinguish models from non-models is the condemnation that its nebulous 
nature makes it of very little use to science educators, who are the ones burdened with 
navigating children through the very distinctions I refrain from making. Experts in 
science education believe that as children progress through the nature of science (NOS) 
curriculum they need to be able to distinguish not only theories from laws, but also 
models from other non-models (e.g., theories) as well. Unfortunately, the integrated 
account either keeps the conversation idle or moves it in reverse. A truly student-friendly 
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account of modeling will not only reflect pertinent issues in the philosophy of science 
literature, but will also help students differentiate between what is and is not a scientific 
model. 
Now I have made my position clear: I refuse to draw a clear demarcation line 
between models and theories because I believe that no such demarcation line exists. 
However, for NOS curriculum purposes, it would be helpful for science students and 
their teachers to be exposed to the kinds of models that are employed by professional 
scientists and also discussed by members of the philosophy of science community. For 
this very reason I have created the Modeling Spheres Model or MSM for short (Figure 
3.1). The MSM consists of three spheres of models, each sphere being an extension of its 
predecessor. Sphere 1 models are what scientists, philosophers of science, science 
educators, and science students normally think of as models. They are: visual, 
explanatory, used to make prediction, based on theories, physical, can be run, imitate 
phenomenon, and have a purpose. The example par excellence of such a model is Watson 
and Crick’s double helix model of DNA. Sphere 2 models share some, but not all, of their 
characteristics with their sphere 1 counterparts. For instance, sphere 2 models are 
purposeful, based on theories, and run, but unlike sphere 1 models, the models in sphere 
2 are mentally run as opposed to physically run. Sphere 2 models also tend to be non-
physical abstractions that idealize nature using ceteris paribus conditions, rather than 
describing how nature actually works. One example that immediately comes to mind of a 
sphere 2 model is Maxwell’s model of the ether. By the time we arrive at sphere 3 
models, the term ‘model’ has lost most of its ordinary, colloquial (i.e. sphere 1) 
connotation. Like sphere 1 and 2 models, sphere 3 models retain the purpose of solving 
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scientific problems. Unfortunately, the similarities end there. Sphere 3 models are 
mathematical models that demonstrate mathematical relationships between different 
phenomena (e.g., force, mass, and acceleration). These models are neither physically nor 
mentally run; they are calculated. Some examples include Kepler’s Laws of Planetary 
Motion, as well as Maxwell’s Laws of Electromagnetism. 
It should be reiterated that the MSM is not intended to be interpreted as a model 
hierarchy ranging from simple models to more and more complex ones, though I 
recognize that such an interpretation is all but inevitable. Sphere 1 models are the models 
that specialists and laypersons alike think about when they conceive of the term ‘model’. 
Sphere 3 models are recognized primarily by initiated scientists as models, whereas the 
layperson would have a difficult time wrapping her mind around why models in this 
sphere are even called models in the first place. At the same time, sphere 3 models are 
not any more real than either sphere 1 or sphere 2 models. All of the models, in all of the 
spheres, are all equally models. The differences in their perception are more the result of 
historical circumstances regarding various elements in science, history of science, and 
philosophy of science, ranging from empirical success to the ubiquity of mathematical 
formalism across the sciences.       
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THE MODELING SPHERES MODEL (MSM) 
                       
 
Figure 3.1Modeling Spheres Model (MSM) 
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good. My reaction to this criticism is one of vexation because the integration account has 
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him solve the problem of expressing Faraday’s line of force in purely mathematical 
terms. Similarly, the Army Corps of Engineers’ model of Reber’s plan was a good model 
because it solved the problem of what would happen if Reber’s plan to dam up San 
Francisco bay actually went into effect. Good models help scientists solve problems, bad 
ones do not.      
Perhaps it is not that simple. Ptolemy’s model and Copernicus’s model both 
solved the problem of Mars’s retrograde motion in radical ways. One was content with 
adding epicycle after epicycle until his model matched what was occurring in the sky, 
while the other displaced the Earth as the center of the universe and replaced it with the 
Sun. Surprisingly, both of the models make similar predictions, but only Copernicus’s 
model represents reality. This example demonstrates that when choosing between 
models, we cannot simply select the one that solves a particular problem because it is 
quite possible that there are several models that can fulfill this function. Additional 
criteria that philosophers of science use to differentiate good models from bad ones 
include: explanatory power, predictive power, fruitfulness, parsimony, and relationship to 
the truth.  
The idea that several, inconsistent models can represent a single phenomenon is 
unproblematic to the integration account. Physicists do not seem as worried as 
philosophers are that “there is currently no coherent account of the atomic nucleus.”49 
That is because physicists are primarily concerned with solving problems and will use 
any model of the atomic nucleus that suits their purposes, even if that means appealing to 
contradictory models. According to Morrison, “from different perspectives phenomena 
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will have different characteristics; hence, we needn’t assume there is only one correct 
model for a physical system. We can use quantum models in some contexts and classical 
models in others, even if we’re dealing with the same phenomena.”50Feyerabend agrees. 
In his view, knowledge is “an ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible 
alternatives, each single theory, each fairy-tale, each myth that is part of the collection 
forcing the others into greater articulation and all of them contributing, via this process of 
competition, to the development of our consciousness. Nothing is ever settled, no view 
can ever be omitted from a comprehensive account.”51 Inconsistency, rather than being a 
detriment, is necessary for knowledge production.      
This criticism of the integration account arises because there are still many 
philosophers of science and scientists out there who are still clinging to the teleological 
assumption made by scientism and positivism: that the history of science is a story of 
unrelenting progress whereby our understanding of scientific concepts is constantly 
improving with each subsequent era, compelling human beings closer and closer to a 
single, absolute truth or something very similar to it. While I fully acknowledge that our 
scientific knowledge has grown immensely since the Renaissance, it does not necessarily 
follow that scientists are inching us closer and closer to what the world is actually like, 
which is just another way of acknowledging that scientific knowledge does not 
necessarily entail the truth. Newton’s laws of motion and Einstein’s special theory of 
relativity have both been empirically successful in terms of the predictions they have 
been able to produce. Because of this success it is impossible to deny that both have 
expanded our knowledge of the universe more than we could have possibly imagined, yet 
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neither Newton’s laws nor Einstein’s special theory of relativity can be used to accurately 
describe the behavior of subatomic particles, the foundation of all matter. Through 
Newton and Einstein our knowledge has been expanded, but it does not follow that either 
has presented us with a mirror of nature.  
Indeed, Kuhn says as much towards the end of Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
when he makes the analogy between evolution and science.52  Kuhn argues that change in 
scientific theories is similar to the idea of mutations in evolution in the sense that both are 
non-teleological.  That is, both do not progress towards a specific end; rather, both just 
change and this change can be interpreted as either good or bad, but inherently it is 
neither. Now philosophers of science sympathetic to scientism might want to argue that a 
species’ or idea’s survival demonstrates its superiority to its predecessors, but this again 
is just interpretation. Survival does not carry with it some kind of special normative and 
evaluative force. The fact that a species, theory, or model has survived tells us nothing 
more than that the latter has survived; from this we cannot make any further inferences 
about the way the world actually is or ought to be. As tempting as it is to collapse 
epistemology into ontology, we must keep the two enterprises separate. 
             
3.4.3.1 Feyerabend’s Normalized Naturalism 
 
Feyerabend believes that not only is description the most we can do, but it is also 
what we should do. In other words, in an ironic twist, he is making a prescription out of 
description! In Against Method he makes the audacious claim that dividing epistemology 
“by an order that contains discovery on one side and justification the other would have 
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ruined science”.53 It would have ruined it because some scientists would never have gone 
forward with their theories and models because they knew that neither was prepared for 
justification. Consider the case of Copernicus. Copernicus did not publish On the 
Revolutions until the end of his life, and even then it was done reluctantly only after 
Rheticus’s prompting. According to Dava Sobel, “By his own admission, he did not feel 
so confident of his own work as to care nothing for others’ opinions of it.”54 Arthur 
Koestler makes the even stronger claim that, “The whole evidence indicates that it was 
not martyrdom he feared but ridicule—because he was torn by doubt regarding his 
system, and knew that he could neither prove it to the ignorant, nor defend it against 
criticism by the experts.”55 In the end, “the Copernican system, bristling with 
inconsistencies, anomalies, and arbitrary constructions, was equally unsatisfactory, most 
of all to himself.”56 Recall that Ptolemy’s system had been making accurate predictions 
for well over a thousand years before Copernicus developed his bold hypothesis. And 
even after the latter’s work was published, sailors and astronomers alike abandoned his 
planetary tables and returned to earlier ones.57 Had Copernicus become overly 
preoccupied with justifying every aspect of his heliocentric theory to the Ptolemaic 
tradition, there is no telling when On the Revolutions would have been published, 
assuming it would have even been published at all.           
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3.4.3.2 The Melting Point of Lead: A Unique Case Study 
 
On the one hand, it makes perfect sense to separate the context of discovery from 
the context of justification. The context of discovery has to do with the circumstances 
surrounding the discovery of a theory while justification involves whether or not a theory 
is a good one. Let us apply this distinction to an example made popular by Ernest Nagel 
and further discussed by James Bogen and James Woodward: the melting point of lead. 
According to the famous distinction, the story of the discovery of the melting point of 
lead is wholly separate from the justification of it. Let us begin with the discovery aspect 
of the melting point. Bogen and Woodward point out that the discovery of the melting 
point of lead involves not one data point, 327 degrees C, but the mean of the scatter of 
individual data points.58 The reason why a mean temperature must be used instead of 
referring to a single temperature measurement is that the melting point of lead will vary 
depending on: the lead’s purity, how well the thermometer is working, how the 
thermometer is being read, and interactions between the initial temperature of the 
thermometer and the lead.59  
Now let us move on to the justification of the melting point of lead. One would 
think that one could justify the melting point of lead by simply measuring the temperature 
at which lead begins to melt. If it starts melting at 327 degrees C then the temperature is 
an accurate one. If it does not begin to melt at this temperature then a new temperature 
must be sought. But the problem is that it is entirely possible that any of the 
measurements taken will not exactly coincide with 327 degrees C because the number 
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just mentioned is the result of an inference and estimation of several data points.60 In 
other words, there is no way to justify the melting point of lead because no such number 
exists; it is an ideal much like Galileo’s frictionless plane. However, if we return to the 
context of discovery and understand how 327 degrees C came to become the de facto 
melting point of lead, then we seem to have further justification for the temperature. So in 
this particular instance, not only is the context of justification indistinguishable from the 
context of discovery; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on it.   
 
3.5 Integration Account vs. Other Accounts of Modeling 
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed three of the most popular accounts of 
modeling: (1) the correspondence account, (2) the denotation account, and (3) the models 
as mediators account. This section will compare each of these accounts with the 
integration account of modeling, providing reasons why the latter should be adopted.  
 
3.5.1 Correspondence Account 
 
According to the correspondence account of modeling, x is a model of y just in 
case x is relevantly similar to y. At the end of the day the position is based on the realist 
assumption that there is only one model that accurately represents the world and it is the 
one that is most relevantly similar to it (the world). Recall that the problem with this 
account is that the notion of “relevantly similar” is notoriously vague. A physicist 
interested in the liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus believes that fission is more 
relevant than the so-called magic numbers, while physicists more interested in the shell 
model believe that the magic numbers are more relevant. To avoid the vagueness 
criticism, the correspondence account must come up with a way to discern the most 
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relevantly similar model between different models that employ equivalent empirical 
evidence, which means they need to address the problem of underdetermination.  
The advantage that the integration account has over the correspondence account is 
that it does not have to deal with the problem of underdetermination. The integration 
account avoids the problem of underdetermination by avoiding representation altogether. 
The problem of underdetermination only arises if we assume that there is a single way 
that the world can be accurately represented. Because the integration account has 
separated the tasks of epistemology and ontology, it views empirically equivalent models 
as expanding our scope of knowledge even though they might be logically contradictory 
to one another in an ontological sense. It should be obvious by now that the integration 
account is consistent with more pragmatic and instrumentalist accounts of knowledge. 
According to such views, models should be thought of as knowledge producing products 
and not necessarily as accurate representations of the world.              
 
3.5.2  Denotation Account 
 
According to the denotation account of representation, x is a model of y just in 
case x is a sign or symbol that refers to a target y. The liquid drop model of the atom can 
be considered a model precisely because it is a symbol that refers to a specific target, in 
this case the atom. Recall that the advantage of the denotation account over the 
correspondence account is that it does not require that models be relevantly similar to 
their targets. As a result, the denotation account, like the integration account, is willing to 
consider the existence of contradictory models of the atom at one and the same time. The 
problem with the denotation account, specifically Goodman’s articulation, is the 
stipulation that the target that any model refers to must actually exist. So Maxwell’s ether 
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model cannot technically be a representation of the ether (and thus a model of the ether) 
because the ether does not to exist. In chapter two I argued that the existence requirement 
was unnecessarily severe. If we take it seriously, then fictional entities, like the ether, 
cannot be modeled, which seems counterintuitive. 
The integration account, unlike the denotation account, does not discriminate 
between entities known to exist and those that do not. According to the integration 
account the primary goal of a model is knowledge proliferation. This means that as long 
as a model contributes to our knowledge of the world, it has every right to be called a 
model even if its reference does not exist. Maxwell’s mechanical model of the ether is a 
perfect example. Maxwell was able to use his “extraordinary assemblage of tiny spinning 
cells interspersed with even smaller ‘idle wheel’ particles”61 to not only mathematically 
represent Faraday’s lines of force, but also discover that light is an electromagnetic 
phenomenon—not bad for a model whose reference is not believed to exist. 
The distinguishing feature common to the correspondence and denotation 
accounts, but excluded from the integration account, is the idea that models are intended 
to be representations of targets. This particular approach takes it for granted that the 
targets being represented chronologically, ontologically, and epistemologically precede 
the models that are constructed to represent them. The integration approach denies this 
priority. Instead, it maintains that when models are created through the integration of: 
theories, laws, background assumptions, paradigms, research programs, experiments, etc., 
a distinct ontological entity is ushered into existence that has a separate identity from 
anything else that already exists in the world. The integration account can downplay the 
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representation of predetermined targets because it believes that targets are created during 
the integration process, which is just another way of saying that models oftentimes 
become their own targets. 
 
3.5.3 Models as Mediators Account 
 
According to the Models as Mediators Account of Morrison and Morgan, a model 
acts as a mediator between a model and a theory. The Models as Mediators Account and 
the Integration Account share the following characteristics in common: 
 
• Both deny that the sole purpose of modeling is representation. 
• Both deny that the sole purpose of modeling is instrumentation. 
• Both deny that models are solely derived from theories. 
• Both believe in the possibility of contradictory models for the same 
phenomenon. 
• Both agree that models are comprised of elements besides theories, laws, and 
empirical data. 
 
One difference between the two accounts is that the integration account emphasizes the 
idea of problem solving. Whatever a model is, a good one extends our knowledge by 
solving a problem. In the words of William James, “Any-idea that will carry us 
prosperously from any part of our experience to any other part, linking-things 
satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labour, is true for just so much.”62 A 
model connects our various empirical, theoretical, metaphysical, psychological, 
sociological, and historical experiences together in a reliable manner that allows 
problems to be solved and our knowledge of the world to be extended. While Morgan and 
Morrison agree with the epistemic potential of models, they say very little about its role 
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in solving scientific problems so as to distance themselves from a purely instrumentalist 
view of modeling.  
The integration account focuses on the problem solving function of scientific 
models because it takes the idea of a naturalized epistemology seriously. Recall that 
naturalized epistemology has all but abandoned the idea of representation in favor of 
solving problems in the world. The integration account reflects this. Abnegating the 
problem solving function of scientific modeling will move scientific modeling back 
towards representation and all of the ontological and epistemological baggage that goes 
along with it (e.g., the quest for absolute truth, the idea that the latter can only be attained 
through logic and rationality, the distinction between the context of discovery and the 
context of justification, etc.)            
 
3.6  Conclusion 
 
According to version 3.0 of the integration of account of modeling:  
 
A model is a temporary collection of integrated elements, interacting with one 
another, whose purpose is to help scientists solve different kinds of scientific 
problems. 
 
This account is both deflationary and naturalistic. It is deflationary in the sense that it 
does not provide necessary and sufficient conditions for what a model is and ought to be. 
It also takes a naturalistic approach, meaning it takes as its starting point how actual 
scientists practice science.  
Nevertheless, there are some who remain skeptical regarding the practical value 
of scientific models. One such outspoken critic was Pierre Duhem who believed that the 
only conceivable purpose for creating a scientific model was pedagogical (i.e. they were 
intended for the edification of non-scientists). It is clear that the integration account 
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presented here wholeheartedly disagrees with this position. The following chapter will 
carefully examine Duhem’s argument and provide an uncompromising critique of it so as 
to leave no question of the value of scientific models.     
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Chapter 4 
 
Pierre Duhem’s Critique of Modeling 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The instrumentalist approach to modeling is the view that models are primarily 
heuristic devices that expedite solutions to scientific problems. Instrumentalists also 
maintain that models play a significant role in the production and development of 
scientific theories. One of the most famous critics of scientific modeling (specifically, the 
instrumentalist approach) was Pierre Duhem. The latter was so distressed by the 
privileged role that models commandeered that he devoted chapter four of his famous 
The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory entirely to the topic. Before launching into 
Duhem’s critique and the reasons for his vehement disdain, some background of 
Duhem’s philosophy of science is in order.  
 
4.2 The French and the English Mind 
 
In the aforementioned chapter, Duhem contrasts two kinds of minds: the French 
mind and the English mind. The epitome of the French mind can be seen in the work of 
Descartes. According to Duhem, Descartes’s Discourse on Method demonstrates the 
“strong but narrow mind”1 at its best with its emphasis on abstraction, deduction, and 
logic. The English mind is supposed to be the opposite of the French mind; rather than 
being strong and narrow, it is conceived of as “weak and broad.”2 Although Duhem 
briefly uses Sir Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum to demonstrate the characteristics of 
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the English mind, his most extensive and detailed example is not only not a scientist, he 
is not even an Englishman. In fact, in an ironic twist, he happens to be the French military 
general and tyrant, Napoleon Bonaparte. For Duhem, Napoleon is the archetype example 
of the English mind for three primary reasons: (1) his predilection for concrete facts and 
examples, (2) his antipathy of abstractions and generalizations, and (3) his emphasis on 
the role of visualization (or “imagination”) in thinking.  
It is clear from this brief description that the two kinds of minds are intended to be 
polar opposites of one another. The French mind believes that knowledge begins first and 
foremost with “common sense” (connaissance commune) first principles. Regarding the 
origin of these common sense first principles Duhem writes, “As for the axioms, where 
do they come from: They are taken…from common knowledge; that is, every person of 
sound mind takes it that he is sure of their truth before studying the science whose 
foundations they are.3” Duhem believes that the foundational principles of all scientific 
theories cannot be derived from reason like the other components of any scientific theory 
because this would lead us into the morass of the infinite regress problem. For Duhem, 
the only inevitable conclusion is that the axioms must be justified in an arational way by 
what can loosely be called human judgment or human intuition. Continuing with the 
epistemology of the French mind, from these first principles the faculty of reason applies 
the rules of formal logic and mathematics to deduce more extensive knowledge of the 
world. Quoting Duhem, “Starting from these ideas, from these principles, the deductive 
method will unroll its syllogisms whose long chain of links, all tested, will firmly tie the 
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most minute consequences to the foundations of the system.”4 For the so-called French 
mind, scientific knowledge is largely deductive knowledge, with the exception of the 
intuitive first principles on which all of the preceding knowledge rests. 
Nothing that was said about the analytic French mind can be applied to the 
mechanical English mind. In discussing Bacon’s Novum Organum Duhem dismissingly 
remarks, “There is no use in looking for Bacon’s method in it, for there is none.” Any 
modern reader will find this comment ironic given that Bacon is widely regarded as the 
progenitor of the so-called scientific method. Duhem would not be amused by the place 
Bacon has assumed in the annals of science; on the contrary he would likely be repulsed 
by it. While discussing the English mind’s lack of methodology, Duhem rhetorically 
asks, “Will these instructions teach us to conduct and arrange our experiments in 
accordance with fixed rules? Will these directions teach us the way to classify our 
observations? Not in the least.”5 While French theory-making depends on “fixed rules” 
determined by logic, English theory-making “proceed[s] not so much by a consecutive 
line of reasoning, as by a piling-up of examples. Instead of linking up syllogisms, they 
accumulate facts.”6 While the English mind is primarily concerned with stockpiling 
concrete facts through observation and experiment, they are very much unconcerned with 
the axioms or first principles that provide the foundation for French theories. 
Another significant difference between the two methods, especially as it pertains 
to models and modeling, are their divergent thoughts on the role of the imagination (or 
what Duhem calls elsewhere “visualization”) in the production of scientific theories. By 
                                                 
4. Duhem, Aim and Structure, 65. 
 
5. Ibid., 66 
 
6. Ibid., 67. 
79 
 
visualization, Duhem is referring to the ability to create mental models in one’s mind of 
some scientific phenomenon. Returning to the example of Napoleon, Duhem writes, “If 
we read again the portrait of Napoleon…we shall recognize immediately…an 
extraordinary power to hold in mind an extremely complex collection of objects, 
provided these are sensory objects having shape and color that the imagination can 
visualize”.7 We are told that though this power of visualization is celebrated in the 
English mind, it is abhorred by the French. The English believe that scientific explanation 
is impossible without these mental models because explanation of a scientific 
phenomenon comes down to discovering the internal mechanism(s) that enable it to 
function.8 For the English, these internal mechanisms can only be ascertained by the 
imagination alone. What Duhem finds especially deplorable, however, is the English’s 
insistence that the imagination has as much, if not more, to do with the production and 
development of scientific theories than pure, unadulterated reason.   
 
4.3 Duhem’s Three Criticisms 
 
In the end, Duhem finds models problematic because: (1) models promote the 
concretization of abstract phenomena, (2) models are not developed logically by moving 
from syllogism to syllogisms, and (3) models are ultimately superfluous.  
 
4.3.1 Concretization of the Abstract 
 
Regarding (1), Duhem remarks:  
 
The French or German physicist conceives, in the space separating two 
conductors, abstract lines of force having no thickness or real existence; the 
English physicist materializes these lines and thickens them to the dimension of a 
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tube which he will fill with vulcanized rubber. In place of a family of lines of 
ideal forces, conceivably only by reason, he will have a bundle of elastic strings, 
visible and tangible…9        
 
For the French mind, the concept “lines of force” is really an unfortunate misnomer 
because the word “lines” suggests the existence of a concrete entity with length, 
thickness, and tangibility. In reality, however, force is an abstract concept with no 
material properties such as the ones described above. Whereas the French use the phrase 
“lines of force” without reading too much into it, the English believe that understanding 
force in terms of actual physical lines is not that far from the truth. Instead of lines, 
Faraday imagines elastic strings connecting two conductors that stretch upon expansion 
and bunch up upon contraction.10 Recall that for the English, understanding a 
phenomenon requires the ability to explain the mechanism(s) underlying it. This need to 
literally see the internal mechanism driving electrostatics is the impetus for Faraday’s 
mechanical model. Quoting William Thomson (i.e., Lord Kelvin), “I never satisfy myself 
until I can make a mechanical model of a thing. If I can make a mechanical model, I 
understand it. As long as I cannot make a mechanical model all the way through I cannot 
understand”.11 Duhem, like Heisenberg after him, believes that the requirement of a 
visualizable mechanism that one can imagine in one’s mind is “trash” and that such 
forays of the imagination actually obfuscate physicists’ understanding of various 
scientific phenomena which can only be understood mathematically through the faculty 
of reason alone.     
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4.3.2 Lack of Logical Progression 
 
This leads us to Duhem’s second criticism of models, which is that scientists who 
are sympathetic of models and model-making do not find it epistemically problematic 
when different models are logically inconsistent with one another. Recall that for Duhem, 
scientific theories are logically deduced from first principles. This means that with the 
exception of the first principles themselves, all of the premises that appear in a theory are 
carefully derived by moving from one syllogism to the next. We saw in the previous 
section, however, that the creation of models involves a much different process. The 
modus operandi of a model maker is to simulate the mechanisms by which different 
scientific phenomena work. In certain instances, logically inconsistent models will be 
proffered as equal explanations for a particular phenomenon. Duhem explains the 
difference in attitude between the French and English minds upon encountering such a 
contradiction: 
To a mathematician of the school of Laplace or Ampére, it would be absurd to 
give two distinct theoretical explanations for the same law, and to maintain that 
these two explanations are equally valid. To a physicist of the school of Thomson 
or Maxwell, there is no contradiction in the fact that the same law can be 
represented by two different models.12 
 
Duhem was apparently commenting on Maxwell’s own remark that “it is a good thing to 
have two ways of looking at a subject and to admit that there are two ways of looking at 
it.”13 Maxwell made this remark in order to bolster support for Faraday’s conception of 
“lines of force” which stood in stark contrast to the more popular understanding of force 
                                                 
12. Duhem, Aim and Structure, 81. 
 
13. James Clerk Maxwell, as quoted in Alan F. Chalmers, “The Heuristic Role of Maxwell’s 
Mechanical Model of Electromagentic Phenomena,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 17, no. 4 
(1986): 417. 
82 
 
as “action at a distance.”14 Maxwell’s method embraced the idea of employing as many 
alternative models or “physical analogies” as possible, even if some of the models 
conflicted with one another. Duhem, on the other hand, scoffed at the model approach for 
its blatant disregard of logic, in particular the principle of non-contradiction. This 
application of models only furthered his belief that models are “not built for the satisfying 
of reason but for the pleasure of the imagination.”15  
Duhem was further perplexed that those sympathetic to modeling maintained a 
steadfast belief in the epistemic potential of models, despite their own recognition that 
models were “not to be accepted as true in nature.”16 Quoting Thomson, “Although the 
molecular constitution of solids supposed in these remarks and mechanically illustrated in 
our model, is not to be accepted as true in nature, still the construction of a mechanical 
model of this kind is undoubtedly very instructive.”17 And quoting Maxwell, “Go back to 
our spherical molecule with its central spherical shells-that is the rude mechanical 
illustration, remember. I think it is very far from the actual mechanism of the thing, but it 
will give us a mechanical model.”18 In Duhem’s mind, making inferences about real 
world phenomena from fictional models is logically dubious. Such an inference is based 
more on “hope” rather than anything to do with logic and reason.19 In fact, Duhem makes 
the rather crude joke that the French are no longer astonished by anything the English 
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modelers say and do because the latter only “wished to produce a work of imagination”20 
and “not an explanation acceptable to reason.”21 As if violating the principle of non-
contradiction were not enough, modelers were also guilty of making unwarranted 
inferences. 
 
4.3.3 Superfluous Models 
 
Duhem’s most famous criticism of models is that they are nothing more than 
“crutches of the imagination” that play nothing more than a heuristic role in the 
conception of novel scientific theories. In a word, they are superfluous. At this juncture 
we should not be surprised that Duhem enlists Thomson and Maxwell as cases in point. 
He remarks of the two of them, “neither in Lord Kelvin’s nor in Maxwell’s work has the 
use of mechanical models shown that fruitfulness nowadays attributed so readily to it.”22 
In particular, Duhem says of Thomson that his most laudable contributions “have been 
made by means of the abstract systems of thermodynamics and of classical 
electrodynamics.”23 In other words, his theories regarding the electrical transfer of heat 
did not require models for their conception; rather, they were introduced more for the 
purposes of representation and elaboration.24 As for Maxwell, Duhem believes that he did 
not require his model of the mechanical ether to conceive of light an electromagnetic 
phenomenon.25 This specific example is defended in contemporary scholarship by Alan 
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Chalmers who not only believes that Maxwell’s “model did not serve a positive heuristic 
function” but even went so far as to state that it was actually “an unproductive 
digression.”26 Maxwell’s theory was that displacement currents begat magnetic fields, 
which could be represented by rotating ether cells brought into motion by moving 
particles.27 Chalmers argues, however, that taking Maxwell’s famous model seriously 
requires that we give up the idea that displacement currents give rise to magnetic fields 
because displacement requires the vortices in the model to turn one way while the model 
itself requires them to turn the opposite direction.28 Even though Thomson and Maxwell 
are both steadfast in their belief regarding the positive contribution of models to their 
theories, Duhem is equally persistent (if not more so) that compared to deduction, the role 
of models in the discovery and justification of theories in physics is at best a “quite 
meager” one.29  
 
4.4 Responses to Duhem 
 
As impressive as Duhem’s critiques are, each one of them can be met with a 
response. Duhem’s first critique will be handled by accusing him of creating a straw-man 
out of Thomson and Maxwell’s positions. Regarding criticism two, I will simply deny 
Duhem the privilege of his realist metaphysics, circumventing his argument altogether. 
Lastly, the charge of superfluousness will be answered by employing Watson and Crick’s 
DNA model as a counterexample.   
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4.4.1 Response to Concretization of the Abstract 
 
When Duhem accuses Faraday and Maxwell of concretizing the abstract, he is 
essentially charging them of reducing purely theoretical, mathematical explanations into 
physical, mechanistic ones. But Faraday does not believe that there are actual strings 
connecting conductors any more than Maxwell believes that ‘vortices’ and ‘electrical 
particles’ under stress cause electromagnetic activity.30 The purpose of creating both 
models is to gain insight into how the concept of force actually works. For the so-called 
English mind, a purely mathematical explanation is insufficient because such an 
explanation is ultimately devoid of mechanism; it does not explain to us how something 
works. Maxwell states that in overemphasizing mathematics “we entirely lose sight of the 
phenomena to be explained; and though we may trace out consequences of given laws, 
we never obtain more extended views of the connexions [sic.] of the subject.” 31  
Faraday and Maxwell concretize the abstract in order to develop mechanistic 
models that explain how different phenomena (e.g. force) work. They do not literally 
believe in the physical existence of the models themselves, but they do stand behind the 
explanations that such models provide. The models themselves may be fictions, but their 
contributions to our scientific understanding certainly are not.     
 
4.4.2 Response to Lack of Logical Progression 
 
Against Duhem’s argument that models are illogical in the sense that sometimes 
contradictory models are used to describe a single phenomenon, my response is to agree 
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with Duhem that contradictory models are used in this way, but to vehemently disagree 
that this application renders them illogical. Duhem’s position reflects a strong realist 
stance where models are judged according to whether or not they accurately represent 
their targets. According to this view, there is only one reality, one way the world actually 
is, and a good model is a reflection of this reality. From a realist’s perspective, 
contradictory models cannot both be used to describe the same phenomenon because 
there is only one reality and hence only one accurate description of the phenomenon. 
When it comes to scientific modeling, I do not presuppose the same realist position that 
Duhem assumes. I believe that models are better thought of as problem-solving 
instruments rather than the means by which nature’s true essence is uncovered. As such, 
models are better served helping scientists abandon futile research programs and pointing 
them in the direction of more fertile projects. According to this instrumentalist view, 
contradictory models can be tolerated so long as they help scientists answer the questions, 
“Where do we go from here?” and “What would be a good project to do next?”32  
This happens to be the case with the various contradictory models of the atom 
discussed in chapter two. Recall that Margaret Morrison convincingly makes the 
argument that there are over thirty models of the atomic nucleus still used by scientists, 
and that some of the models blatantly contradict one another (e.g., the liquid drop and 
shell model). If we are to accept Duhem’s realist thesis, there can only be one model of 
the atomic nucleus that reflects the way the world actually is. The instrumentalist view, 
however, is more concerned with producing new hypotheses and making novel 
predictions than it is with getting the world right. Scientists who are realists will be the 
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first ones to tell you of their aspiration to reconcile various contradictory models. On the 
other hand, scientists with an instrumentalist perspective will continue to dabble in the 
messy, at times contradictory, world of model-making so long as they are contributing to 
a productive research program. 
 
4.4.3 Response to Superfluous Models 
 
Duhem’s argument that models are superfluous is the most stupefying because the 
history of science suggests otherwise. Probably the most famous (and successful!) 
physical model ever built in the history of science was Watson and Crick’s double helix 
model of DNA.33 Like all models, Watson and Crick’s DNA model went through several 
revisions. One such revision was made after Rosalind Franklin pointed out that the three-
chain model built by the two scientists could not possibly be correct because it did not 
provide “appropriate places for water molecules to attach themselves.”34 It is important to 
note that she realized this within minutes of inspecting the three-chain physical model.35   
Nevertheless, Franklin’s rejection of the three-chain model did not dissuade Watson and 
Crick. A year later the two returned to model building, inspired largely by the fact that 
their chief competitor, Linus Pauling, had not already won the Nobel Prize for solving the 
DNA structure riddle. This time, however, Watson suggested that they build a two-chain 
model instead of a three-chain one because of his hunch that “important biological 
objects come in pairs.”36 The end result was a double helix model made out of cardboard 
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that contained “the secret of life.”37 Watson and Crick restrained themselves from a full 
blown demonstration until they were able to replace the flimsy cardboard model with a 
more secure metal one that satisfied available x-ray data and the laws of 
stereochemistry.38  
When it comes to models and their significance, the point of the DNA example 
cannot be clearer: the construction and manipulation of cardboard and metal models 
contributed to Watson and Crick’s discovery of DNA’s double helix structure. Now the 
question arises, how much did the models contribute? If we take Watson’s personal 
memoir, The Double Helix, seriously, the answer is that models contributed greatly. As 
noted above, Watson and Crick’s original three-chain model was easily discarded by 
Franklin when she saw that their model could not possibly hold the amount of water 
needed by actual DNA. In other words, Franklin used the physical model as an 
instrument to problematize the duo’s initial theory of DNA structure. There is irony in 
Franklin using Watson and Crick’s model this way because it was Franklin herself who 
believed that using “tinker-toy-like models to solve biological structures was clearly a 
last resort.”39 In fact, Watson suggests that one of the reasons Franklin opposed their 
project from the beginning was her antipathy towards model-making in general. Watson 
remarks, “Obviously affecting Rosy’s transformation was her appreciation that our past 
hooting about model building represented a serious approach to science, not the easy 
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resort of slackers who wanted to avoid the hard work necessitated by an honest scientific 
career.”40  
However, the use of models in the discovery of DNA is mostly appreciated when 
we consider that the famous spiral staircase visual was more the result of Watson 
tinkering with his cardboard models than laboriously working on complex equations. As 
Watson’s account of the discovery goes, American crystallographer, Jerry Dohohue, 
informed him that he was probably working with the wrong tautomeric form of both 
guanine and thymine.41 If Donohue was correct, then Watson’s like-with-like base pair 
model was not going to work because the bases could not possibly bond the way that the 
above model required.42 It was at this point that Watson began playing with his cardboard 
models of adenine, thymine, guanine, and cytosine. In Watson’s own words: 
When Jerry [Donohue] came in I looked up, saw that it was not Francis, and 
began shifting the bases in and out of various other pairing possibilities. Suddenly 
I became aware that an adenine-thymine pair held together by two hydrogen 
bonds was identical in shape to a guanine-cytosine pair held together by at least 
two hydrogen bonds. All the hydrogen bonds seemed to form naturally; no 
fudging was required to make the two types of base pairs identical in shape.43      
 
In other words, Watson came to the realization that adenine bonded with thymine and 
guanine with cytosine by simply moving the different bases around until they bonded in a 
way that required “no fudging,” much the same way that someone puts a jigsaw puzzle 
together by moving different pieces around until they also form without “fudging.” The 
more skeptical Crick also had his hand at “pushing the bases together in a number of 
                                                 
40. Ibid., 212. 
 
41. Ibid., 190. 
 
42. Giere, Understanding Scientific Reasoning, 17. 
 
43. Watson, 196. 
90 
 
different ways”44 but inevitably came up with the same model formation as Watson. It is 
important to point out that the analogy between molecular bonding and jigsaw puzzles is 
simply not an attempt at a vivid description on my part. Rather, it was inimical to Watson 
and Crick’s model making method, which they appropriated from Linus Pauling. In 1951, 
Pauling, along with Robert Corey and Herman Branson, used the modeling technique to 
discover the structure of protein molecules.45 Historian Horace Judson described 
Pauling’s models as ‘open three dimensional puzzles’ that looked like they had to be 
fitted together.46 More importantly, Crick characterized Pauling’s model as “rather like a 
three-dimensional jigsaw puzzle with curious pieces joined together by rotatable 
joints.”47    
Notice that Watson’s account of the base pair discovery lacks any mention of 
‘deduction from abstract theories’ or ‘strict adherence to the rules of logic and reason’ or 
any other phrase made famous by Duhem in his attack on models and model-making. The 
reason is that Watson himself all but admits that the initial base pair discovery was not 
the result of some grandiose logical deduction from abstract first principles; instead it 
was made by simply moving different parts of the model up and down until they seemed 
to fit with one another. Now it would be absurd to accuse Watson and Crick of not 
applying their reasoning abilities when they had to reconcile their model with Chagraff’s 
rules, the x-ray diffraction data, and the laws of stereochemistry. They recognized more 
than anyone the need for their model to be logically consistent.  At the same time, it 
                                                 
44. Ibid., 197. 
 
45. Samuel Schindler., “Model, Theory, and Evidence in the Discovery of the DNA Structure,” 
British Journal of Philosophy of Science 59, no. 4 (2008), 630. 
 
46. Schindler, “Model, Theory, and Evidence,” 630. 
 
47. Francis Crick, as quoted in Schindler, Ibid., 630 – 631. 
91 
 
would be just as absurd to downplay the role that the “concrete, material, visible, and 
tangible”48 model played in their discovery. Duhem famously mocked the English 
approach to physics by remarking, “We though we were entering the tranquil and neatly 
ordered abode of reason, but we find ourselves in a factory.”49 Had Watson and Crick not 
taken this factory approach, it is doubtful that they would have ever uncovered “the secret 
of life.”50     
 
4.5 Duhem and Modern-day Theoretical Models 
 
Duhem objects to models on the basis that they are tangible, physical objects that 
one operates using one’s hands rather than abstract, mathematical entities that one 
cognizes through deductive reason alone. Anyone remotely familiar with the scientific 
modeling literature of the past twenty-five years will find Duhem’s view ironic in the 
sense that mathematical modeling has become the de facto model of the field. From 
Cartwright’s discussion of superconductivity, to Giere’s famous linear oscillator 
example, to Weisberg’s Lotka-Volterra model of predation, “dynamical mathematical 
models represented by differential equations” are all the rage. In fact, I am tempted to 
state that Duhem would not have the antipathy he had towards models had he lived in this 
era of mathematical models instead of his own mechanical era. But this would be a 
mistake because mathematical models (in the form of mathematical analogies) were 
around during Duhem’s time and they were still not enough to dissuade him. In 
particular, Thomson had already argued that the distribution of heat was mathematically 
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identical to the distribution of electricity and that the principles of each theory could be 
applied to one other.51 However, Duhem believed that analogies between different 
physical laws could be fruitful for discoveries, “but we should not confuse them with the 
use of models.”52 Duhem did not consider the application of a mathematical equation to a 
completely different field an instance of modeling because the process did not involve “a 
vision of concrete collections.”53 In other words, Duhem restricted the concept of model 
to mechanical models (i.e. models that are physical, visible, tangible, concrete, etc.) only. 
This means that the very notion of a mathematical model was an oxymoron to Duhem 
who thought that the abstract nature of mathematical entities precluded them from being 
classified in the same category as models, which he thought of strictly in terms of 
mechanical models.  
As mentioned above, contemporary scholarship has moved past the idea of 
equating models with mechanical models to the extent that the latter have become all but 
anachronistic. According to Giere, “The class of scientific models includes physical scale 
models and diagrammatic representations, but the models of most interest are theoretical 
models.”54 Notice that Giere does not say that theoretical (i.e. mathematical) models are 
of most interest to him; this suggests to me that he is making a general statement about 
philosophers of science in general and few would disagree with him. This paradigm shift 
in modeling is significant because it suggests that despite his fierce anti-modeling 
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diatribes, Duhem is more relevant than ever. One only needs to consider the war of words 
between Schrodinger and Heisenberg regarding the viability of quantum mechanics to 
realize that this is the case. In 1926 Schrödinger wrote, “I knew of his [Heisenberg’s] 
theory, of course, but felt discouraged not to say repelled, by the methods of the 
transcendental algebra, which appeared very difficult to me and by the lack of 
visualizability. [my emphasis]”55  In a letter to Schrödinger, Lorentz expressed his 
skepticism of quantum mechanics by remarking that “if I had to choose between your 
wave mechanics and the [quantum] mechanics, I would give preference to the former, 
owning to its greater visualizability. [my emphasis]”56 Heisenberg was acutely aware of 
how his fellow physicists perceived the mathematical turn in atomic physics and his 
message for them was to get over it. Regarding the views of Schrödinger, Heisenberg 
said, “The more I reflect on the physical portion of Schrödinger’s theory the more 
disgusting I find it. What Schrödinger writes on the visualizability of his theory…I 
consider trash.”57 In 1926 Heisenberg delivered a paper that many believe killed 
visualizability in atomic physics once and for all. In it he explained that “the electron and 
atom possess not any degree of physical reality as the objects of daily 
experience…Investigation of the type of physical reality which is proper to electrons and 
atoms is precisely the subject of atomic physics and thus also of ‘quantum mechanics’.”58  
Visualizability was dead; mathematics was king; and the word ‘model’ was to be the 
exclusive domain of abstract mathematics. This episode suggests that even in modern 
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physics Duhem’s dichotomy between the strong but narrow French mind and the ample 
but weak English mind are more than relevant than ever. Furthermore, if Heisenberg is 
correct about the non-visualizability of quantum mechanics, then Duhem sounds less like 
a raving, anti-model curmudgeon and more like a harbinger of the abstract, theoretical 
models to come. 
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Part II 
 
Chapter 5 
 
The Role of Models in Science Education 
 
 
5.1 Definitions of ‘Model’ in the Science Education Literature 
 
With the explosion of literature on modeling in science education, it should come 
as no surprise that definitions of the term ‘model’ are ubiquitous.  Consider some of these 
more refined definitions: 
A. Gilbert, Boulter, and Elmer - “A model in science is a representation of a 
phenomenon initially produced for a specific purpose...The specific purpose 
for which any model is originally produced in science…is as a simplification 
of the phenomenon to be used in enquiries to develop explanations of it.  
Many models are composed of entities which are concrete…Other models are 
composed of abstractions…A model can thus be of an idea.  A model can 
consist of a mixture of entities which are concrete (e.g. masses) and of entities 
which are treated as if they are concrete (e.g. forces acting on masses).  A 
model can be of a system…A model can be of an event…A model can be of a 
process…A Thought Experiment is a model of that group of processes known 
as a ‘scientific experiment’ carried out entirely within the mind as an idea, a 
mental model.”1 
 
B. Passmore and Stewart - “a scientific model is a set of ideas that describe a 
natural process.  A scientific model (construed of objects and the processes in 
which they participate) so conceived can be mentally “run,” given certain 
constraints, to explain or predict natural phenomena.”2 
 
C. Halloun - “A scientific model is…a conceptual system mapped, within the 
context of a specific theory, onto a specific pattern in the structure and/or 
behavior of a set of physical systems so as to reliably represent the pattern in 
question and serve specific functions in its regard.  These function may be 
exploratory (pattern description, explanation, and prediction or post-diction), 
or inventive (pattern reification in existing physical realities or in newly 
devised realities).  Mapping is done so the model captures the essence of the 
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pattern, and this by concentrating on specific but not all details in the physical 
realities exhibiting the pattern, particularly on primary details that are salient 
to the model function.”3 
 
D. National Research Council (NRC)  
 
• “In science, models are used to represent a system (or parts of a 
system) under study, to aid in the development of questions and 
explanations, to generate data that can be used to make predictions, and 
to communicate ideas to others.”4 
 
• “Models are tentative schemes or structures that correspond to real 
objects, events, or classes of events, and that have explanatory power.  
Models help scientists and engineers understand how things work.”5 
 
• “Scientists construct mental and conceptual models of phenomena. 
Mental models are internal, personal, idiosyncratic, incomplete, 
unstable, and essentially functional. They serve the purpose of being a 
tool for thinking with, making predictions, and making sense of 
experience. Conceptual models…are…explicit representations that are 
in some ways analogous to the phenomena they represent….Conceptual 
models are in some senses the external articulation of the mental 
models that scientists hold and are strongly interrelated with mental 
models.”6 
 
E. National Science Teachers Association (NSTA) - “A model is a 
representation, usually visual but sometimes mathematical, used to aid in the 
description or understanding of a scientific phenomenon, theory, empirical 
law, physical entity, organism, or part of an organism.”7 
 
F. American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)  
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• “A model of something is a simplified imitation of it that we hope can 
help us understand it better. A model may be a device, a plan, a 
drawing, an equation, a computer program, or even just a mental image. 
Whether models are physical, mathematical, or conceptual, their value 
lies in suggesting how things either do work or might work…Models 
may also mislead, however, suggesting characteristics that are not 
really shared with what is being modeled.”8 
 
• Physical, mathematical, and conceptual models are tools for learning 
about the things they are meant to resemble…The term model should 
probably be used to refer only to physical models in the early grades, 
but the notion of likenesses will be the central issue in using any kind 
of model.9 
 
Carefully looking at these definitions, all but one (Passmore and Stewart), explicitly state 
that models are representations or imitations of some sort.  Passmore’s and Stewart’s 
explanation for this exclusion is that although they believe that representation is central to 
model formation, it is not “the primary cognitive aim of scientists.”10  The NSTA’s and 
AAAS’s definitions are the only ones that make a direct reference to mathematical 
representations, while the NRC’s definition is the only one that overtly states that models 
represent “real” objects. All of these definitions, with the exception of the NSTA’s, 
explicitly state that models provide explanations.11  Three of the authors, Passmore & 
Stewart, Halloun, and the NRC, maintain that models can be used to make predictions 
about phenomena.  When we look at the NRC’s, NSTA’s, and AAA’s conceptions of 
what a model is they are alike in that they believe that models have a pedagogical 
function.  This is not surprising because the authors sympathetic to this definition are all 
                                                 
8. American Association for the Advancement of Science, Science for All Americans (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), 168. 
 
9. American Association for the Advancement of Science, Benchmarks for Science Literacy (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 267. 
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science education organizations whose very function is inherently pedagogical.  Gilbert, 
Boulter, and Elmer and AAAS are alone in explicitly stating that models are 
simplifications of phenomena.  Passmore and Stewart, Gilbert, Boulter, and Elmer, and 
the NRC are the only authors who refer to mental models. And Halloun’s definition 
stands alone in expressing a direct relationship between models and theories. Even 
though five of the six authors above agree that models represent and generate 
explanations, the science education community is nowhere close to agreeing upon a 
collection of necessary and sufficient conditions as to what makes a model a model.              
 
5.2 Comparison with the Integration Account 
 
In Section 3.1.3, the integration account defines a model as a temporary collection 
of integrated elements, whose purpose is to help scientists solve different kinds of 
scientific problems. Recall that the elements included in the above definition include all 
of the ideas, concepts, processes, physical instruments, and experiments that are involved 
in constructing a model. In addition to the latter must be included all of the: laws of 
nature, theories, research programs, tacit knowledge (including metaphysical 
assumptions), sources and amount of funding, interpretations of data, historical 
development of a field, as well as any fortuitous, non-rational contingencies that may 
have contributed to the construction and development of a model (i.e. luck), and themata.  
In the present section, the shortcomings of the definitions articulated in section 
5.1 will be thoroughly explored and eventually compared with the integration account. 
Because the preceding definitions share many of the same shortcomings, they will be 
treated as a whole, rather than scrutinized individually. 
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5.2.1 Shortcomings of Definitions in 5.1 
 
Representation 
 
Gilbert, Boulter, and Elmer begin their definition by stating that a model is a 
“representation of a phenomenon.”12 Halloun argues that models “reliably represent” the 
patterns of structures and behaviors of physical systems.13 Like Halloun, the NRC also 
believes that models are representations of a system or part of a system. The NSTA’s 
definition is similar to Gilbert, Boulter, and Elmore’s in that they also maintain that a 
model is a representation of a phenomenon, further adding that models can be visual as 
well as mathematical.14 The NRC does not explicitly use the word ‘representation,’ 
however their definition certainly implies it by defining models as schemes or structures 
that correspond to real objects and events.15 As I mentioned towards the end of 5.1, five 
out of the six definitions either explicitly or implicitly refer to models as representations 
of a phenomenon, system, or object. The only authors that exclude any kind of allusion to 
representation are Passmore and Stewart.    
The problem of representation was thoroughly explored in chapter 2 of this 
project. However, given science education’s fixation on models as representations, I 
believe that it is more than appropriate to revisit some of those arguments here. The 
problem with defining models as a representation is that such a definition assumes that 
models have some kind of designated target of which they are a representation, such as: 
the atom, DNA, the ether, etc. The inadequacy of this targeting approach is two-fold: (1) 
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not all models are representations of real phenomena or systems, and (2) in many 
instances it is unclear what the target of a model is actually like. Regarding (1), James 
Clerk Maxwell is famous (or infamous) for creating models that have no parallel in the 
real world. For instance, in order to think mathematically about Faraday’s lines of force, 
Maxwell re-imagined electromagnetic phenomena as an incompressible fluid flowing in 
both directions at varying velocities through a tube.16 Now Maxwell was not naïve 
enough to believe that electromagnetism actually consisted of an incompressible fluid 
and tubes. What he did believe, however, was that the experimental physics of his time 
provided him with very little that would help him understand electromagnetism, let alone 
formulate it mathematically. So what he did instead was create “his own artificial physics 
to suit the purpose he set himself.”17 Maxwell’s “tubes of incompressible fluid” are 
wholly contrived in the sense that they are “not intended to illustrate anything in nature” 
and certainly do “not represent a physical system.”18 But this does not at all diminish the 
significance of Maxwell’s model because the aforementioned contrivance of fluid and 
tubes laid the groundwork for his famous Laws of Electromagnetism, which make 
computers, the Internet, television, radio, and radar all possible.  
Another reason why science educators need to overcome their commitment to 
representation is that it is not uncommon for there to be several empirically adequate 
models of a single phenomenon at the same time. In chapter 2 I discussed the fact that 
there are over 30 working models of the atom currently used by physicists for their 
                                                 
16. Giora Hon and Bernard R. Goldstein, “Maxwell’s Contrived Analogy: An Early Version of the  
Methodology of Modeling,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 43, no.4 (2012): 243. 
 
17. Hon and Goldstein, “Maxwell’s Contrived Analogy,” 244. 
 
18. Ibid., 237. 
101 
 
specific purposes. Each physicist uses a particular model of the atom because it either fits 
their interpretation of the data, fits their predictions, fits their preconceived notions (e.g. 
theories), or a combination of some or all of these reasons. The point is that it is 
unproductive to discuss models in terms of a relationship to a target because scientists 
themselves have moved past such talk and are mostly concerned with how models help 
them solve scientific problems. Thomas Nickels goes a step further and adds that, 
“Inconsistency, that worst of logical sins, is today widely recognized as a frequent 
characteristic of scientific theorizing…Many scientific theories have been plagued by 
inconsistencies and near-inconsistencies or ‘conceptual blowups’, yet several such 
theories have been extremely fruitful.”19 While some scientists still concern themselves 
with whether or not their model is the one true representation of a phenomenon, others 
move forward to the next problem to be solved, the next fruitful research program, and 
even the next research grant. The integration account is adamant that scientific modeling 
must move on to a post-representation phase where a model’s value is tied to its 
“problem solving capacity”20 instead of how isomorphic it is to a given target. According 
to Nickels, “Scientists are not content…to become spectators of the universe, with their 
models and theories being representational object of epistemic admiration…Rather, they 
want and need tools that they can use to get on with their work.”21 
 
Simplicity 
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Gilbert, Boulter, and Elmer continue with their definition, maintaining that, “The 
specific purpose for which any model is originally produced in science…is as a 
simplification of the phenomenon to be used in enquiries to develop explanations of it.”22 
The worrisome phrase in this portion of the definition is “simplification,” but not for the 
reason one would expect. Admittedly, it is tempting to argue that models are not 
simplifications by simply pointing to any mathematical model used by a physicist or a 
statistical model used by an economist and asking the rhetorical question, “Are those 
models simple?”. However, this would be a case of equivocation, mistaking the terms 
“simplification” and “simple.” To say that a model is a simplification of a phenomenon is 
to say that it is a simple representation of the phenomenon in question. That is, it is a 
more accessible version of the phenomenon itself. On the other hand, when a model is 
described as simple, the model itself is being described as basic and accessible, which has 
nothing to do with the relationship between model and phenomenon. For example, the 
Millenium Run model used by cosmologists to simulate the early universe consists of a 
number of complex mathematical and statistical models hardly anyone would classify as 
simple. But at the same time, because it is a simulation of how cosmologists think the 
early universe was created, it is nevertheless a simplification of the universe moments 
after the Big Bang.  
The real issue with simplification is that it allows the Duhemian narrative 
regarding the dispensability of models to continue. If models are viewed as simplified 
versions of a phenomenon, then once that phenomenon is fully comprehended the model 
has outlived its usefulness. But as I argue in chapter four, this is far from the case. 
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According to this particular train of thought, Watson and Crick could have very easily 
discovered the structure of DNA without constructing their cardboard and metal plate 
models. Logically speaking, the latter scenario is definitely a possibility; however, the 
fact of the matter is that Watson and Crick would not have discovered the structure of 
DNA when they did, had they not busied themselves with model-making. In fact, Watson 
makes a point to stress the importance of model making in the DNA discovery. In his 
personal memoir, he explains,  
The a-helix had not been found by only staring at X-ray pictures…In place of 
pencil and paper, the main working tools were a set of molecular models 
superficially resembling the toys of preschool children….We could thus see no 
reason why we should not solve DNA in the same way. All we had to do was to 
construct a set of molecular models and begin to play—with luck, the structure 
would be a helix.23  
 
To argue that Watson and Crick’s discovery could have been made without models is not 
only idle speculation, it is also an affront to Watson and Crick themselves, whose 
creativity and imagination led them to unprecedented ideas that would forever change 
humankind’s understanding of the natural world.               
According to integration account, scientists do not resort to models out of 
intellectual desperation; rather they construct them because models have a proven track 
record when it comes to solving scientific problems. The integration account believes that 
the model itself, replete with all of the elements (e.g. theories, laws, materials, funding, 
etc.) that go into its construction, is just as endemic to the scientific process as the 
problem it is helping to solve. In fact, I would even go so far as to say that 
groundbreaking discoveries discussed in the preceding paragraph occurred precisely 
because all of the elements in each respective model happened to be integrated in just the 
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right way, at just the right time, with just the right people doing the integrating. In other 
words, the model works precisely because the model’s elements interact in such a way 
that builds-in justification. This not only speaks to the contingency and fragility of 
discovery; it also supports my contention that Duhem is unequivocally mistaken when it 
comes to the dispensability of models. 
 
Explanation 
 
Four out of the six definitions in 5.1 explicitly state that models possess an 
explanatory function. Passmore and Steward describe scientific models as objects or 
processes that can be mentally run in order to explain or predict natural phenomena.24 
Halloun believes that models have an exploratory function that includes explanation. 25 
According to the NGSS, models are used to aid in the development of explanations. 26 
And the NRC defines models as tentative schemes or structures that have explanatory 
power. 27   
The focus of the science education community on a model’s explanatory power is 
significant because it clearly demonstrates their position that a model’s value is epistemic 
rather than instrumental (i.e. problem solving). When science educators remark that 
scientific models explain, what they are really saying is that scientific models provide 
true explanations of how entities and processes in the world actually work. It might be 
the case that science educators are weakening their requirements regarding representation 
and similarity (i.e. models do not have to completely represent their targets and be similar 
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to them in all aspects), but we cannot imagine this when it comes to explanations. In 
science education, it is all but assumed that scientific explanations are true explanations, 
with the only caveat being that a day will come when model x’s explanation of 
phenomenon/process a might be surpassed by model y’s truer explanation of the said 
phenomenon/process and so on. The science education community makes 
epistemological matters their concern because that is what they believe the scientific 
community is concerned with. But this belief is ultimately misguided. In “Kuhn’s 
Philosophy of Scientific Practice,” Joseph Rouse maintains that “Scientists’ primary 
concern is not whether present beliefs are likely to be true, but instead whether available 
models of inquiry can effectively guide further research.”28 According to Rouse, 
phlogiston theory was not replaced because it was empirically falsified; it was abandoned 
because of its failure to guide further research into the new gases discovered in pneumatic 
chemistry.29  
The science education community has to come to grips with the view that 
scientists are less worried about the explanatory power of their models and more 
concerned with the quality and quantity of the research projects that their models 
generate. Contrary to popular belief, model builders are not driven and motivated by the 
question, “Is my model true?” Quite the reverse, scientists are more future-oriented than 
we give them credit for. In place of epistemic questions like the one above, scientists are 
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more concerned with more pragmatic questions such as, “Where do we go from here?,” 
“What would be a good project to do next?,” and “What is the next big thing?”30  
Again, the science education community holds the epistemic view because they 
believe it reflects the view of the science community at large. But as I have attempted to 
argue in this section, the scientific community itself does not view models 
epistemologically. If the science education community wants what it does in the 
classroom to reflect what science practitioners do in the real world, they need to first free 
themselves from 20th century philosophy of science’s (specifically, logical positivism’s) 
fascination with justification. 
 
5.3 Students and Teachers’ View of Models 
 
This section will take a look at the views of various science teachers and students 
as it pertains to scientific models and compare their accounts with the science education 
literature. By the end of the section the reader will see an obvious connection between the 
literature and the teachers and students’ views; namely, all of the above views are 
inconsistent with the integration account and current scientific practice.            
 
5.3.1 Science Teachers and Students’ Model Epistemology Levels 
 
One of the most telling studies concerning students’ epistemology of models 
(what they are, their use, under what conditions they can be changed, etc.) was performed 
by Grosslight et al.31  The study surveyed three distinct groups (seventh graders, eleventh 
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grade honor students, and experts32) to see if there was a noticeable difference between 
the ways that they all thought about and conceived of models.  The survey questions were 
classified into five categories: (1) kinds of models (e.g. What comes to your mind when 
you hear the word ‘model’?), (2) purposes of models (e.g. What are models used for?), 
(3) designing and creating models (e.g. How close does a model have to be to the thing 
itself?), (4) changing a model (e.g. Would a scientist ever change a model?), and (5) 
multiple models (e.g. Can a scientist have more than one model for the same thing?).   
Using the data from the surveys, the authors were able to identify three general 
levels of thinking about models, each level exhibiting a more sophisticated epistemology 
than the previous one. A level one understanding implies that the subjects surveyed 
believe that models are simple copies of reality. That is, “Models are thought to be useful 
because they can provide copies of actual objects or actions.”33 Those who possess a 
level two understanding are more epistemologically sophisticated than their level one 
counterparts in that they no longer believe that models provide complete representations 
of reality. Instead, they realize that models are “repackaged” by modelers in order to 
simplify or highlight specific aspects of the things being modeled.34  However, those at a 
level two understanding still focus on how models represent reality and do not consider 
how models can be used to generate novel ideas and theories, an essential characteristic 
of level three understanding according to Grosslight et al. Unlike those at a level one and 
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two understanding, those at level three have move passed the idea that models are 
supposed to act as mirrors of reality. 
Grosslight et al.’s study found that a majority (67%) of the 7th graders surveyed 
demonstrated a level one understanding.35  The 11th grade honors students fared much 
better with only 23% of them scoring at level one.36  The rest of them either received a 
pure level two score (36%), or a mix of level one and two scores (36%).37  None of the 
11th grade honor students, however, scored at either a pure level three or mixed level two 
and three.38  As for the experts, all of them received scores consistent with a level three 
understanding.39  For Grosslight et al. the main conclusion of the study is clear: middle 
and high school students’ epistemology of models is rather unsophisticated when 
compared to experts in the field.  The latter understand that models can be used to drive 
further research, while the former have retained the naïve view that models are only 
useful insofar as they transmit information about the world as it really is.  This 
understanding of models is dangerous in that it encourages students to think of models as 
“a package of facts…that needs to be memorized” rather than as dynamic tools of inquiry 
that aid both our interpretation and construction of reality.40 
Since Grosslight et al.’s study, researchers have been interested in the idea of 
epistemological levels of understanding of models and applying these levels to both 
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students and teachers alike.  Van Driel and Verloop looked at secondary teachers’ 
understanding of model epistemology using an open-item questionnaire and discovered 
that, for the most part, teachers possessed a level one (naïve) understanding of models.41  
In 2001, Harrison interviewed 10 experienced high school teachers with the following 
results: two scored at pure level 1, two scored at mixed level 1 and 2, four scored at 
mixed level 2 and 3, and two scored at pure level 3.42  Although Harrison’s study is more 
optimistic than J. Van Driel and Verlop’s in that only 20% of the participants scored at 
pure level 1, it is nevertheless discouraging that only 20% received the desired score of 
pure level 3 (sophisticated).43  Both of these studies should make us skeptical of 
Grosslight et al.’s study as it pertains to the subcategory of experts.  In their study, the 
physics teacher scored at pure level three, but as the previous studies point out, such a 
score is the exception rather than the rule. 
When we compare the results of these three studies to the integration account, it is 
clear that the pervasive view amongst secondary school teachers and students are: (1) that 
models are supposed to represent their targets, and (2) that as models continually 
approach their targets, they become more and more true. In other words, both view 
models epistemologically rather than instrumentally. What matters to secondary teachers 
and students alike is a model’s ability to represent the truth, not its potential to solve 
problems and guide further research.  
 
5.3.2 Rutherford’s Case Study on Models of Light 
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An intriguing case study was performed by Margaret Rutherford on models of 
light.44 Rutherford chose the phenomenon of light because like the interior of the atom 
there is no single consensus model that applies to it; rather there are three distinct models 
referred to by scientists: particle, wave, and dual particle-wave. The particle-wave model 
is certainly the most interesting because its construction is essentially an admission by 
physicists that in certain instances light behaves as a particle, while in others it behaves as 
a wave. One of the most interesting aspects of Rutherford’s study was the data she 
gathered on models of light from an analysis of twelve textbooks (biology, chemistry, 
and physics) and six teacher interviews.45 Her examination led her to the surprising 
conclusion that “The single most used model in teaching light is neither the wave nor the 
particle model.  It is the original diagrammatic model where a straight line with an arrow 
on one end is said to represent a ‘ray’ of light.”46  I say surprising because the most 
frequent textbook model used to represent light was neither of the three used by 
practicing scientists.  Although models are understood to be simplifications of their 
targets, the simplifications must not be so drastic that they obscure the most important 
properties of the phenomenon or process being represented. It is not uncommon for 
models to miss their respective targets, but this case is entirely different. It is as if the 
textbook authors knew which models they had to choose from, yet consciously created an 
entirely different model altogether. This view is supported by one interviewed teacher 
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who recommended that the wave model of light should only be introduced to students 
seventeen and older.47  
The implication of this particular case study is of great consequence because it 
demonstrates a clear demarcation between scientific models on the one hand and 
pedagogical models on the other. Scientific models are the models used by the scientific 
community to help its members solve problems and guide future research, while 
pedagogical models are the models used by the educational community to teach students 
about the current beliefs of the scientific community. It cannot be stressed enough that 
these two conceptions of models are at cross purposes—the former instrumental, the 
latter epistemological. The ray model described above is a pedagogical model with no 
equivalent in real-world science. But this by itself does not render it useless, because as I 
argue in chapter two, a model (even a pedagogical model) can be devoid of a target so 
long as it fulfills its problem-solving function. In this particular instance, the problem that 
requires resolution is pedagogical rather than scientific. The teacher in question is 
struggling to get her students to understand the nature and behavior of light, not 
attempting to solve a new problem in the field. Completion of her pedagogical task 
requires the use of models, but ones that are markedly different than scientists are 
certainly accustomed to. The rest of this chapter will explore the nature and necessity of 
this scientific/pedagogical model distinction.       
 
5.3.3 Content Knowledge vs. Pedagogical Content Knowledge: An Analogy 
 
To better understand the relationship between scientific models and pedagogical 
models, one should consider Lee Shulman’s distinction between content knowledge and 
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pedagogical content knowledge. Content knowledge consists of all the technical 
knowledge of a particular subject. In science, scientific content knowledge consists of all 
the particular theories, laws, and equations that scientists employ on a daily basis. 
Pedagogical content knowledge is different. Pedagogical content knowledge “represents 
the blending of content and pedagogy into an understanding of how particular topics, 
problems, or issues are organized, represented, and adapted to the diverse interests and 
abilities of learners, and presented for instruction.”48 It is the knowledge that educators 
possess that enables them to “transform” erudite academic content into something more 
manageable for their students.49 In science, scientific pedagogical content knowledge 
consists of the body of teaching knowledge that teachers use to make the learning of 
theories, laws, and equations more approachable. In this regard, pedagogical content 
knowledge is actually more of a skill or ability than a body of knowledge. 
The relationship between scientific models and pedagogical models follows very 
much the same logic. Scientific models are the models employed by scientists to solve 
scientific problems and guide future research. Like content knowledge, scientific models 
are quite technical and beyond the comprehension of the uninitiated layperson. 
Pedagogical models, on the other hand, are the simplified models that teachers use to 
explain concepts such as: Maxwell’s equations, the nature of light, and the structure of 
the atom. Like pedagogical content knowledge, pedagogical models also involve a 
transformative process whereby depth, rigor, and complexity are sacrificed for the sake of 
basic understanding.             
                                                 
48. Lee Shulman, “Knowledge and Teaching: Foundations of the New Reform,” Harvard 
Educational Review, 57, no.1 (1987): 8. 
 
49. Lee Shulman, “Those Who Understand: Knowledge Growth in Teaching,” Educational 
Researcher 15, no. 2 (1986)” 6. 
113 
 
Those familiar with constuctivism in science education realize that the 
transformation from scientific models to pedagogical models is only an intermediate 
stage in a larger and much more complex network of students’ scientific knowledge 
construction.50 The transformation process begins with the scientist’s own conception of 
her scientific model and her external representation of it in some kind of physical form 
(e.g., peer-reviewed publication, conference presentation, etc.). This external 
representation comes to be the scientific model per se. It is the model that subsequent 
textbook authors look upon when writing their textbooks. However, even the seemingly 
innocuous expression of a scientific model in a textbook already involves some kind of 
knowledge transformation because the textbook author must not only interpret the 
expressed scientific model, she must also represent it in a manner appropriate to the 
students who will be employing the textbook. Here is where we first see teachers enter 
the picture. They are supposed to act as mediators between the models that students see in 
their textbooks and the students themselves. In order to mediate, however, the teacher 
must have a firm understanding of the model used in the textbook. To this end, the 
teacher will reference several sources (e.g., the teacher’s edition of the textbook, various 
websites, material collected at professional development training, and other media) to 
develop her own understanding of the model, which may or may not directly correlate to 
the textbook author’s conception. The next stage is where pedagogical content knowledge 
is created. After the teacher has done her due diligence and is finally satisfied with her 
understanding of how a particular model is presented in a textbook, she will then 
transform her understanding into a lesson plan conducive for all of her students, including 
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Special Education students and English Language Learners (ELLs). Even though the 
textbook authors have already simplified their models for a student audience, veteran 
teachers know that these modifications are not enough and will require even further 
simplification. But knowledge transformation, or knowledge construction if you like, 
does not end there. Students do not passively receive models, no matter how simplified 
their textbooks and teachers make them. A student’s background assumptions, as well as 
their prior knowledge, will both inevitably affect how they come to understand a model. 
In the end, a student’s conception of a particular scientific model will be an 
amalgamation of: the scientist’s expression of her model to the public, the textbook 
author’s interpretation of the scientific model, the textbook author’s simplification of the 
scientific model, the teacher’s interpretation of the model as it appears in the textbook, 
the teacher’s further simplification of the model in the textbook, a student’s previous 
academic knowledge, in addition to any knowledge that the student brings with her from 
her cultural background. 
The utter complexity of this system of knowledge transformation and acquisition 
is why I have been reluctant to support the almost ubiquitous view that models are 
representations. When we consider the process above, the only times we deal directly 
with scientific models are when the scientist is working out the scientific model in her 
head and when she makes the model available to the public, every other manifestation of 
it is a pedagogical model that is modified and simplified for the sake of creating 
pedagogical content knowledge. A physicist’s conception of the atom is not the same as a 
textbook author’s, a teacher’s, or a student’s. This is not to say that the physicist’s 
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conception is superior or ‘closer to the truth,’ but at the same time the two conceptions 
are so different that each might as well be “responding to a different world.”51                                                 
 
5.3.4 Hybrid Models 
 
One unique kind of pedagogical model that Justi and Gilbert discuss is called a 
hybrid model. A hybrid model is “constituted of elements of different historical models 
treated as if they constituted a coherent whole.”52 In other words, a hybrid model is 
simply a combination of several different pedagogical models put together to create a 
single model. Justi came across the concept of hybrid models when she was exploring 
how different science textbooks in Brazil represented the atom. To her surprise, one 
particular textbook depicted the atom as having both an electron orbit and an electron 
cloud in the same model. According to Justi, the problem with this dual representation is 
that students come to believe that “there is an absolute and unchanging conception of the 
atom” and “if a given model is changed by another scientist, the scientist who had 
proposed that model had made experimental mistakes.”53 In a second article on hybrid 
models, but this time on models of chemical kinetics, Justi and Gilbert specify their 
criticism of hybrid models by stating that they are not suggesting that teachers and 
textbooks “should present a linear progression of historical models of a given subject.”54 
Rather, they should “make the backgrounds of their expressed models clear. They should 
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state the context in which they are valid.” 55 Meaning, Just and Gilbert do not believe that 
textbooks should adhere to the principle of verisimilitude when presenting different 
models of the atom, whereby each successive model is considered to be “more true” or 
“closer to reality” than its predecessor. Instead, they want textbooks to carefully articulate 
the transition from one model to the next, explaining why certain properties get replaced 
while others are retained. Just and Gilbert are optimistic that the inclusion of such 
textbook explanations will encourage teachers to discuss the nuanced process of how a 
model emerges from empirical data, including the role that interpretation plays in the 
process.56          
While I sympathize with Justi and Gilbert’s desire to inform students about how 
scientists develop scientific models, the hybrid models under examination are 
pedagogical models in school textbooks, which means their primary purpose is to teach 
scientific concepts. The hybrid model of the atom that Justi and Gilbert discussed was 
intended to teach physics students about the composition of the atom, specifically the 
behavior of the electron(s) within it. Given the ambiguous nature of the atomic hybrid 
model discussed above, one would not be surprised if students walked away with more 
questions than answers (Do electrons behave like orbits, a cloud, or both?). That being 
said, I maintain that Justi and Gilbert’s condemnation of the hybrid model is premature. I 
say this because we do not know the intentions of the textbook authors or how the 
classroom teachers integrated the models into their lesson plans. If the authors intended to 
portray the true nature of the atom, then their pedagogical model was a poor one indeed. 
However, what if their intentions were more humble? It is entirely possible that they 
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would be content if their readers walked away knowing the difference between an 
electron orbit and an electron orbital (i.e. electron cloud) and that the electron behaves 
both ways. If students are able to use the hybrid model to retain this particular content 
knowledge it must be considered a pedagogical success regardless of how poorly it 
represents its target and how invaluable it is for practicing scientists. This compromise is 
an inevitable part of the Faustian bargain educators make when they transform scientific 
models into pedagogical models: as models become more student-friendly, they become 
more unrecognizable to the very scientists who developed them in the first place. 
Cesar Delgado is correct that one of the most daunting problems facing teachers 
who employ models on an everyday basis is navigating the tension between conceptual 
and metaconceptual goals.57 Conceptual goals have to do with content knowledge, while 
metaconcpetual goals concern broader issues in the history, philosophy, and sociology of 
science. In particular, Delgado believes that pedagogical models are susceptible to 
several metaconceptual problems, chief among them being “epistemological 
overreach.”58 Epistemological overreach is committed when a model implies much more 
certainty and knowledge than is actually warranted.59 For example, a thin-line curve of 
Boyle’s Law suggests an exact mathematical relationship between pressure and volume 
when in reality the actual data points collected by ecologists are messy, scattered, and 
stochastically varied.60  
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At this point the science teacher has a quandary. If she presents the graph of 
Boyle’s Law as it is usually presented in science textbooks, she will be guilty of 
epistemological overreach. On the other hand, if she informs her students that the thin-
line curve of Boyle’s Law is only a graph under ideal (i.e. fictional) circumstances and 
does not exist anywhere in the real world, she may risk confusing her students (or even 
worse, alienating them). AAAS suggest that only high school students and above should 
be introduced to the abstract models presented in computer simulations and mathematical 
models because of their more advanced cognitive ability, but as Grosslight et al’s study 
has suggested, 11th grade honor students are for the most part still naïve realists who have 
an unsophisticated understanding of the relationship between models and reality.61 And 
even if students at this age begin to show signs of metapconceptual awareness, the effects 
on the retention of basic content knowledge could be deleterious.                    
 
5.3.5 Stages of Model Complexity 
 
One commonplace assertion regarding how models should be taught in school is 
that the level of model complexity should increase as a student progresses from 
elementary school all the way to high school (and for many, college). Complexity in this 
sense simply means abstraction. Students at the elementary level should be introduced to 
tangible, physical models such as model cars and trains, at the middle school level they 
should become acquainted with more abstract models such computer simulations of 
birds’ flocking patterns, and at the high school level and above they should familiarize 
themselves with purely abstract, mathematical models such as Maxwell’s equations.62 
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Now I do not disagree with either the psychological foundation of the recommendations 
or with the recommendations themselves. My problem is with the implicit assumption 
that as a student’s model knowledge becomes more and more abstract; her model 
knowledge will bear a closer resemblance to the scientist’s model knowledge. In other 
words, there comes a point where a student transcends the use of pedagogical models and 
begins to employ scientific models, the models that scientists themselves use. This is 
certainly erroneous. High school students using the law of gravitation to calculate the 
force between two bodies look like they are doing what physicists are doing, but they are 
not because the law of gravitation that high school students use is a ceteris pariubus law 
that “can explain in only very simple, or ideal, circumstances. It can account for why the 
force is as it is when just gravity is at work; but it is of no help for cases in which both 
gravity and electricity matter. Once the ceteris paribus modifier has been attached, the 
law of gravity is irrelevant to the more complex and interesting situations.”63 Research 
scientists have to deal with these “complex and interesting situations” on an everyday 
basis, but high school students (and even most undergraduates) do not. The quicker we 
come to the realization that pedagogical models are created for educational purposes and 
scientific models for research purposes, the less time we will waste trying to transform 
classrooms into miniature research laboratories.  
The recent mantra in science education has been that students will learn science 
by doing science. Which leads me to the obvious question, “Is school science even 
science?” My reply is that students who are doing school science are doing school 
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science, but not cutting-edge, research science. As Keith S. Taber points out (citing 
Richard Feynman), “even the most respected physicist may find it a difficult task to 
explain a physicist’s notion of energy to the layman”.64 In my estimation, the science 
education community needs to make peace with the scientific model/pedagogical model 
distinction once and for all. Only then can it construct curriculums that are ontologically, 
epistemically, and “intellectually honest.”65          
     
5.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored teachers’ and students’ ontological and epistemic attitudes 
towards models and modeling. Unfortunately, the literature suggests that both their 
ontological and epistemic views are lamentably naïve in that they believe that models are 
supposed to be mirrors of nature and provide true explanations of physical reality. (The 
reader will recall that chapters 2 – 4 of this study have gone a long way in demonstrating 
the shortcomings of both of these assertions.) Later in the chapter, I diagnosed the root of 
the problem: a failure to distinguish between scientific models and pedagogical models, 
or the models scientists use and the models teachers use. So long as teachers and students 
see themselves as professional scientists-in-training, doing what real scientists do, they 
are going to adhere to their simple-minded ontological and epistemic attitudes.  
The following chapter is a natural continuation of the present one. While this 
chapter discussed teachers’ and students’ attitudes towards modeling, the proceeding 
chapter explores three model-based lessons that have already been implemented in 
secondary science and engineering classrooms. By exploring the lessons themselves, we 
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can discern if teachers’ thinking about models has become more sophisticated, or if they 
are simply perpetuating the same naïve ontological and epistemic sentiments.         
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Chapter 6 
Three Case Studies on Modeling 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The following chapter discusses three examples of modeling lessons that have 
been applied in the classroom. Case study 1 comes from mathematics, case study 2 from 
engineering, and case study 3 comes from biology. My discussion of each case study 
includes: (1) a detailed description of the lesson, (2) an in depth analysis where I provide 
critique, praise, or both, (3) and a brief conclusion that suggests possible ways to improve 
the modeling lesson under review. At the end of the chapter I return to the issue of 
mathematical models and explain why our approach to them should be one of caution 
rather than wholehearted commitment.       
 
6.2 Mathematical Modeling Case Study 
 
6.2.1 What is Mathematical Modeling? 
 
According to the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), 
“The basic idea of mathematical modeling is to find a mathematical relationship that 
behaves in the same way the system of interest does.”1 The system in question can be 
anything from an abstract system in mathematics, physics, and economics to a physical 
system in biology, geology, and engineering.2 Consider Boyle’s Law, p α 1/v, where p is 
the pressure of the gas, α means “proportional to,” and v is the volume of the gas. 
According to Boyle’s Law, there is a direct relationship between pressure and volume 
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such that as the pressure of a gas increases, the volume of its container decreases. This 
means that scientists do not need to continuously increase the pressure of a gas and 
measure its volume to know that the volume is going to decrease because the 
mathematical model (Boyle’s Law) already provides us with this information. 
Mathematical models play an essential role in scientific investigation in that they allow 
scientists to make approximations regarding how a system might or might not behave, 
which is especially useful in those sciences where empirical data is notoriously lacking 
(e.g. cosmology).  
 
6.2.2 Description 
 
In “Using the Scientific Method to Engage Mathematical Modeling: An 
Investigation of pi,” Lester Archer and Karen Ng develop an experimental activity 
ambitiously attempting to engage 6th and 7th graders in mathematical modeling via the 
‘scientific method,’ The suggested activity is intended to get students to realize the close 
relationship that exists between science and mathematics. On the one hand, most (if not 
all) scientific explanations can be reduced to mathematical explanations. On the other 
hand, mathematical discoveries might be aided by duplicating the processes and methods 
used in many scientific discoveries. The article under consideration only concerns itself 
with the second half of the science-mathematics relationship; namely, how science can be 
of benefit to mathematics.            
The mathematical modeling activity selected by Lester and Ng focuses on the 
relationship between the circumference and diameter of various, everyday circular 
objects. The envisioned activity is simple enough. First, a group of students will measure 
the diameter of a penny using a ruler. Next, they will record their observation on a data 
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table. They will repeat these steps two more times, ending up with a total of three 
measurements for the penny’s diameter. Next, the students will take the three 
measurements and calculate the penny’s average diameter and record it on the data table. 
After measuring the diameter of the penny, the students will move on to measuring its 
circumference. In order to do this, the students will either use a tape measure or a piece of 
string. The students will do this a total of three times and record their results on the data 
table. After all three circumference measurements have been taken, they will calculate the 
average circumference of the penny and record it on the data table. Once the students 
have calculated both the penny’s average diameter and circumference, they will be asked 
to find the ratio between the two. The calculated ratio will then be recorded onto the data 
table. This process will be repeated for several more circular objects, including a: hula 
hoop, plate, CD, and cookie.        
The authors suggest that this activity can be performed in at least two different 
ways. First, students can be explicitly informed at the outset of the activity that the 
relationship between a circular object’s diameter and circumference should remain 
constant. In other words, for each circular object measured, the diameter-circumference 
ratio should be one and the same. By providing students with this information (what the 
authors call the hypothesis), it becomes the students’ task to either support it or disprove 
it with their recorded data; hence, the authors’ belief that the application of the ‘scientific 
method’ supports students’ mathematical modeling abilities.     
For the most part, the alternative version of the activity is one and the same, with 
the exception that students will not be privy to the diameter-circumference hypothesis. 
The hope is that they will discover the consistency of the ratio all by themselves, without 
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any prompting. The variation of the first activity is supposed to encourage mathematical 
discovery through mathematical modeling. The point is not so much to support or 
disprove a proposed hypothesis, as it is to discover mathematical relationships between 
variables all on one’s own.   
 
6.2.3 Analysis 
 
While it is admirable that Archer and Ng’s attempt to integrate science and 
mathematics in a classroom activity, at the same time it is difficult to avoid the elephant 
in the room: their commitment to the anachronistic ‘scientific method’. Although the 
authors acknowledge that the ‘scientific method’ is not at all comprehensive when it 
comes to answering questions and understanding about the world, they nevertheless 
maintain that it “is a good approximation to use.”3 But for whom is it a good 
approximation? According to the traditional ‘scientific method,’ a scientist makes some 
initial observations, develops a question from those observations, proposes a hypothesis 
that answers the question, formulates an experiment to test the hypothesis, performs the 
experiment, records data from the experiment, compares the data with the proposed 
hypothesis, and either concludes that the data supports the hypothesis or that it does not 
support it. If it is the case that the data does not support the hypothesis, then a new 
hypothesis is proposed and the cycle begins anew. However, one glaring problem with 
the traditional ‘scientific method’ is that it heavily favors the empirical sciences at the 
expense of the theoretical sciences. According to the ‘scientific method,’ if a theory and 
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an experiment disagree, the experiment overrides the theory.4 But this is not how a 
theorist (e.g. cosmologist) thinks. The theorist believes in the theory despite contrary 
experimental evidence so long as it is a fruitful area of research capable of producing 
more and more theories. Quoting eminent physicist Sir Arthur Eddington, “it is also a 
good rule not to put overmuch confidence in observational results that are put forward 
until they have been confirmed by theory.”5 The point is that each thinks that the other is 
misled because they each have their own idiosyncratic view of what science is and how 
science should be done. In the end, there is no one ‘scientific method’ that all the sciences 
use; instead “there are many different sorts of science”6 that rely on all different sorts of 
methods.  
Furthermore, the idea of a single ‘scientific method’ promulgates the idea that all 
scientific discoveries are rational, orderly, and systematic. But this is far from the case. 
Take, for instance, what Nima Arkani-Hamed, a physicist at the Institute for Advanced 
Study in Princeton, had to say about the future of supersymmetry, the extension of the 
Standard Model of particle physics that predicts a partner particle for each particle in the 
Standard Model.7 While delivering a talk at the Kavli Institute for Theoretical Physics at 
the University of California, Santa Barbara, Arkani-Hamed asked rhetorically to the 
audience, “What if supersymmetry is not found at the LHC (Large Hadron 
Collider)…then we will make new supersymmetry models that put the superpartners just 
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beyond the reach of the experiments.”8 Consider for a moment this statement by Dr. 
Arkani-Hamed. He is implying that lack of experimental evidence for supersymmetry 
does not necessarily spell doom for supersymmetry because all that needs to be done is to 
formulate a model of supersymmetry that is incapable of being disproved by any of the 
experiments currently being performed at the LHC. Needless to say, Arkani-Hamed’s 
methodology does not match the ‘scientific method’ advocated by Archer, Ng, and every 
primary and secondary school science textbook written before the year 2000. But wait, 
the article gets even more interesting. Arkani-Hamed continues, “But wouldn’t we be 
changing our story? That’s okay; theorists don’t need to be consistent—only their 
theories do.”9 At the very heart of the ‘scientific method’ is the notion that theories must 
be supported by empirical or experimental evidence. This anecdote from particle physics 
suggests that for some scientists, inter-theoretic consistency is more desirable than 
theory-evidence consistency. In the words of Henry Bauer, “Scientific research is a 
medley of all sorts of attempts to gain new knowledge…by cutting corners; by doing 
“quick-and-dirty” experiments, not just carefully systematic ones; by following hunches 
or “just playing around.”10 It is unclear what the future holds for supersymmetry, but one 
thing is certain: those who support it will remain undeterred despite lack of empirical 
evidence. 
Next, the authors’ dedication to the ‘scientific method’ stifles the creativity of the 
students to the point that one can question whether or not they are actually participating 
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in a modeling activity in the first place. According to the Standard of Mathematical 
Practice 4 (MP4): Model with Mathematics, mathematical modeling includes both 
“identifying variables” and “formulating models that describe relationships between 
those variables.”11 In the activity presented, students neither identify their own variables, 
nor formulate their own mathematical models of those variables. From the outset, 
students are told that the variables they will be working with are diameter and 
circumference, and that their primary objective is to find the relationship between the 
two. Regarding the former, it is incomprehensible why the students are not allowed to 
discover the variables on their own. Why not give the students a ruler, string, and tape 
measure and provide them the freedom to identify the midpoint, radius, diameter, 
circumference, and area all by themselves? Why tell them what to measure and how to 
measure it in the first place? The activity’s focus is clearly on having students measure 
predetermined variables rather than identifying them on their own; unfortunately, the 
simple act of measuring is not tantamount to modeling.  
As for the activity’s role in helping students formulate mathematical models 
between variables, the activity is similarly ineffective for the same reasons stated above. 
Authentic mathematical modeling involves “playing” with variables until a meaningful 
relationship is discovered. By telling students that there is a relationship between the 
diameter and circumference, and by further informing them that the relationship can be 
found by finding the ratio between the two, the aforementioned activity deprives students 
of the joys of mathematical exploration. There is no harm in allowing students to find out 
for themselves that there is a relationship between: radius, diameter, pi, circumference, 
and area. Even if the only relationship a student recognizes is that for all circles 2r = d, 
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she is still discovering a mathematical model on her own with minimal prompting from 
her teacher. I contend that this is the kind of mathematical modeling that teachers should 
encourage in their classroom, the kind that engenders creativity, exploration, and 
imagination. Mary Hesse says the following about scientific discovery but it can also be 
applied to mathematical discovery: “there can be no set of rules given for the procedure 
of scientific discovery…it is a product of creative imagination, of a mind which absorbs 
the experimental data until it sees them fall into a pattern.”12 By combining their activity 
with the ‘scientific method,’ Archer and Ng transform what could be a genuine modeling 
activity into a banal exercise of measuring and dividing.      
According to the integrated account of modeling, a model is a temporary 
collection of integrated elements whose purpose is to contribute to human knowledge by 
helping scientists solve different kinds of scientific problems. Although some of the 
elements in the integrated account include the traditional components of the ‘scientific 
method,’ the integrated account maintains that scientific modeling, and the scientific 
endeavor in general, is much more robust and dynamic than simply proposing a 
hypothesis, testing it, and reconciling the hypothesis with experimental data. If anything, 
the integrated account scoffs at the idea that there is one universal method that all 
scientists employ. The fact that: theory-ladenness of knowledge, metaphysical 
assumptions, access to funding, interpretation, intuition (or “playing a hunch”), 
analogical reasoning, the historical development of a scientific field, and luck all play a 
crucial role in scientific discovery and justification strongly suggests that scientists 
themselves do not even follow the infamous method attributed to them. 
                                                 
12. Mary Hesse, as quoted in, Daniela M. Bailer-Jones, Scientific Models in Philosophy of Science 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 101. 
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The ‘scientific method’ is intended to be a pedagogical model that teachers can 
use to explain to their students what science is, how it works, and how to do it. The 
problem with transforming any scientific model into a pedagogical model, however, is 
that certain attributes of the former are bound to be left out of the latter. In the case of the 
‘scientific method’ model, the vicissitudes of scientific discovery and justification are 
sacrificed for the sake of simplicity and student understanding. However, if a pedagogical 
model no longer resembles the scientific model it was intended to represent in the first 
place, then we have to consider whether or not the Faustian bargain was worth it. 
 
6.2.4 Conclusion 
 
If the problem with this activity is that it is too restrictive, the solution is to allow 
students the freedom to think on their own. When it comes to measuring the 
circumference of a circle, the teacher should not prompt the students how to do it; 
instead, the teacher should make explicit all of the measuring instruments available to 
them and allow them to make the choice of what instruments they want to use and how 
they are going to use them. The same suggestion applies when having students calculate 
the ratio between the circumference of a circle and the diameter—it needs to be student-
centric. This means that students should not even be told that there is a relationship 
between the two in the first place; they should be allowed to apply their critical thinking 
skills and discover the relationship entirely on their own. Students are going to take 
several wrong turns and arrive at many dead ends, but this is part of the modeling 
process. Even Kepler, Galileo, Newton, Maxwell, and Einstein did not get their 
mathematical models right the first time around.  
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I applaud Archer and Ng for introducing students to mathematical modeling and 
the kinesthetic approach they have adopted. However, I would like to see the objectives 
and methods of their modeling activities radically altered so that students are building 
mathematical models rather than simply calculating them.      
 
6.3 Engineering Case Study 
 
6.3.1 Description 
 
In “High School Student Modeling in the Engineering Design Process,” Nathan 
Mentzer, Tanner Huffman, and Hilde Thayer are interested in how and in what ways high 
school students are modeling when presented with an engineering design challenge.13 In 
particular, the authors challenged students to design a neighborhood playground (75 ft. x 
75 ft.) in a mid-size city on a donated city block. Some of the parameters of the 
playground were: it had to be safe, it had to remain outside all year long, it could not cost 
too much, and it had to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as any 
zoning laws.14 Furthermore, all playground equipment had to be made from scratch from 
materials available at any local hardware and/or lumber store. Participants had exactly 
three hours to complete their model(s). As for materials, students were only allowed to 
use basic office supplies such as: paper, pencils, pens, rulers, etc. during the challenge. 
After the students completed the design challenge, the authors coded the student 
models five different ways. The models were classified as: (1) employing mathematical 
explanations, (2) employing mathematical descriptions, (3) graphical, (4) physical, or (5) 
                                                 
13. Nathan Mentzer, Tanner Huffman, and Hilde Thayer, “High School Student Modeling in the 
Engineering Design Process,” International Journal of Technology and Design Education 24, no. 3 (2014), 
294. 
 
14. Mentzer, Huffman, and Thayer, “High School Student Modeling,” 296 – 297. 
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other.15 By mathematical explanations, the authors simply mean mathematical models. If 
students used any kind of mathematical relationship, such as the Pythagorean Theorem, 
they were coded as practicing mathematical modeling. Mathematical description, on the 
other hand, implies that students used numbers in their models. For example, if students 
merely wrote down the dimension of the playground on a piece of paper, they were coded 
as providing a mathematical description. The difference between a mathematical 
explanation and a mathematical description is that a mathematical explanation expects 
students to use mathematical equations and functions, whereas a mathematical 
description requires that they use numbers in any way. Models were coded as graphical if 
they used anything written such as: drawings, lists, or notes. If any of the models used 
any kind of physical object, such as a ruler, to represent a piece of playground equipment, 
it was coded as physical. Finally, models coded as “other” did not employ any of the 
modeling strategies mentioned above; rather, the students verbally discussed their models 
without any attempt of mathematical, graphical, or physical representation. 
The results of the design challenge severely disappointed Mentzer, Huffman, and 
Thayer. Whereas the authors expected many of the participants to employ graphical 
descriptions, they were shocked by the minimal amount of time students devoted to 
mathematical explanations (i.e. mathematical modeling).16 This result was especially 
disheartening given the amount of mathematical modeling involved in engineering. Every 
building, bridge, plane, car, space shuttle etc. is the product of a combination of complex 
mathematical modeling, computer simulations, and real world testing. The fact that high 
school engineering students do not know ho w endemic mathematical modeling is to 
                                                 
15. Ibid., 299 – 300. 
 
16. Ibid., 301. 
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engineering makes the authors seriously question if aspiring engineers truly understand 
what engineers actually do. The biggest challenge for these students is making the 
transition from just creating graphical and physical models to also creating abstract, 
mathematical models. The authors believe that in order for high school students to 
recognize the importance of mathematical modeling to engineering, they need to be 
consistently exposed to some real world applications of mathematical modeling 
throughout their K-12 education.                  
 
6.3.2 Analysis 
 
The engineering case study presented by Mentzer, Huffman, and Thayer was 
interesting in the sense that the authors gave the participants an open-ended problem and 
left them to their own devices to arrive at a solution, thus encouraging the students to use 
their own creativity and imagination throughout the entire modeling process. 
Unfortunately, this is only partially the case. Although the students were encouraged to 
create their own models for the design challenge, there was one type of model that the 
authors admittedly discouraged: physical models. According to the authors, “Students did 
not have an opportunity to construct physical models or prototypes”17 because 
“prototyping materials were not included.”18 In my view, this is a major omission that 
considerably weakens the reliability of the case study. The intentional attempt to suppress 
physical modeling begs an important question; namely, why? Why did the authors 
seemingly encourage mathematical and graphical modeling, but not physical modeling? 
According to the text quoted above, it is because “prototyping materials were not 
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18. Ibid., 300. 
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included.” But surely this is not an acceptable answer. Students could have easily been 
supplied with any combination of the following: Legos, blocks, play dough, construction 
paper, scissors, and glue. So it is not so much that the authors of the study could not 
supply the students with materials to construct prototypes, what is becoming more 
apparent is that they did not want to provide them with the materials in the first place. 
Which begs the question again, why? One possible answer might have to do with time 
constraints. Maybe the authors believed that students would use all of their time building 
physical models and not leave any time to explore other types of model constructions. 
This is plausible, but if Mentzer, Huffman, and Thayer were only worried about time 
constraints, then they would have said as much when describing the limitations of their 
study. I maintain that neither limited availability of resources, nor time constraints were 
their primary concern. Instead, I believe that the authors suspected that if they allowed 
students to build physical models, they (the students) would become so preoccupied with 
constructing prototypes to the point that mathematical models would all but be neglected. 
Remember that even though the students were presented with an open-ended design 
challenge, the real purpose of the study was to see how many students incorporated 
mathematical functions and equations in their model constructions. Hence the authors’ 
dilemma: if they discouraged students from building prototypes, then their design 
challenge would not be completely open; on the other hand, if they allowed students to 
build prototypes, they would most likely gather very little, if any, data concerning 
mathematical modeling. In the end, the authors discouraged the construction of physical 
models because the prospect of having an insufficient sample size was far too 
discomfiting.  
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Some might argue that I am making a mountain out of a molehill, but I truly 
believe that the design challenge’s failure to include prototypes slanders physical 
modeling and its contributions to the acquisition, development, and cultivation of both 
knowledge and technology. Consider the problem of flight. In particular, consider the 
primary difficulty that faced all early flying machines: control. Once an aircraft took 
flight, how was the pilot going to steer it? The answer came to Wilbur Wright when he 
reflected on the only entities capable of sustained flight at the time: birds. Wright 
suspected that a bird “adjusted the tips of its wings…turning itself into an animated 
windmill.”19 He received an early confirmation of his hypothesis when he created a kite 
out of a cardboard box and designed it to behave like a bird’s wing.20 “The construction 
of a small model to validate the general idea of wing-warping was the next step, followed 
by the building of a full-scale model”.21 The construction of these successively complex 
kite models were the first successful prototypes of controlled, unmanned flight.  
I included this brief example from the history of aviation to reinforce the limitless 
possibilities of physical models. In this particular example, Wright’s physical models 
were so productive because they allowed him to participate in what Adam Toon calls 
“games of make-believe.”22 According to Toon, physical modelers not only imagine the 
properties of the thing being modeled, they also imagine themselves physically 
manipulating that which is being represented. Thus, when Wilbur Wright was twisting 
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and bending the inner-tube box to create his earliest prototype, he was actually imagining 
himself holding a bird’s wing and fashioning it to resemble what a bird’s wing looked 
like during mid-flight. What makes this kind of “imagined experiment” unique to 
physical modeling is its exploitation and dependence on our sense of touch.23 Graphical 
models, mathematical models, and even computer simulations do not allow us to use our 
sense of touch in this productive way.24 This means that no matter how complex our 
technology gets, there seems to always be a place for models made out of cardboard 
boxes, popsicle sticks, and foam spheres.    
By speaking on the behalf of physical models, I am in no way denigrating the 
significance of mathematical models, especially when it comes to engineering. What is 
frustrating about the design challenge in particular is that the authors did not even 
consider the possibility that physical modeling could encourage mathematical modeling. 
While discussing their results, Mentzer, Huffman, and Thayer discovered that “graphical 
modeling often preceded mathematical modeling.”25 The same could be said of physical 
modeling. Consider Andrea, the study’s exemplar when it came to the application of 
mathematical modeling. When asked what she thought were the most important factors to 
consider during the design process, one of her responses was “prototyping.”26 This is 
especially poignant coming from Andrea, the design challenge standout. One can only 
imagine what kind of mathematical models she would have developed if she was given 
the opportunity to construct physical models alongside her graphical ones. Whether we 
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are discussing James Clerk Maxwell, Wilbur Wright, or James Watson, physical models 
are never too far removed from their mathematical counterparts. In most cases the two go 
hand-in-hand; unfortunately the architects of the engineering design challenge failed to 
capitalize on this all too obvious association. 
 
6.3.3 Conclusion 
 
The integrated account of modeling subscribes to the notion that different kinds of 
models are useful for different kinds of purposes. More often than not, scientists use a 
combination of graphical, physical, and mathematical models to develop and justify their 
theories. Even though Mentzer, Huffman, and Thayer were primarily concerned with how 
high school students developed mathematical models, their study should not have been 
carried out at the expense of physical models. Any reasonable engineering design 
challenge should allow students the freedom to explore the kinds of models they want to 
construct. Now it will likely be the case that most of the student models will end up being 
deficient, but this is where teachers have the opportunity to introduce pedagogical models 
to supplement any incomplete learning.       
 
6.4 Biology Case Study 
 
6.4.1 Description 
 
In “Systems Modelling and the Development of Coherent Understanding of Cell 
Biology,” Roald P. Verhoeff, Arend Jan Wasario, and Kerst Th. Boersma developed a 
teaching and learning strategy (from now on T-L strategy) in cell biology primarily based 
on modeling. The T-L strategy created by Verhoeff et al. subjected upper secondary 
students to four distinct modeling stages, with each stage acting as an epistemic scaffold 
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for the previous one. First, students were expected to learn how an independent cell 
functioned, then they studied how living (i.e. plant and animal) cells functioned with one 
another, and finally they examined the role that cells played at the organ and organism 
level. Although students had difficulty jumping back and forth between the cell, organ, 
and organism levels (stage 4), the T-L strategy nevertheless increased their understanding 
of cell biology, in particular, the different parts of the cell and how each part interacts 
with one another to produce a functioning whole.          
As noted above, the foundation of Verhoeff et al.’s study was the development of 
a four stage cell biology modeling strategy. What distinguished the authors’ approach 
from other modeling activities was their emphasis on differentiated and hierarchical 
modeling. In particular, the authors suggested the following. First, different kinds of 
models (e.g. 2D, 3D, and computer simulation) should be used at each of the different 
stages of the activity; and second, the models being created and studied should increase 
in complexity parallel to the complexity of the biological system being studied. In other 
words, if the system being studied was simple, then the model created for that particular 
system should likewise be simple.  
At this point I will briefly outline each of the modeling stages presented by 
Verhoeff et al.’s systems modeling T-L strategy.  
Stage 1: Developing a Model of Free-living Cells 
 
During the initial stage of the systems modeling T-L strategy, students observed 
free living Paramecia cells under a microscope in order to develop a model for unicellular 
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and multicellular organisms.27 In particular, students learned how cells carry out basic 
life processes such as: feeding, breathing, growing, regeneration, excretion, and self-
protection.28 To aid in their understanding of the cells and how they function, the students 
were also introduced to the work of Antoine van Leeuwenhock, who made analogies 
between how cells function and how familiar organisms function.29 The students 
demonstrated their acquired knowledge of free living cells by creating rudimentary 2D 
drawings of some of the aforementioned functions. 
 
Stage 2: Developing a General 2D Model of Cells 
 
In stage 2, students moved on from studying free-living cells to cells that were 
part of an organism (e.g. plant and animal cells). Students began by observing plant and 
animal cells using a light microscope, but quickly discovered that they could hardly 
discern any of the cells’ different organelles. As a result, they transitioned to using 
electron microscopes instead, which provided higher magnification powers. The students 
were able to recognize larger organelles such as mitochondria and chloroplast, but had 
difficulty when it came to identifying organelles that were not clear and round. To move 
passed this difficulty, the teacher introduced them to a “textbook” (my phrase) model of 
the cell, in which all of the cell’s organelles were clearly depicted and labeled. By 
comparing the “textbook” model with their initial electron microscope observations, the 
students were able to develop a more coherent understanding of the cell.  
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It should be pointed out that stage 2 did not require students to produce a 2D 
model of a plant or animal cell like they did in stage 1. The authors do not specify why a 
student 2D model was produced in stage 1, but not stage 2, but I suspect that the answer 
has to do with context. Because stage 1 students did not have difficulty understanding 
free-living cells, it was appropriate for them to produce a model of it to demonstrate their 
understanding. This was not the case when the students transitioned to studying plant and 
animal cells. Unlike free-living cells, the organelles in these cells were much more 
difficult to identify regardless of the kind of microscope they were using. As a result, the 
teacher must have believed it more appropriate to use a “textbook” 2D model to support 
his students understanding, rather than have them produce one for themselves.     
 
Stage 3: Developing a 3D Model of a Plant Cell      
 
Using the knowledge they acquired during stages 1 and 2, the students were 
subsequently given the task to create a 3D model of a plant cell. To accomplish this task, 
the students were separated into pairs of two, with each pair given the responsibility to 
create a 3D model of a particular plant organelle. Once each separate model organelle 
was created, each pair would come together and combine their individual organelles to 
create a single 3D model of a plant cell.  
To construct their models, each pair used a variety of resources at their disposal 
including: their textbook, other biology books, and the Internet. Rather than simply 
adopting the first model they came across, the students went “back and forth between the 
different cell representations”30 and eventually had to agree on which model(s) they were 
going to eventually use.   
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Although it is conceivable that each individual pair could have worked in 
isolation from one another until the final model was created, this is in fact the opposite of 
what actually transpired. Rather than separating themselves from one another, the pairs 
worked more closely than ever, helping one other understand how their particular 
organelle affected the functions of other organelles within the system. One might go so 
far as to say that the students were apparently mimicking the behavior of real life plant 
organelles by how closely they were working together. For according to the study’s 
authors, “Sometimes this cooperation became a kind of role-play in which students 
identified themselves with their organelles.”31       
 
Step 4: Modeling Representation at the Organism, Organ, and Cellular Level to a General 
Systems Model 
 
The final stage of the study ended up being the most challenging for the students. 
Whereas stages 1 – 3 introduced students to free-living cells, plant cells, and animal cells, 
stage 4 required them to consider the larger role that cells played in various organs and 
organisms. To accomplish this difficult task, students were allowed to participate in an 
interactive computer simulation that guided them through the process of human digestion 
beginning at the cellular level all the way up to the organism level.32 The final assessment 
for the simulation required the participants to not only describe cellular activity at the 
cell, organ, and organism levels, but also the interaction between all of the levels. 
Unsurprisingly, the final part of the assessment is where the students demonstrated the 
most difficulty.  
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To further explore their idea of a “hieracrchical open-system model,” the authors 
challenged the students to apply the previous model to an all together different human 
function, breast-feeding. Once again, the students were rather comfortable investigating 
each level on its own (i.e. cellular, organ, and organism), but encountered difficulty when 
required to explain the role of individual organelles at the organ and organism level. At 
this point, teacher intervention was required to help students understand that what was 
occurring at the organism level was likely a function of organelle activity at the cellular 
level. With their teacher’s guidance, the students were eventually able to conceive a 
hierarchical model of breast-feeding at the cellular, organ, and organism levels. To 
demonstrate their knowledge, the students created a complex 2D chart that exhibited the 
many nuances of this complex relationship.                           
 
6.4.2 Analysis 
 
The proceeding analysis of Verhoeff et al.’s “Systems Modelling and the 
Development of Coherent Understanding of Cell Biology” is going to take place in the 
context of the National Center on Universal Design for Learning’s Universal Design for 
Learning (UDL) framework. UDL is a teaching and learning framework that “helps 
address learner variability by suggesting flexible goals, methods, materials, and 
assessments”.33 The UDL framework is a direct response to inflexible, “one-size-fits-all” 
curricula that assumes that all children should be taught and assessed the same way. 
Instead, the UDL framework focuses on individual variability whereby each student is 
assumed to represent, express, and engage knowledge differently.  
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At its core, UDL is founded on three basic principles: (1) Provide Multiple Means 
of Representation, (2) Provide Multiple Means of Action and Expression, and (3) Provide 
Multiple Means of Engagement.34 Principle 1 states that each learner represents the same 
information differently. While many secondary school teachers and university professors 
heavily rely on textbooks and lectures, they neglect the possibility that visual and hands-
on learning might be more conducive to some of their students’ learning needs. Principle 
2 calls for individualized, rather than ubiquitous, assessment. Because students represent 
information differently, they should be given every opportunity to express their learning 
in a way that is conducive to their particular understanding. Principle 3 asserts that each 
student has a different motivation to learn. Differences in “neurology, culture, personal 
relevance, subjectivity, and background knowledge”35 all have an influence on whether 
or not a particular student will be engaged on any given day or during a particular lesson.    
 
Principle 1 of UDL and Systems Modeling 
 
Once we analyze Verhoeff et al.’s teaching and learning framework in the context 
of UDL, it becomes immediately clear that the two agree on the same basic principles. 
According to principle 1 of UDL, different students represent knowledge in different 
ways. This principle suggests that teachers present knowledge to their students in 
different ways because it is uncertain which kind of representation is going to maximize 
student learning. When we analyze the four modeling stages in Verhoeff et al.’s 
framework, this is precisely what the teacher did. During stage 1 of the modeling 
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framework, he had students look at cells of Paramecia under a light microscope and 
supplemented their learning by making analogies between how cells and familiar 
organisms function. In stage 2, the teacher differentiated his means of representation by 
not only having students look at plant and animal cells instead of Paramcia; he also had 
them view the cells using an electron microscope instead of a light microscope. During a 
discussion with the class he made the reason for his decision explicitly clear, “You stick 
to your model until it turns out to be otherwise, which seems to be the case now. But then 
you could still say: well maybe the model is right after all, but I just need better 
equipment.”36 The teacher understood that the representations of plant and animal cells 
provided by the light microscope were much too convoluted; as a result he variegated his 
teaching and discovered a more tenable means of knowledge representation. 
Nevertheless, the teacher’s curriculum adjustments did not end there. He immediately 
realized that the images produced by the electron microscope, by itself, were not enough 
to help students identify the different organelles contained in the plant and animal cells. 
Consequently, he provided workbooks for students depicting clear plant cell models in 
order to help them recognize the organelles they could not initially find. Stage 2 of 
Verhoeff et al.’s teaching and learning modeling framework certainly embodied UDL’s 
emphasis on “the importance of providing multiple, flexible methods of presentation 
when teaching.”37 By providing multiple examples, the teacher clearly attempted to 
address each student’s pattern recognition network in a manner satisfactory for that 
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particular learner.38 If the teacher acquiesced to the notion that “one-representation-fits-
all,” all of the students’ learning would have been greatly compromised. 
Stage 3 of Verhoeff et al.’s framework required students to collaborate with one 
another to build a large 3D model of a cell. In order to construct this model, students 
were encouraged to use various cell models from their textbook, biology books, and the 
Internet.39 Some groups even went as far as accessing “dynamic computer models”40 to 
further understand the organelle they were constructing. Stage 3 was similar to stage 2 in 
that the students did not rely on a single source of knowledge for their understanding. 
Rather than relying solely on their textbook, they were prompted to look at additional 
resources that presented the model of a cell somewhat differently. Stage 3 supports 
another recommended practice in UDL methodology: provide multiple media formats.41  
What may have been initially unclear in the student’s textbook was clarified by using 
another book or a model presented on the Internet. For most visual learners, a normal 2D 
picture model of a cell is sufficient for basic understanding. For others, however, a more 
dynamic means of representation, such as an animated computer model, is more likely to 
entrench and establish learning. The diversity of resources provided by both Verhoeff et 
al. and UDL ensure that alternative representations can be accessed so as to maximize 
information and learning.42    
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Stage 4 of the modeling phase required students to complete an interactive 
computer program on human digestion. The program allowed students to explore human 
digestion at the cellular, organ, and organism levels by various interactive activities such 
as dragging and dropping organs to the correct place in the human body and drawing 
arrows between cells to signify exchange of matter/information.43 Unlike looking at 
models of cells in textbooks or on the Internet, the computer program promoted students’ 
active learning through practice and experience. As limited as dragging-and-dropping and 
pointing-and-clicking activities might be, it was far more “interesting, engaging, and 
accessible”44 than the skill-and-drill pedagogy prevalent in so many classrooms today. 
For Hall et al., digital materials are critical to student success because unlike speech, 
printed text, and printed images they are inherently flexible, meaning they can be 
modified depending on the needs of the student.45   
 
Principle 2 of UDL and Systems Modeling 
 
Principle 2 of UDL states that students should be provided with multiple, flexible 
methods of action and expression. In other words, teachers should allow students to 
express their learning in different ways. When we examine Verhoeff et al.’s teaching and 
learning framework, it is clear that the latter follows guidelines similar to principle 2 of 
UDL. This is exemplified by the fact that each stage of the framework calls on a different 
form of assessment. Stage 1 required students to create basic 2D drawing of cells 
multiplying, taking in food, and excreting waste matter. Stage 2 did not call for students 
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to complete any kind of formal assessment; instead the focus seemed to be on 
supplementing and supporting their knowledge. Recall that this is the stage where 
students made the transition from Paramecia to plant and animal cells, as well as light 
microscopes to electron microscopes. Because students had difficulty identifying the 
cell’s various organelles, the teacher focused primarily on how to employ various types 
of media to bolster student learning. Now it would be a mistake to infer that the teacher 
abandoned assessment of plant and animal cells altogether; rather he merely postponed 
assessment to stages 3 and 4 where his students would be more adequately prepared.  
In terms of student-produced artifacts, stage 3 was certainly the most compelling. 
Recall that this was the stage where students separated into smaller groups and each 
group created their own 3D model of an organelle that would later be combined with the 
other organelles to form a single, complete model of a cell. What distinguished this 
stage’s activities from the others was its employment of kinesthetic (i.e. bodily) learning. 
Students were doing much more than drawing rough 2D sketches and dragging and 
dropping icons from one side of the computer screen to the other; they were cutting, 
gluing, coloring, and pasting. This kind of hands-on learning using manipulatives 
certainly caters to students who get easily bored with lessons that focus primarily on 
visual and auditory learning. The hope is that these kinds of engaging activities translate 
into Piagetian “sensorimotor learning,” in which physical activity transforms into 
representative mental symbols.”46 The connection between stage 3’s kinesthetic learning 
activity and principle 2 of UDL is an apparent one. According to UDL, teachers should 
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provide their students with “flexible opportunities for demonstrating [their] skill.”47 By 
varying their “requirements and expectations for learning and expressing knowledge,” 48 
Verhoeff et al.’s teaching and learning framework demonstrates their full-fledged 
endorsement of UDL. In the end, both are entirely aware that “versatility is crucial in the 
classroom if learning is to occur.”49              
The final stage of Verhoeff et al.’s teaching and learning framework had students 
use all of the knowledge they acquired from the computer program of human digestion to 
“draw a hierarchical systems model of the organism by combining the models at the 
cellular, organ, and organism level.”50 The teacher used the activity as a dual assessment, 
evaluating the students’ understanding of the content of the computer program as well as 
their overall knowledge of the cell. According to UDL, “supported practice should be 
used to ensure success and eventual independence. Supported practice enables students to 
split up a complex skill into manageable components and fully master these 
components.”51 When we look back at stages 1-3 of Verhoeff et al.’s framework, it is 
clear that each stage was arranged hierarchically so that the knowledge obtained in a later 
stage was built upon the previous one. At first, the teacher did not give students too much 
material at once. Similar to the teaching method guidelines put forth by UDL, he 
“chunked” learning into tractable lessons (i.e. stages) for students to master. Once each 
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stage was mastered, the students used their learning as a scaffold for the next stage that 
contained more complex information. As students ascended through the hierarchy, the 
teacher increasingly relinquished his pedagogical authority and the students became more 
active and responsible learners.         
 
6.4.3 Conclusion 
 
Verhoeff et al.’s teaching and learning framework provides an example of a 
modeling curriculum at its apex. The primary strength of the curriculum is its willingness 
to have students construct a variety of models in the classroom. Unlike Mentzer, 
Huffman, and Thayer’s engineering design lesson, the former did not discourage students 
from creating models of a certain type. Instead, students learned about the structure and 
function of cells via: light microscopes, images from electron microscopes, images in 
textbooks, images from the Internet, animated computer simulations, sophisticated 
computer programs, simple sketches, complicated hierarchical sketches, as well as 
physical, 3D models. Verhoeff et al.;’s commitment to model diversity reflects their 
understanding that different students represent knowledge differently at different stages 
in the learning process. While some models might work for one group of students, they 
might not work for others. More classroom activities need to follow Verhoeff et al.;’s 
lead and recognize that when it comes to modeling, heterogeneity is the key.    
 
6.5 Beyond Mathematical Models 
 
The case studies discussed in sections 6.2 and 6.3 of this chapter focus primarily 
on mathematical modeling. Archer and Ng’s curriculum explores the relationship 
between mathematical models and the scientific method, while Mentzer et al.’s study 
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suggests that high school engineering students favor creating visual 2D models of an 
engineering project rather than more sophisticated mathematical models. To a certain 
extent I sympathize with the authors’ clarion call for more mathematical modeling 
because I agree that “some basic understanding of the nature of mathematics is requisite 
for scientific literacy.”52 However, I vehemently disagree with any suggestion, either 
implicit or explicit, that suggests sacrificing visual, physical, and analogical models for 
the sake of purely abstract, mathematical models. This hidden curriculum agenda usually 
takes the following form: In elementary school (grades K – 5), students should be 
exposed to rudimentary visual and physical models ranging from graphs to orreries. 
When they are in middle school (grades 6 – 8), they should be introduced to basic 
mathematical modeling, some of which can be done by hand, calculator, or computer. 
And by the time they reach high school (9 – 12), the students’ focus should be primarily 
on complex mathematical modeling that can only be performed on and by computers.53 
The assumption this kind of modeling curriculum makes is that by the time students 
graduate from high school they no longer need to rely on obsolete visual and physical 
models because all the work can be performed more accurately using mathematical 
models. This dogma that mathematical models are somehow more desirable than their 
non-mathematical counterparts needs to be challenged. The discovery of the structure of 
DNA provides a case in point. The contribution of mathematical modeling to the 
discovery has received scant attention. However, quantum mechanics was “used as a 
check and a guide in the selection of probable molecular structures, and in particular to 
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accept or reject the bond distances and angles derived from X-ray diffraction pictures.”54 
Nevertheless, the mathematical models produced by quantum mechanics do not diminish 
the contribution of other models used in the discovery including: Franklin’s X-ray 
diffraction images, Watson’s sketches to Delbrϋck, Pauling’s folded paper model of a 
helical polypeptide chain that resulted in the discovery of the α and γ helices,55 and last 
but certainly not least, Watson and Crick’s physical model of the double helix 
constructed out of cardboard and then metal. The fact is that all of these models worked 
in concert with one another to produce Watson and Crick’s groundbreaking discovery. 
The elimination of one or several of these models would have severely impeded Watson 
and Crick’s progress. My point being, different models serve different purposes. At 
times, mathematical models are more appropriate than physical models, but the reverse is 
also the case. Students, teachers, and scientists need to be reminded that useful models 
come in a variety of forms; each should be given the freedom to explore which models 
are appropriate for a particular problem and which are not. My fear is that society’s 
preoccupation with STEM education (and mathematical modeling in particular) is 
making it more and more difficult for visual, physical, and analogical models to be taken 
seriously as genuine problem-solving alternatives.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Models Revisited 
 
 
7.1 Scientific Models, Pedagogical Models, and Student Models 
 
In chapter five I discussed some of the differences between scientific models, 
pedagogical models, and student models. Scientific models are the various models 
scientists use everyday to solve scientific problems. These models are typically 
mathematical in form, but they can also be: visual (2D), physical (3D), computer 
generated simulations, or mental (e.g., Einstein’s Gedanken experiments). Pedagogical 
models are the models that teachers, textbook authors, and curriculum designers create to 
make learning accessible for their students. Some examples include: pictures of the Bohr 
(i.e. solar system) atom, diagrams of the water cycle, Styrofoam-and-stick molecules, 
orrerries, and plant cells made out of papier-mâché. Student models are the students’ 
mental models of pedagogical models. More specifically, they are the internal 
conceptualizations that students form when they encounter the pedagogical models 
provided by their teachers. For instance, a student’s mental model of the Bohr atom 
consists of all her thoughts and beliefs about the Bohr atom spawning from her encounter 
with the pedagogical model (e.g. What does it look like?, How do the electrons within it 
behave?, How far are the electrons from the nucleus?, etc.).   
In the same chapter I argued that pedagogical models could not be representations 
of scientific models because each has their own distinct epistemic purpose. Whereas 
scientific models are used by scientists to solve problems, pedagogical models are teacher 
created models designed specifically to help students learn the curriculum. It would be a 
mistake to argue that scientific and pedagogical models deal with the same target system 
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because what is conducive for one might be inconvenient (even unnecessary) for the 
other. When Maxwell conceived of his model of the ether, he used it to explore the 
relationship between electricity and magnetism, which culminated in his famous 
Maxwell’s Equations. Teachers and curriculum designers, on the other hand, do not 
create pedagogical models with the intent of supporting or disconfirming current theories 
or developing novel ones. Rather, their whole purpose is educational, to support students 
as they learn theories in normal science. For Maxwell, the ether model was invaluable; 
for physics teachers it has become nothing more than an expendable historical anecdote 
that merits scant attention. This sounds harsh, but a physics teacher’s primary concern is 
to create pedagogical models that maximize student comprehension and application of 
Maxwell’s equations, and not to re-create the anachronistic models that Maxwell himself 
used.   
Some might argue that I am exaggerating the differences between scientific 
models and pedagogical models, because surely there are times when the two are similar, 
if not the same. We can imagine, for instance, a high school engineering teacher having 
her class recreate the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) Bay Area model to scale. Like the 
original model, the pedagogical model would also show the catastrophic results of 
Reber’s plan to dam up the San Francisco Bay Area. In this particular case, wouldn’t the 
scientific model (the original ACE model) and the pedagogical model (the student model 
of the original model) resemble one another? I agree that the two models would share a 
visible likeness, but I am not willing to concede anything more. First, we must remember 
that the ACE model was only an approximation of what might have happened if Reber’s 
plan had been implemented. This means that its designers had to make decisions which 
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model elements had to be included and which were disposable. The same applies to the 
pedagogical model of the ACE model. In creating their model, the teachers and students 
have to decide which model elements are essential, and which are expendable. My point 
is that whether we are talking about the ACE model or the pedagogical model of the ACE 
model, human choice is always going to be a factor in model making.1 In chapter two I 
discussed this issue in depth, arguing that because our choices are guided by our values, it 
is unsurprising that modelers allow extra-logical factors to affect the construction of their 
models. This consideration is exacerbated by the fact that the pedagogical model in 
question is a model of a model, which makes it considerably more difficult for it to 
maintain its integrity.      
Second, even though a scientific model and a pedagogical model may share a 
similar appearance, it does not follow that they also share the same purpose. The ACE 
model was built in order to test a novel hypothesis; while a pedagogical model of the 
ACE model does nothing more than confirm a previously accepted hypothesis. The 
difference is subtle, but of great consequence. A scientist who is testing a new theory for 
the first time may have a hypothesis of what is going to happen once a model is run, but 
does not know for sure. The scientist is under a professional obligation to run a model 
several times to provide further support for her findings, whether or not those results 
support or refute her hypothesis. Teachers do not share the scientist’s approach when 
creating and running a pedagogical model. The teacher already knows in advance how 
the simulation should run, what the results should be. If the pedagogical model does not 
run as expected, no attempt is made to fix either the model or the theory; instead the 
                                                 
1. For a more thorough investigation of the role that choice plays in model construction, see 
chapter 2 of this study. 
155 
 
teacher explains the discrepancies away by appealing to errors in the model’s 
reconstruction and/or user error. For a scientist, a positive model run could indicate a 
paradigm shifting theory; for a teacher, a positive model run is just another affirmation of 
normal science. 
Even with these remarks, the critic might still be undeterred. In fact, she might 
ask me to consider the following argument. In order to solve the structure of DNA once 
and for all, Watson and Crick first needed to teach themselves what the structure looked 
like. In other words, before arriving at the double helix model, Watson and Crick had to 
first create several useful pedagogical models that would propel them towards their 
historic discovery. For instance, they had to teach themselves that the structure was a 
helix and that adenine bonded with thymine and guanine with cytosine. If this description 
is correct, then the distinction between scientific models and pedagogical models 
collapses because scientific models either are pedagogical models themselves or else they 
rely so heavily on the prior construction of several pedagogical models that it is difficult 
to tell where one ends and the other begins. 
I do not deny that scientific models require the prior construction of several 
previous models before reaching its final form. Model construction is a frustrating 
process where modelers should anticipate the construction of multiple models, many of 
which end up being dead ends. (In the case of Edison this number is literally in the 
thousands!) But at the same time, these so-called dead ends are actually quite productive 
when they steer modelers away from unproductive research programs. Consider Watson 
and Crick’s early three-chain model of DNA that failed to take into account how much 
water DNA actually contained. Had Rosalind Franklin not immediately pointed out their 
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miscalculation, Watson and Crick would have stubbornly insisted on their incorrect 
model. Yet, I deny that this example and others like it support the view that pedagogical 
models are indispensable when it comes to the formulation and construction of scientific 
models because I dispute the notion that these early, abandoned models are even 
pedagogical models in the first place. Pedagogical models are models created by 
educators and professional scientists (when they are tasked with presenting their work to 
non-specialists) with the specific purpose of transmitting specific information about the 
scientific models in question. Pedagogical models are only created after a scientific 
model has reached its completion, never before. This is because the scientific model-
building process and the pedagogical model-building processes are wholly separate 
endeavors with distinctive functions. The former is in the business of knowledge 
construction and production, while the latter is concerned with how best to disseminate 
and transmit this knowledge.  
Let us return to the early Watson and Crick model of DNA that literally did not 
hold enough water. This model was neither a scientific model, nor a pedagogical model. 
It was not a scientific model because it was incomplete and erroneous; and it was not a 
pedagogical model because Watson and Crick did not use it to present their final version 
of the structure of DNA. Rather, the best way to understand the model was as a working 
model whose purpose was to bridge the gap to their final, scientific model. Of course, at 
the moment, Watson and Crick did not realize that this model would only be an 
intermediary; they were hopeful it was going to be the final model they would have to 
create. But such is the nature of scientific, pedagogical, and working models, their 
manifestations only become clear after the fact.           
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At this point, the critic might respond that even though Watson and Crick’s early 
models were not pedagogical models in the operationalist sense I have formulated, they 
nonetheless served a pedagogical function in the broadest sense of the term by teaching 
Watson and Crick about the nature of DNA and how much water it needed to be able to 
contain. This, however, is blatant equivocation. From the start I have been adamant that a 
pedagogical model fulfills the function of informing the non-scientifically trained public 
about the most up to date findings in the scientific community. Watson and Crick’s early 
models may have contributed to their final, scientific model, and thus played a 
pedagogical function in the layman’s sense of the term, but that is not how I have been 
applying the concept throughout this project. Such a loose conceptualization would have 
us interpret every model as a pedagogical model, which runs the risk of rendering a once 
substantive concept into one bereft of any meaningful value.   
 
7.2 Problems with Student Models 
                      
Student models are the students’ mental models of the pedagogical models. When 
a student listens to a teacher’s lesson, reads a chapter in a textbook, or completes an 
online assignment, it is assumed that the student’s mental model of her task resembles the 
activity assigned to her. But this is the exception rather than the rule. In “Some 
Observations on Mental Models,” Donald Norman describes student models as: 
incomplete, severely limited, unstable, confused, parsimonious, and unscientific,2 which 
is just a roundabout way of saying that they are oftentimes inaccurate. Student models are 
incomplete in the sense that they lack essential information included in scientific and 
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pedagogical models.3 For instance, a student’s model of force lacks the complexity and 
depth of her teacher’s conception, and only bears a superficial resemblance to a 
professional scientist’s model. To say that students’ models are severely limited means 
that students lack the ability to run their mental models adequately.4 It is one thing for a 
student to know that the seasons are caused by the 23° tilt of the celestial equator to the 
ecliptic, wholly another for a student to be able to run the simulation in her head. 
Students who are unable to make accurate predictions and/or accommodate their models 
to novel situations do not understand how their models work. Student models are unstable 
because students oftentimes forget the details of what they are learning about, especially 
if those details are not reviewed on a consistent basis.5 Every teacher (and professor) 
knows that if they do not review material throughout the semester, most, if not all of it, 
will mysteriously disappear. Another common occurrence is that students confuse 
different models of the same phenomenon, sometimes through no fault of their own.6 
Consider the case of the atom. By the time students graduate from high school they are 
going to encounter several models of the atom, including the solar system model and the 
cloud model. Unfortunately, these models give us different, sometimes contradictory, 
information about the behavior of electrons in an atom. The solar system model tells us 
that the electron orbits the nucleus like a planet orbits the sun, while the cloud model 
maintains that the electron behaves more like a cloud in that it is everywhere at once. 
Recall Rosaria Justi’s discovery (chapter five) of a textbook that combined these two 
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disparate models together to form a single “hybrid model” of the atom.7 (No wonder 
students are confused!) Finally, the idea of models being parsimonious and unscientific 
goes hand in hand. Given the choice between a complex model to run and a simple one, 
some students will choose the latter simply because it requires less mental effort.8 This 
means that given the choice between the solar system model and the cloud model of the 
atom, some students are going to adopt the solar system model for reasons that concern 
parsimony rather than the truth. From the fact that students allow non-rational factors to 
influence their model selection, it should come as no surprise that student models are also 
unscientific, or to use Norman’s phrase, “superstitious.”9 It is unfortunate that when it 
comes to selecting and applying models, students are prone to follow the path of least 
mental resistance.                                            
 
7.3 Student Models and Vygotsky’s Zone of Proximal Development 
 
If we accept the notion that student models are: incomplete, severely limited, 
unstable, confused, parsimonious, and unscientific, it becomes the teacher’s task to alter 
her students’ mental models so that they are less incomplete, limited, unstable, etc. In 
other words, teachers ideally want their student to enter what Vygotsky called the zone of 
proximal development (from now on ZPD). According to Vygotsky, ZPD is “the distance 
between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving 
and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under 
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adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers.”10 In layman’s terms, it is the 
gap in between what the student already knows and what she doesn’t know or what the 
student has already learned and what she can potentially learn. For teachers, the most 
significant aspect of ZPD is Vygotsky’s appeal to “adult guidance” and “collaboration 
with more capable peers.” The main point is that students cannot learn what they do not 
already know on their own, they require the assistance of teachers and other learned 
students to get them there. This suggests that in order for students to develop better 
mental models of scientific phenomena, they cannot be without their teacher’s guidance. 
A few examples will illustrate my point. First, let us consider model confusion. On the 
one hand teachers need to correct their students if they embrace contradictory models of 
the same phenomenon (e.g. geocentrism and heliocentrism). On the other hand, physics is 
notorious for its contradictory models. In addition to the 30 concurrent models of the 
atom, light is also a contradictory phenomenon, at times behaving like a wave and at 
other times like a particle. Think back to the teacher in Rutherford’s study (chapter five) 
who expressed the idea that students should not examine the nature of light until they 
were at least 17. Students have difficulty understanding contradictory models just as 
much as textbook authors have difficulty creating pedagogical models of them. For this 
reason, a teacher’s counsel is more crucial than ever.  
Second, let us consider what it means for students’ mental models to be 
parsimonious. According to Norman, a student’s mental model is parsimonious if she 
accepts the explanation that requires the least amount of intellectual effort. The most 
banal, and unfortunately common, form of student parsimony is when students simply 
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resort to guessing because they do not want to put in the mental effort to solve a problem, 
or remember the correct answer. This kind of mental model parsimony is inexcusable and 
unacceptable. However, there is another kind of parsimony that is more sophisticated and 
warrants our attention. In some philosophy circles, parsimony is considered a “theoretical 
virtue.”11 In the 14th century, religious philosopher William of Occam developed the Law 
of Parsimony, otherwise known as Occam’s Razor. According to the Law of Parsimony 
or Occam’s Razor, “Entities are not be to be multiplied beyond necessity.”12 This means 
that other things being equal, the simplest explanation is usually the correct one. From the 
fourteenth century on, prominent natural philosophers (or scientists) used Occam’s Razor 
to support their position. Galileo used Occam’s Razor to defend the Copernican model of 
the solar system against the Ptolemaic one arguing that, “Nature does not multiply things 
unnecessarily; that she makes use of the easiest and simplest means for producing her 
effects; that she does nothing in vain, and the like”.13 Similarly, the eighteenth century 
chemist Lavoisier appealed to Occam’s Razor to admonish the existence of phlogiston by 
remarking, “If all of chemistry can be explained in a satisfactory manner without the help 
of phlogiston, that is enough to render it infinitely likely that the principle does not exist, 
that it is a hypothetical substance, a gratuitous supposition. It is, after all, a principle of 
logic not to multiply entities unnecessarily.”14 The Galileo and Lavoiser examples 
suggest that there may be some value to parsimonious models. The nebulous and 
                                                 
11. Alan Baker, "Simplicity", ed. Edward N. Zalta (2016), in the The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, accessed August 1, 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/simplicity/. 
 
12. Louis P. Pojman, Classics of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
486. 
 
13. Baker, “Simplicity.” 
 
14. Ibid. 
162 
 
confusing nature of parsimonious models makes it more imperative than ever for teachers 
to be able to explain to their students in what instances parsimony is a virtue and when it 
is just a convenient excuse.  
The teacher’s obligation is to get her students to their ZPD. The issues of 
contradiction and parsimony suggest that when it comes to mental models, the content of 
the ZPD is imprecise at best and must be handled on a case by case basis.  Students are 
besieged with innumerable mental models of various phenomena all the time, their only 
chance of making sense of these phenomena is through the stewardship of a caring, 
patient, and learned teacher. 
           
7.4 Expert Knowledge vs. Novice Knowledge 
 
According to Susan Ambrose, Michael Bridges, and Michelle DiPietro et al., 
authors of How Learning Works, experts such as practicing scientists use their 
background knowledge and experience to “create and maintain, often unconsciously, a 
complex network that connects the important facts, concepts, procedures, and other 
elements” within a domain.15 These networks are often deep, meaningful, and based on 
abstract principles.16 Non-experts (e.g. students), on the other hand, only have a handful 
of superficial ways in which they can organize their knowledge. A study cited by 
Ambrose, Bridges, and DiPietro et al. describes how practicing physicists organized 
different physics problems according to which ‘laws of nature’ informed each problem, 
while physics students organized the same problems into basic categories such as ramp 
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problem or pulley problem.17 Once again, the notion of purpose cannot be overlooked. 
The physicist’s mind naturally identifies complex patterns and relationships because that 
is how physicists have traditionally solved problems in their field for hundreds of years. 
Students, on the other hand, are primarily concerned with expending the least amount of 
cognitive effort necessary to answer questions correctly, which usually entails sacrificing 
rigorous thinking for the sake of expediency and convenience.  
The authors of How Learning Works continue their comparison of expert and 
novice organizational structures by suggesting that even though novices (e.g. students) 
are far from attaining an expert level of expertise (e.g. scientists’ knowledge), “there are 
instructional approaches that can help students organize their knowledge meaningfully 
around deep, rather than superficial, features of the domain.”18 In other words, there are 
ways to improve novice thinking so that it resembles expert thinking. Or to put it bluntly, 
there are ways to make students think like scientists. And this is where I disagree with 
Ambrose, Bridges, and DiPietro et al. and the scores of others in science education who 
believe that low student interest in science and low science assessment scores can be 
fixed by treating students like amateur scientists. In his research on the topic, Derek 
Hodson remarks that “Research fails to yield clear and consistent conclusions about the 
success of these [laboratory science] courses in sharpening children’s understanding of 
the nature of science and increasing their abilities to employ the processes of science.”19 
Even worse, these science classes focusing on problem solving and critical thinking have 
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had the deleterious effect of conflating scientific and non-scientific student models. 
Quoting Hodson, “If there is any transfer [of models] it would seem, if anything, to be in 
the opposite direction, with children applying their everyday thinking skills to laboratory 
problems.”20 The point of turning the science classroom into a mini laboratory is to give 
students a space to act and think like amateur scientists, but this transformation cannot 
occur if students are applying their non-scientific models to solve scientific problems.         
Henry Bauer also objects to teaching expert-level science thinking to students 
because he believes that the science classroom turned laboratory cannot possibly be a site 
where genuine science education takes place. According to Bauer, the experiments that 
students learn about and perform in science class are only examples of “successful 
science,” when in reality “history teaches that the science being done at any given time 
will largely be discarded, even in the short space of a few years, as unsuccessful.”21 In an 
1890 interview in Harper's Monthly Magazine, Thomas Edison is quoted as saying, “I 
speak without exaggeration when I say that I have constructed three thousand different 
theories in connection with the electric light, each  one of them reasonable and apparently 
to be true. Yet only in two cases did my experiments prove the truth of my theory.”22 
When students learn about Thomas Edison and his invention of the light bulb, they are 
only going to be exposed to the theories and experiments that worked and not the 2998 
theories that he discarded. Bauer’s point is that theory and experimental failure are as 
much a part of science as any successful theory and experiment. In fact, any honest 
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scientist and historian of science will readily admit that science has seen far more failures 
than successes. By only exposing students to science’s achievements, students will get 
the misguided notion that the scientific method, the principal organizational structure of 
classroom science experiments around the world, ensures success when history has 
demonstrated otherwise. When Edison's friend and associate Walter S. Mallory was 
asked about Edison’s experiments on the alkaline battery, Mallory vividly recalled 
Edison remarking, ‘Results!  Why, man, I have gotten lots of results!  I know several 
thousand things that won't work!’23 Bauer is adamant that science students must no 
longer be indoctrinated with the myth of the scientific method; rather it should be 
presented to them as an unattainable ideal that does not mirror what goes on in actual 
science laboratories.24    
 
7.5 Against Science Students and Nonscientists as “Little Scientists” 
Not everyone agrees with my position that scientists, teachers, and students all 
employ different kinds of models. In particular, William Brewer maintains “that scientists 
have the same basic cognitive architecture as nonscientists, with some possible 
differences due to selection and special training.”25 By “cognitive architecture” Brewer is 
referring to how nonscientists (i.e., anyone who is not a professional scientist) mentally 
represent different kinds of scientific concepts including, but not limited to, explanations, 
theories, and models. Brewer’s argument is that, for the most part, nonscientists are just 
like scientists in that they have the same kinds of mental representations; the differences 
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being more of degree and sophistication rather than differences in kind. For example, 
children, like professional scientists, propose theories about how the natural world works, 
it is just that most of those theories are what we would call “native theories,” but they are 
theories nonetheless. One of the examples that Brewer cites is his own study on the 
day/night cycle.26 In response to the question, ‘Where is the sun at night?,’ one student 
responded, ‘Well, it goes under the earth to China. See, while we have day China has 
night and while China has night, we have day.’27 Now most us probably cringed after 
reading the student’s explanation with thoughts about what is occurring in America’s 
science classrooms, but Brewer’s point is that no matter how mistaken the student’s 
explanation is, it is still a causal/mechanical explanation about how the world works. 
Even though the student’s explanation did not include any mention of the earth’s rotation 
on its axis or the revolution of the moon around the earth, it nevertheless provides a 
causal explanation (albeit a very poor one) of why the sun and the moon both appear to 
rise and set at seemingly opposing times. 
I do not deny that the previous student’s ‘goes under the earth to China’ 
explanation counts as an explanation, what I do take umbrage with is the idea that just 
because children (and all nonscientists for that matter) provide causal/mechanistic 
explanations, they all of a sudden count as “little scientists.” Consider the following 
example: The planets move because God is pushing them. This example satisfies many of 
the so-called epistemic virtues that philosophers of science are quite fond of: it is 
causal/mechanistic, universal in scope, simple, and can be mentally modeled. At the same 
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time, no scientist or philosopher of science would classify such an explanation as 
scientific, even if we are working with the loosest possible conception of scientific 
available. This is because working scientists highly value testability and mathematical 
formalism as epistemic virtues as well, which the above explanation clearly does not 
satisfy. It is all the more curious that Brewer defends the “little scientists” moniker, given 
that he clearly recognizes that testability and mathematical formalism are values children 
do not possess and scientists do.         
1. [O]ur overall analysis suggests that children’s explanations for the physical 
world show the same essential structure as those used by scientists, except that 
scientists include a requirement that explanations be potentially testable [my 
emphasis].28                    
 
2. [I]t appears to us that children use most of the common forms of explanatory 
frameworks used by scientists, except for formal/mathematical accounts [my 
emphasis].29 
 
Brewer would remark that I should be the last person defending the merits of 
testability and mathematical formalism given what I have said in this project about 
cosmologists putting theories out of the reach of empirical testability, and my defense of 
visual and physical models against the proliferation of mathematical models in both the 
natural and social sciences. And Brewer would be correct. However, all this discussion 
demonstrates is that there is a lack of agreement when it comes to defining what counts as 
a scientific model and what does not. (So in the end, Brewer has actually strengthened 
my position that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions when it comes to 
defining a scientific model!) My point is that even if children and nonscientists happen to 
share some of the same cognitive architecture as professional scientists, I am nevertheless 
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hesitant to call them “little scientists” because of the varying purposes that professional 
scientists and non-scientists have. When professional scientists propose a model, theory, 
explanation, or mathematical formulation of how phenomena in the natural world work, 
they do so with the purpose of solving specific problems in their specialized fields, of 
which they do not know the answer in advance. Nonscientists, especially those in a 
science classroom setting, on the other hand, do not employ their cognitive architecture in 
the same manner. Any explanations students proffer can be mitigated by their teachers 
who already have the correct explanation at their disposal, while professional scientists, 
because they are chartering into unknown territory, are devoid of such luxury.  
For example, astronomers before Kepler, and even Kepler himself, assumed that 
all planetary orbits were circular. It was only after he applied exacting mathematical 
analysis to Tycho Brahe’s meticulous observational data that he was able to derive his 
three laws of planetary motion, including the second law that states that all planetary 
orbits must be elliptical. Kepler’s laws contain all the virtues scientists demand out of an 
exemplary scientific model or theory. They are: simple, universal, explanatory, 
predictive, can be confirmed or denied (i.e., testable), fruitful, and mathematically 
rigorous. The only significant virtue his laws were missing was a causal mechanism 
(gravity), which he was on the precipice of discovering before Newton himself, but 
eventually abandoned because he could not “work out the mechanics” to his 
satisfaction.30   
When science students in elementary and middle school are asked about the shape 
of a planet’s orbit, their answers are either immediately confirmed or denied by their 
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teachers and Kepler’s laws are never spoken of again. And therein lies the difference 
between scientists and nonscientists. For scientists, their cognitive architecture is 
sacrosanct; their hierarchy of epistemic values is what they ultimately use to convince 
themselves and their colleagues that a scientific issue has been resolved. Nonscientists 
may initially use their cognitive architecture to propose a model or a theory about the 
world, but in the end they do not use it to adopt a given model or theory. Sadly, students 
base their model and theory choice entirely on a single factor alone, whether or not their 
teacher tells them they are right or wrong. 
 
7.6 Models as a Societas 
 
Scientific models, pedagogical models, and student models should all be treated 
as distinct phenomena in and of themselves because each is equipped with their own: 
purpose, logic, context, and idiosyncrasies that make them all particularly unique; nor 
should we think of them as imitations of one another because any similarities that they 
share are superficial at best, nothing more than a structuralist attempt to bring order to 
epistemic, cognitive, and naturalistic chaos. As Vladimir Tasić remarks, if “there is no 
such thing as a grounding, central principle…we invent it, assume it, make it up for our 
own convenience.”31 In the end, each kind of model plays by the rules of its own 
individual language-game, which means that once models get into the hands of scientists, 
teachers, and students alike, they take on a life of their own.   
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Richard Rorty uses Michael Oakeshott’s 
distinction between a universitas and a societas.32 A universitas consists of a group of 
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people united by mutual interest to achieve a common end.33 A societas, on the other 
hand, is formed by people bonded by civility and respect, rather than a common goal or 
common ground.34 I believe that this is a useful distinction when ruminating about 
scientific, pedagogical, and student models. The usual way to approach models is to think 
of them as a universitas, connected by some kind of common ground or essence. But this 
study has shown this way of thinking to be outdated. A much more productive way to 
think about models is to regard them as a societas, bonded by mutual respect for one 
another instead of an overarching epistemological structure. By thinking of models as a 
societas, we are absolved from the obligation of treating them as “mirrors of nature” and 
free to praise or blame them depending on how they contribute to our students, education, 
and society in general.      
The suggestion that we approach the study of models as a societas does not imply 
that I am advancing a relativistic view of models. Because I have gone to great lengths in 
this study to distinguish scientific, pedagogical, and student models from one another, it 
would be a mistake to compare them to one another. However, it is quite appropriate, 
some would even say obligatory, to compare like models with one another (i.e., scientific 
vs. scientific, pedagogical vs. pedagogical, and student vs. student). In this regard, all 
models are not equal. Copernicus’s heliocentric model is a better model of our solar 
system than Ptolemy’s geocentric model. The cloud model of the electron provides a 
better description of an electron’s behavior than the Bohr model. The question that 
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naturally arises is, how do we determine which models are better than others? What 
criteria do we use? 
When it comes to scientific models, I advocate adopting models that either solve 
or can help solve current scientific problems. The heliocentric model of the solar system 
may have been more economic, and hence elegant, than the geocentric model, but that is 
not why it ultimately supplanted the geocentric model as the pervading model of our solar 
system. In the end, the heliocentric model just solved astronomical problems better. 
Quoting Thomas Kuhn, “In its most developed form the system of compounded circles 
was an astounding achievement. But it never quite worked.” The geocentric model, 
replete with its epicycles or “compounded circles,” was useful for navigational and 
theological purposes, but in the end it could not “discern or deduce the principal thing—
namely the shape of the Universe and the unchangeable symmetry of its parts.”35 The 
heliocentric view, with the help of Johannes Kepler, was able to do just that. Assuming 
the heliocentric model, Kepler was able to determine: that the shape of all the planetary 
orbits are ellipses, that planets must cover the same area in the same amount of time, and 
that there is a mathematical relationship between a planet’s period and its distance from 
the sun. Kepler’s mathematical Copernicanism was nearly impossible for any 
mathematically minded astronomer to refute, and by the end of the 18th century the 
geocentric model of the universe was all but dead.36        
The choice between pedagogical models comes down to which one maximizes 
student learning. Put differently, given two distinct models, the better pedagogical model 
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is the one that helps students understand the material presented in the curriculum better. 
The signposts that usually designate the desired level of achievement include students 
passing their science classes, as well as any statewide assessments. At the same time, 
anyone who has stepped into a classroom as a teacher knows that there is more to 
learning than just grades on a report card or test score numbers. The latter demonstrate a 
student’s ability to get the correct answer, but as teachers, especially science teachers, we 
should want more than that. Paul Thagart implores that students should learn a particular 
scientific theory, “not just because it is in the textbook or class lectures, but because it is 
a powerful explanatory theory. Students need to learn not only what to believe, but how 
to believe for the right scientific reasons.”37 According to Thagart, a good place to start is 
having discussions with students regarding the nature of scientific evidence, explanations, 
hypothesis, and theories.38 The committee for new K – 12 science education standards 
agrees with Thagart, stating that “The goal for students is to construct logically coherent 
explanations of phenomena that incorporate their current understanding of science…, and 
are consistent with the available evidence.”39 When a student answers a question 
correctly, she should be able to explain why it is the correct answer and not some other 
theory or explanation. For example, it is not enough for a student to know that the Earth 
goes around the sun and not the other way around; she should also be able to explain the 
advantages of the heliocentric model over its geocentric counterpart.  
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I can think of at least once instance, however, where a teacher might avoid a 
pedagogical model with the most explanatory power. In chapter six I discussed the idea 
of differentiation, the notion that different students require individualized teaching 
approaches and assignments that cater to their individualized ways of learning. In a 
differentiated teaching environment, we can sympathize with a teacher selecting a 
pedagogical model that is more conducive to her student’s individualized learning style, 
rather than one with stronger explanatory power. Teachers know their students the best, 
and what works for one student might not work for another. When explaining electricity, 
teachers usually resort to one of two analogies: either electricity is like water-flow or 
electricity is like a moving crowd.40  Both analogies provide clear explanations for 
current, voltage, and resistance, but the moving-crowd analogy is deficient in that there is 
no clear explanation of batteries in the analogy.41 Clearly the water-flow analogy is the 
stronger analogy for the reason just stated; however, we can certainly imagine teachers 
invoking the moving crowd analogy either as a supplement to the water-flow analogy or 
to give students an entirely different approach to think about electricity. Student models 
are precarious, you never know which models students are going latch on to and which 
ones they are going to completely disregard. While some students might immediately 
gravitate towards the water-flow analogy, others might make more sense out of the 
moving crowd analogy. When it comes to differentiation, teachers should use their 
discretion in selecting the pedagogical models that will maximize their students’ learning. 
For most students this means being introduced to models with the most explanatory 
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power. For others, it entails sacrificing a modicum of explanatory power for models that 
simply make more sense to them.       
The reason teachers have had a frustrating time evaluating their students’ mental 
models are that they are notoriously difficult to determine. Donald Norman, cited earlier 
in this chapter, gives us many reasons why this is so. First, verbally asking students for an 
answer and/or explanation might be informative, but ultimately incomplete.42 Second, 
and more importantly, teachers encounter what is referred to as the “demand structure” 
problem.43 Norman explain the problem thusly,  
If you ask people why or how they have done something, they are apt to feel 
compelled to give a reason, even if they did not have one prior to your question. 
They are apt to tell you what they believe you want to hear…Having generated a 
reason for you, they may then believe it themselves, even though it was generated 
on the spot to answer your question.44  
 
Imagine the following scenario. A teacher asks a student how she thinks an 
electron behaves. In her mind, she begins running a mental simulation of an electron 
traveling around the nucleus like a planet, but then she remembers that her teacher told 
her that the solar system model was an outdated model. She quickly remembers that her 
teacher said something about a cloud. She herself does not know what this means, she 
just knows that it is the correct answer. Consequently, she tells her teacher that the 
electron behaves like a cloud and her teacher congratulates her for her keen intellect. 
Even though the student in question got the correct answer and has established a verbal 
connection between the words “electron” and “cloud,” she has absolutely no conception 
of what it means for an electron to behave as a cloud. In her mind, she is still attached to 
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the solar system model because that is the model she is able to mentally run and make the 
most sense of, even though she recognizes that come test day, it is technically the inferior 
model.  
The “demand structure” problem highlights the importance of differentiation, 
especially when it comes to student created artifacts; the implication being that teachers 
need to give their students access to as many different forms of media as possible to 
demonstrate their knowledge. What might be difficult for a student to express verbally 
might be easier for her to express physically, using either a visual 2D model or a 
mechanical 3D model. This does not mean that students will not still try to give their 
teachers the desired answer, but it certainly creates multiple opportunities for teachers to 
get a glimpse of what their students genuinely think. Only after a teacher has a clear idea 
of the kinds of mental models her students possess, can she judge these models according 
to their: accuracy with observed phenomenon, explanatory power, coherence, 
evidential/data support, and predictive power. Just because a teacher encourages students 
to produce several different models of the same phenomenon, it does not follow that all 
of the models created are of equal value.      
 
7.7 Concluding Remarks: Models in the STS and NOS Curriculum  
 
In choosing pedagogical models, teachers must consider choosing the ones with 
the most explanatory power. Unfortunately, in many science classrooms, issues regarding 
the explanatory power of models are viewed as beyond the purview of traditional 
scientific content and as a result are not adequately considered. This is not only a shame, 
but completely and utterly disagreeable. If scientific literacy genuinely refers to a 
student’s understanding of the “concepts, principles, theories, and processes of science, 
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and one’s awareness of the complex relationship between science, technology, and 
society,”45 then STS (Science and Technology Studies) and NOS (Nature of Science) 
issues should not be perceived as just “additional didactic strateg[ies]”46 that compliment 
STEM education; they ought to thought of as endemic to it. Science teachers and students 
should familiarize themselves with the differences between science by inquiry and 
science as inquiry,47 the two sides of the scientific literacy coin. Teachers and students 
alike need to realize that knowledge of one does not imply knowledge of the other, yet 
both are requisite for genuine scientific literacy.    
Part of the reason why STS and NOS issues have not been adequately addressed 
in primary and secondary classrooms has to do with mandatory statewide assessments. 
My quarrel is not so much that students are required to take such assessments (that is a 
different issue altogether); rather, I object to their content. As long as these assessments 
focus strictly on traditional scientific content knowledge and not STS or NOS issues, 
teachers and administrators have a convenient excuse to disregard the latter, even if it 
flies in the face of the most up to date AAAS (American Association for the 
Advancement of Science) and NRC (National Research Council) recommendations.  
For decades now, modeling has been a hot topic in science education. What the field 
needs now are more and more researchers and practitioners working together to design 
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innovative, teacher-friendly, and student-friendly STS and NOS curriculums that 
emphasize the central role that models play in the scientific process.  
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